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
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BEING STAGED: UNCONCEALMENT THROUGH READING AND PERFORMANCE IN MARLOWE'S *DOCTOR FAUSTUS* AND BHARATA'S *NĀTYAŚĀSTRA*



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Christopher Marlowe's *Doctor Faustus*, like Goethe's *Faust*, begins in Faustus' study. Faustus, renowned for his learning, is reading, going through the entire range of medieval disciplines—Aristotelian logic, Galenic medicine, Justinian law, Jerome's Vulgate. His rapid deductions, after quoting to himself snatches from the concerned texts, read like a pastiche of the vanity of all human knowledge one encounters in *De vanitate scientiarum* (1526) by Cornelius Agrippa (1486–1535), a rumored alchemist and master of the occult.¹ Faustus rejects logic as sterile, and medicine and law as “mercenary,” unfit for the gentleman-scholar, who, according to the contemporary code,² did not study or work for gain—these are “Too servile and illiberal” for him, (1.1.34).³ He dismisses theology as self-contradictory, sinfulness being intrinsic to the human condition and yet punished by death. He settles finally for necromancy. Medicine and the rest leave Faustus “still . . . a man,” while the magus may breach human limits: “A sound magician is a demigod” (1.1.21, 61).

The scene stages a moment of decision after a dispute in the mind, a convention in the early modern theater studied by Joel Altman.⁴ Medieval and Renaissance rhetoricians would have termed the process *addubitation*, a verbal chain that involves doubt, including self-doubt, and its resolution. “Addubitation or doubting is a kinde of deliberation with our selues,” wrote Abraham Fraunce in his 1588 manual on rhetoric.⁵ However, the Chorus has already alerted the audience that Faustus had had his mind made up:

And glutted now with learning's golden gifts,
He surfeits upon cursèd necromancy;
Nothing so sweet as magic is to him,
Which he prefers before his chiefest bliss.

(Prologue, 23–26)

Like the commentator outside the frame in a narrative painting, the Chorus points to Faustus, framed by his book-lined study. One might discern in the device a strategy to diminish Faustus' seemingly daring transgression. It brings to the fore—and this is a point I would wish to stress—less the question of spiritual choice than of *performance* and *enactment*.⁶

The enactment in this instance involves pretense. The pretense is that of chancing upon random texts: stray passages from Aristotle, Galen, Justinian, and Saint Jerome's Latin translation of the Bible. Scholars who read the play as an orthodox Christian

text focus on Faustus' deliberate elisions. To take the instances best known, he reads the line from Romans 6:23 in Jerome's Latin: "*Stipendium peccati mors est. . . . Ha! / . . . The reward of sin is death?*" (1.1.37–39). Hard on its heels come two lines from 1 John 1:8 and their English rendering:

*Si pecasse negamus, fallimur
Est nulla in nobis veritas.*

If we say that we have no sin,
We deceive ourselves, and there is no truth in us.
(1.1.40–43)

Faustus glosses the lines as a version of unremitting fatalism. We must necessarily sin, and hence die—and that too an everlasting death: "What doctrine call you this? *Che serà, serà*" (1.1.47). The sentence from Romans 6:23 had in fact ended with the promise of grace, the gift of eternal life in Christ, while the one from 1 John 1:8 is followed by 1:9, which assures humankind that confession of sins will lead to spiritual absolution. Faustus skips the parts that do not suit his intent. Like a skilled forensic orator, he uses the first three parts of Ciceronian rhetoric in their recommended order: he introduces the argument (*inventio*), arranges the texts (*dispositio*), and articulates the argument in a given style of disputation (*elocutio*).⁷ Although the passages seem to be random samples, they are so disposed as to add up to a convenient syllogism.⁸ In the process, he is willing to be less than faithful to the fifth element of rhetoric: memory (*memoria*).

Those who stress Marlowe's daring point out that as reprobate Faustus has no choice, and that the scene, as also the play in general, enables Marlowe to allude to the insoluble contrarities in the Calvinistic doctrine of predestination. Further, debates on the precise moment when Faustus irrevocably damns himself show no symptom of fatigue. Does he damn himself before the play begins? Does this follow the pact with the devil? Or does it issue from the sin of demoniality, that is, after sex with the devil, who appears in the guise of Helen of Troy?⁹ The text itself offers discrepant evidence: Mephistopheles—oddly, a compulsive truth-teller—says one thing, the Good Angel another, and the Old Man still something else.

It seems to me that Faustus is made to *enact* such moments so that we might learn that the denouement is foreclosed. He is the *habitué* whose natural inclination to sin leaves him "free" not to choose good. Does he have the will to choose to repent? Faustus asks himself the question: "Now, Faustus, must thou needs be damned? / Canst thou not be saved?" (2.1.1–2). His wavering mind seems to be caught on the hop in the ambiguity of "needs" and "canst." He admits that when he looks toward the heavens, he finds cause to repent (2.3.1). However, the devil's crew bullies him into despair, although the compulsion accords with his deepest design: "My heart is hardened; I cannot repent" (2.3.18). Faustus turns obdurate, and "cannot" hardens to "shall not" a few lines down the text so that he may misrepresent his abandoned predicament as "freedom," as a choice between an impossible option and a perverse one: "I am resolved, Faustus shall not repent" (2.3.30).

Faustus, one may argue, anticipates the problem much discussed in recent moral psychology. One may claim that one was free to act otherwise than the way one did, although that is not to say that the performed action had no *cause*. Cause, as has often been pointed out, could be distinguished from choice, and need not rule out the freedom of the will.¹⁰ But if, like Faustus, one insisted that one had the freedom to choose only one option and might not have been able to choose any other, the distinction would hardly lead to a difference or tilt the argument in favor of free will. Commentators have at times considered Faustus' predicament in this flawed bargain of the tainted human will as a close reflection of the anxiety caused by the Calvinistic doctrine of predestination and election.¹¹

There were precedents for Faustus' predicament on the early modern stage: in Nathaniel Woodes' *The Conflict of Conscience* (1581) Philologus is persuaded by Sensual Suggestion that he is a reprobate, that Christ had suffered not for him but only for the elect.¹² Does his tortured awareness of Christ's sacrifice and divine grace imply that he is yet redeemable? Similar questions have been raised about Faustus. William Empson went to the extent of suggesting that the insertions in the B text (a longer version derived from an independent authority) were demanded by the censor to bring a disruptive play in line with Protestant orthodoxy.¹³

These debates often miss the element of purposive *performance* in the enactment. The surest indication of the performative dimension is to be found in Faustus' imitation of Saint Augustine chancing upon a passage in Romans 13:13–14. The crucial act of reading a chance-blown passage is described in *Confessions* 8.12 (ca. 398).¹⁴ On hearing a child's voice, Augustine picks up a copy of the Bible and reads the passage that first hits his eye. The passage leads to a conversion as dramatic as that of its author, Paul. It shakes Augustine out of his life of profligacy, and he feels the pall of doubt lift and the light of certitude shine on him. The motif reappears in Petrarca's *The Ascent of Mont Ventoux* (ca. 1350), where the text the author runs into is, appropriately, the tenth chapter of Augustine's *Confessions*, which reminds Petrarca, who had gone on a trip to Mount Ventoux, that men travel to admire high mountains, vast seas, huge rivers, and revolving stars, but abandon themselves.¹⁵

In both cases, the texts are religious. One finds a modern Indian parallel in the fifth chapter of the Bengali autobiography *Ātmajībanī* (1898) of Debendranath Tagore, father of the poet Rabindranath. Here again the text is religious, or at least a philosophical meditation on divine presence. A despondent Debendranath Tagore chances upon a verse from the *Īśa Upaniṣad* inscribed on a wind-blown leaf. He seeks out a Sanskrit scholar who explains to him the import of the passage. The text is the first two lines of the *Īśa Upaniṣad*: *Īśā vāsyamidam sarvaṃ yatkiṃca jagatyāṇ jagat / tena tyaktena bhuñjīta mā grdhaḥ kasyasvid dhanam*.¹⁶ Loosely translated, the verses mean that whatsoever moves on earth should be covered by the Lord. Therefore, enjoy through detachment. Do not covet, for to whom does wealth belong?¹⁷ Debendranath Tagore's story, too, is one of radical conversion. Son of Dwarkanath Tagore, a wealthy and ostentatious colonial entrepreneur, Debendranath gave up a life of ease and indulgence to head the Brahmo Samaj, an austere sect that professed a monotheistic version of Vedic Hinduism. He also founded the Tattvabodhini Sabha,

a society of spiritual seekers, and edited its important journal. Debendranath Tagore devoted much of his life to travel: not to the courts and castles of Europe that his father visited, but to quiet places in the Himalayas for contemplation, and to the rural retreat in Bengal he named Santiniketan, where his more gifted son Rabindranath would later found a university.

In Faustus' case, the verses are certainly from religious sources—Romans 6:23 and 1 John 1:8. How “free” is he to choose the texts to stage the play of *addubitation*? The question is made complicated by Mephistopheles' later claim that he had betrayed the learned Faustus in deepest consequence by turning the leaves and guiding his eye when he was reading (5.2.100–104)—a detail tellingly missing from Marlowe's sources.¹⁸ Calvin had spoken of salvation as a *decision*—but one that is solely God's. It is a “free” gift of God, the efficient cause being the love of God the Father, the material cause the obedience of the Son, and the instrumental cause the illumination of the Spirit.¹⁹ Faustus seems to have been enacting a blasphemous moment of solitary decision-making, although Mephistopheles' disclosure would undermine his performative autonomy.

There are elements of blasphemic correspondences in the staging of other momentous events: the pact with the devil parallels the Covenant with God (2.1); Christ's blood streams in the firmament (A Text 5.2.78), recalling Faustus' sealing of the diabolical bond with his blood, which congeals at the moment of consummation (2.1.62); Faustus' joyrides with Mephistopheles through time and space borrow from the thrill and dread in the contemporary literature on travel, especially to places inaccessible to English Protestants such as the Papal court (3.1–2);²⁰ the parade of the Seven Deadly Sins (2.3) and of Helen (the latter invoking the most arrestingly lyrical passage in the play, at 5.1.94–113) are symptoms of desire and beauty; and there is the narrowing down of time from twenty-four years to stage-time, as the clock strikes the dreaded midnight hour when Faustus is to be carried off to an eternity of death (5.2.138–191)—a paradox that is set across the mystery of time's intersection with the timeless embodied in the Incarnation. Such analogies between the divine and the devilish enabled Jerzy Grotowski to reverse the routine codes in his 1963 Theatre Laboratory production of the play in Opole, Poland. It represented Faustus as a martyr who dares the divine, rather than the diabolical, trap to betray humans in spiritual consequence.²¹

At Cambridge, Marlowe had studied ethics and political philosophy. As a graduate student, he went on to read natural philosophy, metaphysics, astronomy, mathematics, and Greek. The curriculum, together with lessons in rhetoric, a keen interest in dramatic performances, and long exposure to the heated theological debates at Cambridge on such matters as predestination and free will must have induced Marlowe to look closely at orthodox beliefs. Presumably, the training also made Marlowe aware of the relationship of ethical questions to self-articulation through language and performance.²² It is no surprise that *Doctor Faustus* should have struck Alan Sinfield as a play that unsettled any comfortable version of orthodox theology by its very nature as *dramatic performance*.²³ Sinfield's comment recalls Stephen Greenblatt's influential essay on Marlowe, which discussed the self-invention of Marlovian

heroes. In Faustus' case, the hero's self-invention involves performance as a perverse figuration of Christ as god and martyr.²⁴ My stress is not on the ambivalence of signification typical of theatrical representation on the early modern stage, which fascinated Sinfield and Greenblatt. This essay is concerned with the performative dimension and its implication for what may be termed the *ethical* in *Doctor Faustus*. There is no ethical silence "which passeth show": *the ethical is manifest only in show*, in verbal and gestural articulation. That seems to me one of the crucial lessons of the early modern English theater. Simultaneously, this essay will try to mine an ancient Sanskrit manual on drama, Bharata's *Nāṭyaśāstra*, to pick up a few leads toward that end.

Events in the Old Testament are deemed to have foreshadowed those in the New. Abraham's sacrifice of Isaac could be read as a figural anticipation of the *agnus dei* theme in Christ's crucifixion. The theme involves sacrifice, obedience, and faith.²⁵ Faustus' compact with the devil, on the other hand, is a contrapuntal variation that centers on self-love, transgression, and doubt. The Old Testament episode is crucial to Søren Kierkegaard's discussion of the ethical in *Fear and Trembling* (1843). Kierkegaard maintains that the ethical is universal, self-immanent, and autotelic. The ethical as universal, however, needs to be *manifest*. The individual as immediate, as physical and psychical being, is not manifest. The individual's ethical task is "to develop out of this concealment and reveal himself in the universal." Faith, such as Abraham's, "is not the first immediacy, but a subsequent immediacy." The first immediacy is aesthetic. On broaching the aesthetic question, Kierkegaard introduces the problem of tragedy. Ethics requires revelation; aesthetics, as in Sophocles' *Oedipus Rex*, needs concealment. Kierkegaard's discussion of tragedy glances back at Hegel's distinction between the ethical-universal in objective tragedy and the aesthetic-individual in the subjective,²⁶ and, somewhat remotely, forward to the distinction drawn by Sartre between "being-in-itself" (*être-en-soi*) and "being-for-itself" (*être-pour-soi*) in *Being and Nothingness*.²⁷ In tragedy, says Kierkegaard, even aesthetics requires revelation in the interest of the ethical issue at stake. This is the case, for instance, when the hero "by his action intervenes disturbingly in another man's life." Thereafter the tragic hero, like Agamemnon declaring to Iphigenia her fate in Euripides' *Iphigenia in Aulis*, dares ethics at the risk of endangering aesthetics since, as we have learned already, "ethics requires revelation."²⁸

Although not conceived in Hegel's or Kierkegaard's terms, such a trespass onto the ethical turf had impelled Plato to deplore *mimesis*, understood as dramatic representation, as more of a civic menace than *diegesis*, that is, simple storytelling or third-person narrative. The ontological reasoning behind Plato's objection to all mimetic arts is in a sense less urgent and more general than his civic and ethical arguments against dramatic imitation. Dramatic imitation, argued Plato, degraded divine figures by showing them to be mutable. Moreover, dramatic mimesis exaggerated the representation of affect, which, in its turn, paralyzed reason, while poetic mimesis as a whole compromised the truth claims of philosophy.²⁹ The latter may not be the right sequence for stating the case. It is more accurate to say that the truth

claims of philosophy had to be established by Plato by striking at the roots of the oracular mystique of expressive utterance. Alain Badiou described this Platonic view against poetry as a form of expression that offered “seduction without concept, legitimation without idea.”³⁰

Aristotle was following the mimetic-diegetic division when he distinguished tragedy from epic by pointing out that tragedy was mimetic, that is, “in the form of action, not of narrative,” implying “personal agents,” while epic mixed the mimetic with the diegetic. Yet Aristotle insisted that action, rather than agents, was the primary means of achieving the ethical aim of tragedy.³¹ He may have been responding to Plato’s dislike of making gods behave like mortals, not to speak of the exaggerated emotions of tragic personae. For Aristotle, tragedy served an important ethical and civic function by cleansing viewers of an excess of fear and pity, by inducing a balanced reflection on the philosophical import of the mythos enacted. Plato dealt the initial blow on behalf of philosophy against the shamanic bewitchment of poetic language that seemed to allow its captivated consumers a privileged access to truth. But more important, his mistrust of drama was rooted in its power of affective representation, which was at the same time an ethical *unconcealment*, and as such a threat to the state’s prescription in matters relating to moral conduct. It is hence no paradox that Aristotle’s argument on behalf of the philosophical claims of tragedy should also center on such *unconcealment* through *recognition* or *anagnorisis* at the level of the plot.

In referring to Sartre earlier, I was recalling his notion of the chasm of nothingness separating thinker and the object of thought. Performance and articulation of choice confer on the subject the semblance of a social being, if not an ethical one. The difference between choice and responsibility, or even the admissibility of Sartre’s ideas, is of minor consequence for my purpose. What is important is his stress on the performative in fashioning identity, as when he describes the socially encoded behavior of a waiter in a café, conferring on him the normative identity of a waiter irrespective of whatever else he may do in the course of a day. He can acquire the being of a waiter only in the mode of “being-what-I-am-not.”³² Identity from the standpoint of moral psychology is a function of the forceful use of language (including body language) and emotive performance. Moral quietude is the consequence of what Sartre would have termed bad faith, *mauvaise foi*³³—an ability to tell ourselves, like Faustus in his study, that we have “freely” considered the matter, and later claim that we never had “choice.”

One could add to this the consideration of the emotive force of poetic language and its resemblance to ethical statements. Poetic language and dramatic performance are best designed to arouse feelings, as Plato had insisted. On the other hand, ethical statements, as A. J. Ayer and the emotivists insisted, are not assertoric, neither verifiable nor falsifiable: they are simply statements of feeling.³⁴ A theory of meaning, as Michael Dummett observed in a different context, is to be considered in association with a theory of *force*.³⁵ Ethical articulation would lose *meaning* without a consideration of a theory of force. Such force, one would imagine, would be mere dissimulation to a listener harboring a Platonic prejudice against actors and plays.

The actor's lines carried force—more so to the viewers in the early modern playhouse in England where the best poets of the time found a lucrative career in the repertory companies and custom-built commercial theaters. The dissimulation was an act of forcing the soul to the conceit, not of the dissimulation of the hypocrite, which, incidentally, signified an actor in Greek.³⁶ Hamlet rues his inability to suit language and action to his ethical responsibility after listening to an actor describe the slaying of Priam. He calls himself a “rogue and peasant slave” (2.2.552)³⁷ because he has the “motive and the cue for passion” yet cannot act, whereas the actor can weep at the plight of characters from the Trojan fiction:

Is it not monstrous that this player here,
But in a fiction, in a dream of passion,
Could *force* his soul so to his whole conceit
That from her working all his visage waned,
Tears in his eyes, distraction in's aspect,
A broken voice, and his whole function suiting
With forms to his conceit?

(2.2.553–559; italics added)

There are two species of dissimulation, then—one in which “one may smile and smile and be a villain” (1.109), and the theatrical “hypocrite” or actor that Hamlet turns to, and turns himself into, so that his inchoate ethical self may break through the silence of concealment and find firm articulation. The contrast is made plain when Hamlet asks his mother to examine closely two portraits or miniatures in the so-called closet scene, that of his father and that of Claudius: “The counterfeit presentment of two brothers” (3.4.53; Hamlet uses the word “hypocrite” in line 41: “Calls virtue hypocrite”). In *An Apologie for Actors* (1612), the playwright Thomas Heywood observed that stage performance could bewitch the viewer

as if the Personator were the man Personated, so bewitching a thing is lively and well spirited action, that it hath power to new-mold the harts of the spectators, and fashion them to the shape of any noble and notable attempt.³⁸

Hamlet's words seem to bear out theater's power to melt the identities of the impersonator and the one impersonated, and the bewitchment it produces in the viewer.

The actor, in Sartre's terms, exists in the mode of “being-what-he-is-not.” One might contend that the question of *mauvaise foi* is irrelevant in the actor's case since actors do not script their parts and, as a consequence, genuinely lack choice. But the actor's lack is not simply a matter of Stoic *apatheia*: the actor's performance combines representation on stage with the effects of utterance and performance. It stages the act of unconcealment and places the ethical issue at stake in a clearing that Heidegger would call *lichtung*, “the Open.”³⁹ Consider the following instance, again from *Hamlet*. Hamlet believes that his inky cloak of mourning does not reveal the force of feeling within: “Seems, Madam? Nay, it *is*. I know not ‘seems’” (1.2.76). The “customary suits of solemn black” do “indeed ‘seem’” (78, 83):

For they are actions that a man might play;
But I have that within which passeth show—
These but the trappings and the suits of woe.
(1.2.84–86)

“Seems,” “action,” “play,” and “show” are terms that link the major referents to playhouse practice. These suggest that Hamlet, who had started losing faith in the self-evidence of truth ever since he attempted to ascertain the “honesty” of his father’s ghost, still hopes for an implacable ethical core beyond the contingent variants of “show.” That was in the first act. As Hamlet progresses through the subsequent scenes, playing “actor” with the players in 2.2, and commissioning the staging of *The Mousetrap* in 3.2, he graduates to the roles of actor, director, patron, and viewer, plotting to “catch the conscience” (2.2.607) of fellow-viewer Claudius and also impel himself to action. Hamlet, who had earlier claimed that he had that within “which passeth show,” can now reject the easy notion of “show” as an uncomplicated sign that had hardly anything more than an indexical function. After the climactic “dumb show” that represents the murder of Gonzago in an inset pantomime, Ophelia remarks: “Belike this show imports the argument of the play” (3.2.133). But drama for Hamlet has now a more fundamental hermeneutic task: the actor’s job is to articulate the responsibility of the ethical agent, to unconceal the ethical. Hence, his flippant reply to Ophelia’s legitimate remark disregards the innocent assumption of how a “dumb show” on stage is supposed to work, and his sexual distemper is evident as he plays on the lewd connotation of the word “show”:

OPHELIA: Will he tell us what this show meant?

HAMLET: Ay, or any show that you’ll show him. Be you not ashamed to show, he’ll not shame to tell you what it means.

(3.2.136–139)⁴⁰

Faustus and Hamlet both cast themselves as actors, both read on stage, and both use performance to articulate their ethical beings. One can fault Faustus for bad faith since he stages an apparently argumentative route to arrive at a decision when his mind was already made up, pretending to be a free agent but “free” only not to choose good. Hamlet learns only through shock and pain to rely on dramatic utterance and emotive performance of the actor as the shaping force behind ethical identity of the portrayed agent, and as a hermeneutic task for the viewer. Hamlet’s infamous inertia is not simply the result of doubt or vacillation, but a slow battle to accept that ethical identity is not defined by the noble “mind” that suffers. To *be* moral is to *act*, to perform like a player against the immediacy and random externalities of fortune (see 3.1.58–62). However, for both Faustus and Hamlet, there is nothing beyond the dramatic text, nothing within “which passeth *show*.”

In the English theater of Marlowe’s time, there was a strong sense that repeated dramatic mimesis demanded that the community of viewers be a sort of moral witness. Tragedy, for instance, was defended as a genre that “maketh Kinges feare to be Tyrants, and Tyrants to manifest their tyrannicall humours.”⁴¹ Albertino Mussato’s

Latin play *Ecerinis* (1315), the first secular tragedy in Renaissance Italy, which tells the story of the tyrant Ezzelino III (1194–1259) of Verona and Padua, was expected to perform such a civic function. Enactment vivified, if not constituted, the ethical being of agents portrayed, even if the play were to be on historical or fictional events of far-off times and places. The seemingly anachronistic self-consciousness of Casca after the stabbing of Caesar in Shakespeare's *Julius Caesar*, a tragedy staged in London in 1599 in a language unknown to ancient Rome, is hardly surprising:

How many ages hence
Shall this our lofty scene be acted over,
In states unborn and accents yet unknown!
(3.1.112–114)

Casca is expecting the scene to serve a republican function for the community, not unlike that expected of Mussato's pseudo-Senecan play.

Kierkegaard's comments on tragedy, particularly Greek tragedy, may seem similarly anachronistic: the book in question carried more than a grain of the autobiographical. Hermann Fränkel speaks of the absence of the distinction between self and not-self in Homer as a result of which we miss an "inner life" in Greek epic heroes, and, one may add, Greek tragic heroes on stage. We may set this remark, as Bernard Williams does, alongside Jean-Pierre Vernant's comment on the moment of tragedy. Vernant maintains that tragedy marks a moment in the evolution of the introspective subject: "the tragic sense of responsibility arises when human action becomes the subject of a reflection, a debate, but has not yet acquired a status autonomous enough to be self-sufficient."⁴² The tragic protagonist on the early modern English stage is glimpsed at the cusp when the autonomy of human action appears at odds with a sense of the self encountering a not-self.⁴³ As far as *Doctor Faustus* is concerned, the encounter is especially acute for the hero and the audience. Faustus is not a distant "outsider" such as Tamburlaine and the Jew of Malta, the protagonists of Marlowe's other major tragedies. In him the viewers of the time could examine, at a remove, the precarious situation of their own souls that the doctrine of election forced them to confront.⁴⁴

Faustus may be seen, as those who sympathize with his heterodoxy see him, as seeking autonomy of human action on the edge of despair, without recourse to a sense of secular agency. He knowingly theatricalizes, to borrow a phrase from Jonathan Dollimore, the "impasse of despair."⁴⁵ He is hence constrained to stage *addubitation* in the absence of genuine choice, if we are regarding his transgression in a sympathetic light. Even if we are not, there is no denying that the enactment of the transgression does not ensure that experience is "a guarantor of certainty":

In the theatre we hear the magnificent poetry and witness the scenic illusion, but are afforded no normative fixed point in the play's staging by which to resolve skeptical questioning.⁴⁶

The fashioning of ethical volition, one might say, has to be achieved through the enactment of this impasse. The terminal difficulty of Faustus' situation is represented not simply by his complex fictional character, but, for instance, by the use of such cardboard supernatural figures as the Good and Bad Angels, who enact a spiritual battle with a foretold outcome. Faustus' willful misreading and the shows that he manages on stage are "determinants" or "excitants" (proposed renderings of the Sanskrit word *vibhāva* in Bharata⁴⁷) that the actor uses—and Faustus is here an "actor"—devices through which the hidden is uncovered. It is a revelation of the terrible price of human responsibility in the face of the absent assurance of mastery of truth. It is both a bold and perverse version of ethical unconcealment, and an abandonment of the subsequent immediacy of faith.⁴⁸

The staging of choice in *Doctor Faustus* takes place in order to unconceal the ethical predicament of the fictional dramatic character. Faustus, or rather the actor playing Faustus, commences the process by reading "found" texts, by playing the actor who strikes us as having scripted his own play. However, a distinction needs to be made. The performance is for shaping the character's ethical identity, or, in Faustus' case, for articulating an identity presumably in the making when the action begins. But it is obviously not for his *benefit*. Nor is it for the actor. The question of benefit, the *utile* of poetry, brings in the viewers. Even if we maintain the primacy of the aesthetic and its alleged disinterest in universally applicable rules of practical action, the unconcealment requires viewers as witness to the event. When Mussato's anti-tyrant play *Ecerinis* was performed, for instance, the community was expected to play witness and serve as "moral anchor."⁴⁹ Dramatic performance needs a witness to the event that for Heidegger was the symptom of all significant art, a "happening of truth."⁵⁰

It is at this point that I wish to refer to the Sanskrit manual on theater and drama-turgy, the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, attributed to Bharata (ca. eighth century), for the text extant, although the composition may have started a few centuries back and the surviving text bears marks of plural authorship.⁵¹ The relevant passages involve the distinctness and fusion of performer, character, and viewer in shaping ethical identity, and to the concept of *loka pramāṇa* as a source of legitimacy for drama. The remarks that follow do not stem from a study in literary "influence" or cultural comparison. Rather, these are reflections on the converging lines of response to the ethical implications of theatrical representation that we find in two periods and two cultures separated by a sizable distance.

The *Nāṭyaśāstra* lists three sources of knowledge or evidence (*pramāṇa*) that confer epistemological legitimacy on dramatic performance: *loka*, *veda*, and *adhyātma* (26.119). It is the first that especially pertains to viewers. The spectators belong to the human communities whose actions in different circumstances are portrayed on stage for the performance to qualify as *nāṭya*, that is, drama. At the same time, the theater audience's approval and *recognition* of such representation through performance, words, music, and dance justifies drama as epistemic evidence.⁵²

Such an apology obviously bears upon the ethical status of stage representation for both performer and viewer, as much as Aristotle's comments do on the arousal of pity and fear in the spectators. Nevertheless, Bharata's justification seems to be more relevant to the viewer than the performer or the character portrayed. The ethical import for the spectator more than for the character and the actor is signaled in the important statement in chapter 25 of the *Nāṭyaśāstra*. It states that rulebooks and instruction manuals do not exhaust the range of the world's ideas and human activities (*na ca śakyam hi lokasya sthāvarasya carasya ca / śāstreṇa nirṇayaṃ kartuṃ bhāva-ceṣṭāvidhiṃ prati* [25.122]). That is to say, the heuristic function of manuals on ethics, among other things, may be served by drama, music, and dance. Besides, people vary in their natures (*svabhāva*). Drama rests on the portrayal of different kinds of people. Such portrayals constitute *loka pramāna*. The range of *svabhāva* is the source of dramatic ideas, the latter signified also by the word *bhāva* or mental state (*nānāśīlāḥ prakṛtayaḥ śīle nāṭyaṃ pratiṣṭhitam / tasmā llokapramāṇaṃ hi kartavyaṃ nāṭyayok-trbhīh* [25.123]).

Read together, the statements seem to be attempting to associate the self-image of spectators with their response to dramatic representation. The *svabhāva* (nature, also a compound of *sva* = own + *bhāva* = nature, conduct, idea) of people—and they include the gods and demons (*trilokasyāśya sarvasya nāṭyaṃ bhāvānukīrtanam* [1.106])—is the source of dramatic idea or *bhāva*. In the lines quoted above from chapter 25 (122–123), Bharata noted that the *svabhāva* represented in drama, dance, and music could be constant or changing: *na ca śakyam hi lokasya sthāvarasya carasya ca* (25.122). At any rate, it is through the recognition of such features by the culturally competent (*adhikārin*)⁵³ that drama is able to serve its ethical purpose—reforming the wicked, restraining the concupiscent, humbling the immodest, instilling courage in the timid, encouraging the brave and the noble, instructing the ignorant (1.108–109). Hamlet may well have used this section of the manual in instructing the troupe of players who traveled to Elsinore.

Is there more than a claim for the ethical impact of drama in all this? Is there a simultaneous bid for *the performative as constituting ethical identity*? If so, whose identity are we talking of—the portrayed character's, the performer's, or the viewer's? Such are the questions that link this section of my discussion with that of Marlowe and Shakespeare.

Although not posed in this manner, not dissimilar questions are raised in discussions of the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, especially by Abhinavagupta (ca. tenth to eleventh centuries C.E.),⁵⁴ arguably the most profound of the later commentators. Abhinavagupta, in his commentary on Ānandavardhana's *Dhvanyālokaḥ* (ca. ninth century C.E.), had defined the word *sahṛdaya* as the reader or listener of poetry who feels one with the subject matter (or, if the poet is the subject, with the poet). The sensitive listeners achieve this sense of identity by clearing the speculum of the mind through a disciplined study of the way poetry works (*yeṣāṃ kāvyānuśīlanābhyāsa-vaśād viśa-dībhute mano mukure varṇanīya tanmayibhavana-yogyatā te hṛdaya-saṃvādabhāḥ sahrdayāḥ*).⁵⁵

Abhinavagupta also composed a great commentary on the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, and it is not impossible to adapt his remark in the commentary on *Dhvanyāloka* to the experience of the theater audience. The *saḥṛdayas* or competent readers must acquaint themselves with poetic resources and the hermeneutic process that is employed. Although there is no thought in Bharata of the shifting expectations of viewers over time, one may justifiably recall Hans-Georg Gadamer's adage on the message of any text—that what the text says must be what it says *to us*: re-cognition of a text is necessarily self-cognition.⁵⁶ Similarly, what the play says must also be what it says through certain structured means. These take the form of *vibhāva* (the stimulus, determinant, and device that produce affect or *bhāva* in the human mind), *anubhāva* (facial and bodily expressions that express *bhāva* so engendered), and *vyabhicāri bhāva* (the minor, passing, and mixed *bhāvas* produced by the major or *sthāyi* ones).⁵⁷

At a more immediate level, we are reminded of the remarks on the recognition by early modern viewers of their own spiritual anxiety in Faustus' staging of choice and its consequence—the orchestrated representation of what Jonathan Dollimore had termed the “*impasse* of despair.” I believe this is achieved, as in *Hamlet*, through the metatheatrical devices that Faustus employs that facilitate the recognition of the theatrical *vibhāvas*. The viewer is caught in the midst of an unfolding truth event, as if the “personator” were the one “personated,” and the viewer perilously close to the predicament of the latter, and yet distanced from both by the recognition of theatrical devices as Faustus stage-manages his ethical evolution like a deft producer-actor and a skilled reader and interpreter of texts. Whatever one might say about the difference between the staged and the written (or printed) dramatic script as objects of art, the actor-producer, too, is necessarily a reader and interpreter of the text.⁵⁸

Bharata outlined the upshot of drama and its performance in the famous formula in chapter 6 of the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, as *rasa* created through the employment (or a mix) of *vibhāva*, *anubhāva*, and *vyabhicāri bhāva*: *tatra vibhāvānubhāvavyabhicāriṣaṃ yogād rasaniṣpattih* (6.31). Subsequent commentators gloss the verse in the *Nāṭyaśāstra* in a variety of ways. But the one that comes closest to what has been said above regarding dramatic performance is to be found in the commentary of Abhinavagupta, who maintains that knowledge needs a medium. If the medium is beyond cognition, the epistemic process cannot reach fruition. In such cases, dramatic representation does not inspire identification with events and agents, and the mind of the viewer is unable to focus on a recognizable object of reflection. Hence, the events need a credible, and not an idiosyncratic, representation, even if one is dealing with miraculous and supernatural narratives (*saṃvedyam asambhāvayamānaḥ samvedye samvidam viniveśayitum eva na śaknoti . . . tadāpasārene hṛdayasaṃvādo lokasāmānyavastuviśayaḥ*, etc.).⁵⁹ In representing extraordinary events, the dramatist has to induce trust (*pratya*) by bringing on stage familiar characters (such as Rāma) and events. Abhinavagupta leads the exponents of the *dhvani* school, who interpret Bharata to mean that *rasa* is *suggested*, that it is the obliqueness that is more potent in generating signification “through the relation of the suggested (*vyaṅgya*) and the suggestor (*vyañjaka*); the *niṣpatti* of Bharata . . . should mean *abhivyakti*.”⁶⁰

But what has the text of Bharata to say about the shaping function of theatrical performance as far as the *ethical* identity of character, actor, and viewer is concerned? Here again one finds Abhinavagupta's commentary useful in making sense of the metatheatrical devices used in the early modern theater in England, especially in *Doctor Faustus*. Abhinavagupta joins issue with a number of commentators, particularly Śaṅkuka, in arguing that the actor does not lose identity in the character or imitate a permanent mental state (*sthāyibhāva*), for one cannot imitate what one does not know: one may simply employ recognizable determinants to suggest mental states. At the same time, spectators do not mistake the actor for the character portrayed. The spectator or reader would miss the *rasa* if their own personal desires or interests impede enjoyment. The following translated passage is typical of Abhinavagupta's line of reasoning in his refutation of earlier commentators:

One of the principal obstacles regularly occurs when the spectator is at the mercy of the tasting of pleasures, pains, etc., inhering in his own person. This obstacle consists in the appearance of other forms of consciousness, due variously to the fear of being abandoned by these sensations of pleasure, etc., to concern for their preservation, to a desire to procure other similar sensations, to the desire to get rid of them, give them open expression, hide them, etc. Even when someone perceives pleasures, pains, etc., as inhering exclusively in other persons, other forms of consciousness inevitably arise in him (pleasures, pains, mental stupor, indifference . . . etc.) which naturally constitute an obstacle. The means of eliminating this obstacle are the actor's changing of dress [,] . . . which hide[s] his true identity. . . . For the presence of all these elements eliminates the perception: this particular individual, in this particular place, at this particular moment, feels pain, pleasure, etc. This elimination takes place in so far as the theatrical spectacle implies the negation both of the real being of the actor and of the real being of the character he is playing. Indeed, on one side there is the negation of the real being of the actor, and, on the other, the spectator's consciousness does not rest entirely on the being represented . . . who[se representation] therefore does not succeed in hiding completely the real being of the actor.⁶¹

Abhinavagupta, exponent of the Śaiva notion of *pratyabhijñā*, which seeks to identify the individual self-consciousness with a universal self, would be inclined to interpret Bharata in its light. He seems to be arguing that the dramatic experience liberates the spectator from personal interest, although such disinterestedness is different from religious ecstasy.⁶² Theater is not materially unmoored, although it is unconcerned with the narrowly particular. When Kālidāsa describes fear, it is not the poet's or the deer's, but an abstract *bhāva* arrived at through the appropriate devices, verbal or otherwise. Hence, the cultured viewer or *sahṛdaya* arrives at a state of mind that recognizes anxiety yet enjoys it as dissimulation, an attitude that S. C. Sen Gupta described as a "combination of absorption and aloofness."⁶³ Drama, therefore, creates identity at a distance, at a remove as it were. In this sense, as Sen Gupta points out in connection with the views of Abhinavagupta, *all* art is dramatic and lyrical at the same time. Art is the expression of personal affect; yet it is dramatic, "because it is only by viewing his impressions from a *distance* that the artist can give them universal form."⁶⁴

However, Bharata's aphorism about *rasa* in chapter 6.31 (*tatra vibhāvānu-bhāvavyabhicārisaṃ yogād rasaniṣpattiḥ*) suggested that *rasa* was "born of the union of the play with the performance of actors": "Out of the union of the Determinants (*vibhāva*), the Consequents (*anubhāva*) and the Transitory Mental States (*vyabichārin*) the birth of *Rasa* takes place."⁶⁵ If expressive devices such as *vibhāva* create a *rasa* that overcomes the limits of the particular and allows the viewer's consciousness to expand into the reach of the universal, such universality may be interpreted to be free of the interestedness of the ethical. As such, it would be different from the "interested universality," if the phrase may be permitted, attributed to ethics by Kierkegaard in *Fear and Trembling*.

Abhinavagupta's observations suggest a way out of the apparent contradiction. It is through the theatrical spectacle that the particularities of time and space of actor, character, and viewer are canceled out.⁶⁶ Theatrical spectacle, we recall, "*implies the negation both of the real being of the actor and of the real being of the character he is playing*" (emphasis added). One could state the matter in a different way. It is only through theatrical spectacle and dramatic articulation that the distinctions between the "real beings" of actor and character may be made manifest. "Real being" is an admittedly archaic phrase: we could think of individuals such as fictional characters, actors, and viewers, with personal and partisan interests, as existing in Sartre's inert mode of "being-what-one-is-not." Abhinavagupta's idea of aesthetic contemplation is a stimulus to engaged discrimination that is closer to the idea of ethical unconcealment in Kierkegaard's sense than the Śaiva philosopher's rhetoric would suggest.

Let us return to Faustus in his study in Marlowe's play. As reader, Faustus is dramatic, distanced from the texts he is reading by the role he has pre-scripted for himself. In this, he is as much a player as the actor who would impersonate him. The stray texts are not his personal statements: they are arranged with the deftness of a diabolical pleader. The impressions are not lyrical: these are not intimate effusions. But when the verse indeed turns lyrical, as when Helen passes across the stage, the *dramatic* distance is never compromised. The spectators are aware of the illusion, suspended between "aloofness" and "absorption" in their own anxieties. The character that is Faustus, on the other hand, is willing to risk eternity for the magic of the theatrical spectacle. The "real" being of the actor is never at stake: it would have been too hot for the censors if it were.

Hamlet is the other actor and reader on the early modern English stage who had studied in Wittenberg. He walks in with a book in his hand in 2.2. This is the actor's studied distance mirrored in the portrayed character, for he has decided to put on "an antic disposition" (1.5.173). Like the spectator discussed by Abhinavagupta, he surveys the roles people play in court. The "honest ghost" (1.5.142) has rid his memory of all anterior texts. Hamlet the reader is now simply a staged actor, choosing "being" rather than existing as "being-what-one-is-not." His father's ghost directs him to "remember" (1.5.91), to piece together the *disjecta membra* that would join *inventio*, *dispositio*, and *memoria*. Hamlet's response brings into focus the dramatic distance that the "beings" of character, actor, and viewer have to travel by constructing a new book of memory impelled by the ghost's revelation:

Remember thee!

Yea, from the table of my memory
I'll wipe away all trivial fond records,
All saws of books, all forms, all pressures past,
That youth and observation copied there;
And thy commandment all alone shall live
Within the book and volume of my brain,
Unmixed with baser matter. . . .

(1.5.95–104)

Hamlet the reader is substituting one form of reading matter with another. He is erasing from his memory his tablet ("table") and commonplace book, including "forms" and "pressures" that bring to mind the imposed forms and inked impressions in the Elizabethan printing house,⁶⁷ with an injunction implanted in his memory by the "real" being of the ghost.

In both *Doctor Faustus* and *Hamlet*, the viewers witness the moment of choice staged. In both, the actor playing the fictional character is distanced by foregrounding the *vibhāvas*—theatrical spectacle and its determinants, including inset play and dumb shows. The characters themselves dramatize their choice, so that the theatricalized moment mediates an ethical self that otherwise lies buried in the silence of immediacy. In the case of *Doctor Faustus*, the impasse of moral contrarities posed by questions of human choice and divine predestination—and we are thinking of the performative as a form of articulation of one's moral being and not simply of Calvin's version of predestination—found such material representation on stage. It is in this sense that we might claim that Abhinavagupta's gloss on the passage in Bharata has a bearing on Faustus' conscious staging of a hopeless choice. Perhaps the early modern stage had an intuition that was beyond the range of the discursive apparatus of Bharata or Abhinavagupta. It was the intuition that a performed moment of choice was more than fictive. It was constitutive of the ethical selfhood that accounts for *Doctor Faustus* being still such a disturbing play for viewers.

Notes

- 1 – I discuss the scene and related issues in detail in "Hypocrite Lector: Reading on the Early Modern Stage," in *Renaissance Themes: Essays Presented to Arun Kumar Das Gupta*, ed. Sukanta Chaudhuri (London: Anthem Press, 2009), pp. 33–61; see esp. pp. 41–51.
- 2 – See, for instance, Machiavelli's observation in *Discorsi* that gentlemen do not devote themselves to useful pursuits to gain a living. See Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Prince and Discourses on the First Ten Books of Titus Livius*, trans. Luigi Ricci and Christian Detmold (New York: Modern Library, 1950), p. 255.
- 3 – Unless otherwise indicated, quotations from *Doctor Faustus* are from Christopher Marlowe and his Collaborators and Revisers, *Doctor Faustus: A- and*

B-Texts (1604, 1616), ed. David Bevington and Eric Rasmussen, Revels Plays (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), the B text.

- 4 – Joel Altman, *The Tudor Play of Mind: Rhetorical Inquiry and the Development of Elizabethan Drama* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978).
- 5 – Abraham Fraunce, *The Arcadian Rhetorike: Or the Precepts of Rhetorike Made Plaine* (London, 1588), sig. D7.
- 6 – The relationship between the stage location of the actor and his speech in the early modern English theater is explored by Robert Weimann through the notion of *figurenposition*; see Robert Weimann, *Shakespeare and the Popular Tradition in the Theater: Studies in the Social Dimension of Dramatic Form and Function* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), pp. 230 ff., and John Randall Holmes, “Lay for Pleasure Here a Space’: Figurenposition in Marlovian Dramaturgy” (Ph.D. thesis, University of Colorado at Boulder, 1994), p. 270.
- 7 – See *Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics*, ed. Alex Preminger (1965; enlarged edition, 1974; London: Macmillan, 1975), p. 703.
- 8 – See Martha Tuck Rozett, *The Doctrine of Election and the Emergence of Elizabethan Tragedy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 215–216. On Faustus’ syllogistic juxtaposition of the lines, see Paul H. Kocher, *Christopher Marlowe: A Study of his Thought, Learning and Character* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1946), pp. 106–107.
- 9 – See Bevington and Rasmussen, *Doctor Faustus*, pp. 19–20. Endnotes 82–84 on pp. 84–85 cite influential studies on the subject.
- 10 – See G. E. Moore, *Ethics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1912), pp. 220–222.
- 11 – See Rozett, *Doctrine of Election*, pp. 209–246. See endnotes 57 to 90 in Bevington and Rasmussen, *Doctor Faustus*, pp. 82–85, for earlier studies on the subject. For recent essays, see, e.g., T. McAlindon, “*Doctor Faustus*: The Predestination Theory,” *English Studies* 76, no. 3 (1995): 215–220, and John Ross Macdonald, “Calvinist Theology and ‘Country Divinity’ in Marlowe’s *Doctor Faustus*,” *Studies in Philology* 111, no. 4 (Fall 2014): 821–844. On Calvinism and early modern English literature in general, see John Stachniewski, *The Persecutory Imagination: English Puritanism and the Literature of Religious Despair* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991).
- 12 – Nathaniell Woodes, *The Conflict of Conscience*, ed. John S. Farmer, Tudor Facsimile Texts (1581, 2nd issue; facsimile, London: For Subscribers by T. C. and E. C. Jack, 1911), sig. H3. See Lily B. Campbell, “*Doctor Faustus*—A Case of Conscience,” *Publications of the Modern Language Association of America* (PMLA) 67, no. 2 (1952): 219–239.
- 13 – William Empson, *Faustus and the Censor* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), chap. 6. For an extended discussion of the problem, see Rozett, *Doctrine of Election*,

pp. 209–446. On the reprobate, see St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (New York: Benziger Brothers, 1911; electronic edition, 1997), Part I, Question 23, Articles 3–4, <http://www.egs.edu/library/thomas-aquinas/articles/summa-theologica-part-i-prima-pars-from-the-complete-american-edition/first-part/question-23-of-predestination> (accessed on 30 November 2014). On the debates involving the A (1604) and B (1616) texts of the play and their collaborative authorship, see Bevington and Rasmussen, *Doctor Faustus*, pp. 62–77.

- 14 – St. Augustine, *Confessions*, trans. William Watts [1631], 2 vols., Loeb Classical Library (London: William Heinemann, 1912), vol. 1, pp. 464–465.
- 15 – Francesco Petrarca, *The Ascent of Mont Ventoux*, trans. Hans Nachod, in *The Renaissance Philosophy of Man*, ed. Ernst Cassirer et al. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), p. 44.
- 16 – Debendranath Thakur [Tagore], *Ātmajibani*, ed. Jyotirmay Sen (Kolkata: Al-akananda, 2011), pp. 25–26.
- 17 – See *Eight Upaniṣads, Volume One (Īśa, Kena, Katha, Taittiriya), with the Commentary of Śaṅkarācārya*, trans. Swami Gambhirananda, 2nd ed. (1957; Kolkata: Advaita Ashrama, 1989), p. 4.
- 18 – See Rozett, *Doctrine of Election*, pp. 237–238.
- 19 – John Calvin, *The Institutes of the Christian Religion*, trans. Henry Beveridge, 2 vols. (Edinburgh: Calvin Translation Society, 1846), 3.14.21, vol. 2, p. 85.
- 20 – The A and B texts draw unequally on P. F.’s *The History of the Damnable Life and Deserved Death of Doctor Faustus* (extant edition dated 1592), a free English translation of the German *Faustbuch*. See Bevington and Rasmussen, *Doctor Faustus*, p. 65.
- 21 – See Bevington and Rasmussen, *Doctor Faustus*, p. 55.
- 22 – See Constance Brown Kuriyama, *Christopher Marlowe: A Renaissance Life* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), pp. 53–56.
- 23 – Alan Sinfield, *Faultlines: Cultural Materialism and the Politics of Dissident Reading* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), pp. 230–237.
- 24 – Stephen Greenblatt, “Marlowe and the Will to Absolute Play,” *Renaissance Self-Fashioning: From More to Shakespeare* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), pp. 193–221.
- 25 – I am using the word “figural” in the restricted sense of typological prefigurations in the Old Testament of episodes in the New; see Erich Auerbach, “Figura,” *Scenes from the Drama of European Literature*, trans. Ralph Manheim (New York: Meridian, 1959), pp. 11–76.
- 26 – G.W.F. Hegel, *Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art* (1835), trans. T. M. Knox, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), vol. 2, pp. 1192–1237. See Sebastian Gardner,

- "Tragedy, Morality and Metaphysics," in *Art and Morality*, ed. José Luis Bermúdez and Sebastian Gardner (London: Routledge, 2003), pp. 218–259, esp. pp. 241 ff.
- 27 – Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness: A Phenomenological Essay on Ontology*, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (London: Methuen, 1957), pp. lxii–lxvii.
- 28 – Søren Kierkegaard, *Fear and Trembling: A Dialectical Lyric*, trans. Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941), pp. 79, 124–125, 131–133.
- 29 – Plato, *The Republic*, trans. and ed. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1968), 382a–383c, at pp. 60–61; 388c–394c, at pp. 66–72; 395a–d, at pp. 73–74.
- 30 – Alain Badiou, "Philosophy and Art," *Infinite Thought*, trans. and ed. Oliver Feltham and Justin Clemens (London: Continuum, 2005), p. 71.
- 31 – Aristotle, *Poetics* 1449b–1450a, in *Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art*, trans. and ed. S. H. Butcher (London: Macmillan, 1895); in *Criticism: Twenty Major Statements*, ed. Charles Kaplan (Scranton, PA: Chandler, 1972), 6.2–10, at pp. 25–26. See Bernard Bosanquet, *A History of Aesthetic: From the Greeks to the Twentieth Century* (1932; New York: Meridian, 1957), pp. 64–72. In *Rhetoric* 1386a (2.8), Aristotle observed that any speaker might intensify the arousal of pity with tones, dress, and dramatic action; see Rozett, *Doctrine of Election*, pp. 33–34.
- 32 – Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, p. 60. See pp. 59–60.
- 33 – See *ibid.*, pp. 47–70.
- 34 – See A. J. Ayer, *Language, Truth and Logic* (1936; 2nd edition, 1946; London: Penguin, 1971), pp. 103–126, esp. pp. 110–112, and Mary Warnock, *Ethics since 1900*, 3rd ed. (1960; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), pp. 45–72.
- 35 – Michael Dummett, *The Seas of Language* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), p. 122. See also pp. 34–93.
- 36 – See Jonas A. Barish, *The Anti-theatrical Prejudice* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), p. 91 and *passim*.
- 37 – All Shakespeare references are to *The Complete Works*, ed. Stanley Wells and Gary Taylor, Compact Edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988).
- 38 – Thomas Heywood, *An Apologie for Actors* (London, 1612); for the excerpt, see E. K. Chambers, *The Elizabethan Stage* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1923), vol. 4, p. 251. See also William B. Worthen, *The Idea of the Actor* (1984; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), p. 14, and Martin White, *Renaissance Drama in Action* (London: Routledge, 2013), pp. 58–108.
- 39 – Martin Heidegger, *Poetry, Language, Thought*, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), pp. 17–87.

- 40 – On twentieth-century interpretations on stage of Hamlet's bitter lewdness in this scene, see Marvin Rosenberg, *The Masks of Hamlet* (Newark, DE: University of Delaware Press, 1992), pp. 576–580.
- 41 – Philip Sidney, *The Defence of Poesy: The Prose Works of Sir Philip Sidney*, ed. Albert Feuillerat, 4 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1912–1926), vol. 3, p. 23.
- 42 – As cited in Bernard Williams, *Shame and Necessity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), pp. 16, 46.
- 43 – George Steiner locates Marlowe's tragedy as transitional, although his approach to the tragedy of his time takes a different route. For all its novel developments, early modern tragedy in England rests on "a great inheritance of medieval and popular forms." See George Steiner, *The Death of Tragedy* (1961; London: Faber and Faber, 1963), pp. 13–16.
- 44 – See Rozett, *Doctrine of Election*, pp. 28–40, 213–214.
- 45 – Jonathan Dollimore, "Subversion through Transgression: *Doctor Faustus* (c. 1592)," in *Staging the Renaissance: Reinterpretations of Elizabethan and Jacobean Drama*, ed. David Scott Kastan and Peter Stallybrass (London: Routledge, 1991), p. 125; italics in source.
- 46 – Bevington and Rasmussen, *Doctor Faustus*, p. 24.
- 47 – See S. C. Sen Gupta, "Hamlet in the Light of Indian Poetics," in *Aspects of Shakespearian Tragedy* (Calcutta: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 149. Sen Gupta points out that for Bharata, the actors' portrayal of characters on stage does not produce "knowledge" for viewers, but the actor's means allow them to taste *rasa*, the sensuous, affective, and contemplative impact of drama; see pp. 143–172.
- 48 – For an overview of the orthodox and sympathetic interpretations of Faustus' transgression and for the literature on the subject, see *ibid.*, pp. 15–31, 82–87.
- 49 – See "Introduction," in *Humanist Tragedies*, trans. Gary R. Grund, I Tatti Renaissance Library (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), p. xxi.
- 50 – See note 37 above.
- 51 – See *Nāṭyaśāstra with the Commentary of Abhinavagupta*, ed. M. Ramakrishna Kavi et al., 4 vols., Gaekwad's Oriental Series 36, 68, 124, 145 (Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1934–1964), and *The Nāṭyaśāstra Ascribed to Bharata-Muni*, ed. Manomohan Ghosh, rev. ed., 2 vols. (1951–1956; Calcutta: Manisha, 1967). For an English translation, see *The Nāṭyaśāstra: A Treatise on Hindu Dramaturgy and Histrionics ascribed to Bharata-Muni*, trans. Manomohan Ghosh, 2 vols., Bibliotheca Indica 272–272A (Calcutta: Asiatic Society, 1950–1961). The text here is transliterated and paraphrased. On the date and composition, see Amulyacharan Vidyābhushan, "Ādi Nāṭyaśāstra," *Prabāsi* (Bāīśakh 1336 BS [April–May 1929]), reprinted in Bharata, *Nāṭyaśāstra*, ed. Sureschandra Ban-

dyopadhyāy, trans. [into Bengali] Sureschandra Bandyopadhyāy and Chhanda Chakrabarti, 4 vols. (Kolkata: Nabapatra, 1980), vol. 1, pp. 224–233.

- 52 – *Nāṭyaśāstra* 25.119–125.
- 53 – The requirements of the culturally competent are listed in 27.49.
- 54 – For Abhinavagupta's dates, see Kanti Chandra Pandey, *Abhinavagupta: An Historical and Philosophical Study* (1936; Varanasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, 1963), pp. 8–9.
- 55 – See J. L. Masson and M. V. Patwardhan, *Aesthetic Rapture: The Rasādhyāya of the Nāṭyaśāstra* (Poona: Deccan College, 1970), p. 6. See also Sushil Kumar De, *History of Sanskrit Poetics*, 2 vols., 2nd ed. (1925; Calcutta: Firma KLM, 1960), vol. 2, p. 135.
- 56 – Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Philosophical Hermeneutics*, trans. and ed. David E. Linge (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), pp. 100–101.
- 57 – See Jyotirindranāth Thakur, “Bhārater nāṭyakalā o rachanā-paddhati,” in *Prabandha-manjari*, ed. Tarun Mukhopadhyay (1312 BS; Kolkata: Karuna, 2007), pp. 222–228. For Gnoli's translation, see below.
- 58 – On the actor as reader and interpreter of texts, see Roman Ingarden, *The Literary Work of Art: An Investigation on the Borderlines of Ontology, Logic, and Theory of Literature*, trans. George G. Grabowicz (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973), pp. 317–323.
- 59 – *Abhinava-Bharati*; see Rainero Gnoli, *The Aesthetic Experience according to Abhinavagupta*, Serie Orientale Roma XI (Roma: Istituto Italiano per il ed Estremo Oriente, 1956), p. 17. See p. 78 for an English translation: “A man who considers that what constitutes the object of cognition . . . is lacking in verisimilitude is obviously not able to immerse . . . his consciousness in it. Thus the spectator will not be able to rest in it. . . . The means by which it [the obstacle] is eliminated is the consent of the heart and the representation of an event of ordinary nature.”
- 60 – De, *History of Sanskrit Poetics*, 2 : 130.
- 61 – Gnoli, *Aesthetic Experience according to Abhinavagupta*, pp. 79–81.
- 62 – See *ibid.*, pp. xxiv–xxv.
- 63 – See Sen Gupta, “*Hamlet* in the Light of Indian Poetics,” p. 144.
- 64 – S. C. Sen Gupta, “Shakespeare's Sonnets,” in *Shakespeare Manual* (Calcutta: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 156.
- 65 – Gnoli, *Aesthetic Experience according to Abhinavagupta*, pp. xix, 29.
- 66 – *Ibid.*, p. 80 n.
- 67 – See William Shakespeare, *Hamlet*, ed. G. R. Hibbard, in *The Oxford Shakespeare* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 191.