

CHAPTER I

UNDERSTANDING INDO US RELATIONS: ENGAGEMENTS OF A SUPERPOWER AND A REGIONAL POWER

International politics predominantly develops on the ways actors in international system act, unilaterally or in relation to others. The unilateral action often proceeds and modifies with consideration to its bi-lateral or multilateral engagements. Interactions and engagements in varying degrees form the basic criterion for a state to forward its own intentions towards achieving or serving its interests within a system where others are also striving to fulfill theirs. Thus, in a system where varied interests may collide and conflict comes the question of power capabilities of a state. In simple understandable terms larger the power capabilities more is the scope of a state to influence or maneuver its ways over others and correspondingly, lesser capable states under such circumstances develops alternative means to achieve their interests. Given engagement is a necessary criterion in an interdependent international order and states do differ in their power capabilities and strategic interests, the ways and modes through which they engage with each other becomes crucial. The difference in structural position within the power hierarchy informs how they frame their interests and how they act to promote those. A superpower will be motivated to utilize such strategies that will preserve and extend its preponderance over others while a regional power with major power aspiration will utilize such strategies that help it to manage its beneficial relation with the superpower and enables it to achieve its interests on its own terms. The natural impulse of a superpower to contain or restraint the rise of a regional power runs in contradiction to the regional power's impulse to avoid domination and thrust for role elevation sets them on a conflictual course. The occurrence of deeper engagements between the superpower and the regional power while limiting the inherent structural conflict makes the case stronger for the utilization of engagement strategies. The intent is to describe the diverse modes of interaction through which a superpower and a regional power engages with each other and to posit the relation between The United States and India in the post-Cold War

period within such a framework to underline a systematic understanding of communication, persuasion and coordination that outlines the engagement process.

This chapter proceeds in a conceptual descriptive manner, beginning with the concept of power, its components and variations; measurements and ranking of power, their criteria and definitions; the various processes of engagement and finally the framing of Indo-US relations in the Post-Cold War within such context.

1.1 Conceptualizing power

The attempt is to explain the varied definition and dimensions of power, its position within major theories of international relations and the way power is represented in decision making spheres. It seeks to provide a brief account of definition and its variations of power, its representativeness in terms of influence in policy making to give a semblance to the following discussions on measurement and ranking of power within the international system.

Power is central to any premise of international politics. Its definitions, dimensions, ramifications and analysis revolve around the concept of power. Scholars however disagree not only regarding the conception but also the nature and role of power. Hans J Morgenthau (1964:27) suggests that ‘the concept of political power possesses one of the most difficult and controversial problems of political science’. In spite of such incoherence there exists widespread consensus among scholars on the necessity of role of power on international interactions.

Alternative definitions of power are abound but there is a general acceptability around Robert Dahl’s (1957) conception of power as the ability of one actor (A) to influence another actor (B) to do something it otherwise would not do. Thus, power consists of two basic elements, (a) ability to do or affect something, (b) possession of control or command over others.

The concept of power underwent certain transformations with time. Traditionally, the study of international politics relied primarily on military force to define power. The states with the higher military power were designated as great powers, who were the main actors shaping world affairs (Spykman, 1942; Sprout and Sprout, 1945, 1962; Wight, 1946).

In the 18th century certain parameters were considered to gauge power apart from the monopoly of military power alone, ‘the power of individual states were conceived to be susceptible of measurement by certain well-defined factors’ (Gullick, 1955:24) included factors such as population, territory, wealth, armies, navies. In the following years this approach received a definite evolution in the form of ‘elements of national power’ approach to power analysis in Hans J Morgenthau’s *Politics among Nations* (1948). It was possible to add up various elements of this national power, sometimes referred as ‘power resources’ or ‘capabilities’ in order to calculate the power distribution among great powers and their tendency to produce a balance of power (Claude, 1962; Gulick, 1955; Morgenthau,1948,1960). Modern approach to this concept of power defined in terms of capabilities or resources can be traced in Waltz’s *Theory of International Politics* (1975) and John J Mearsheimer’s *Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (2001).

The ‘elements as national power’ approach depicted power as a possession or property of states was challenged during the last half of 20th century which established power as a relational concept or the relational power approach (Baldwin,1989; Barry,1976; Cartwright,1965; Dahl,1957,1984,1991; Frey,1971,1985, 1989; Oppenheim,1981). The new relational approach developed the idea of power as a type of causation. This causal notion conceives of power as a relationship (actual or potential) whereby behavior of actor A partially causes a change in behavior of actor B. Behavior here includes beliefs, attitudes, opinions and preferences. It views power as multidimensional rather than monolithic. This approach allows for the possibility that power can increase in one dimension while simultaneously decrease in another.

1.1.1 Faces of Power Debate

One of the most famous debates in the literature on power during the last half of the twentieth century is known as the 'Faces of Power' debate (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962; Isaac, 1987; Lukes, 1974) was triggered by reactions to Dahl’s study of governance in New Haven, Connecticut (1961). The methodology adopted for the study of power in New Haven identified three issue areas and attempted to determine who could successfully initiate policy proposals in decision making with respect to these issue areas (Bachrach and Baratz,1962; 1963) argued that Dahl’s approach neglected a second ‘face’ of power represented by the suppression of some issues,

thus, in effect, keeping them from being considered, that is to say, keeping them off the agenda of decision makers. A decade later, Lukes (1974) introduced the idea of another face of power 'third face.' He pointed out that one way for A to get B to do something B would not otherwise do is to affect B's preference, wants and thoughts. Each of these so called faces of power has some relevance for the study of international relations. The first face, focused on decision making with respect to specific issues, is on view anytime the foreign policy makers of one country try to influence decision making in another country. The second face is illustrated whenever an agenda item is suppressed by some countries despite the desires of other countries. And an example of the third face might be the (alleged) ability of the United States to get other countries to embrace the 'Washington consensus' or 'neo-liberal economic views'.

1.1.2 Power and International Relations theory

A concern with power in international politics is frequently interpreted as a disciplinary attachment to realism. Ever since E.H Carr (1964) leveled his criticism against the utopians and emphasized the role of power, the discipline of international relations has tended to treat power as an exclusive province of realism. 'The proposition that nature of international politics is shaped by power relations' is often listed as 'a defining characteristic of Realism' (Wendt, 1999: 96-7). Though the other schools have acknowledged the role of power they have typically evolved by distancing or offering alternatives to the notion of centrality of power. Neoliberal institutionalists, liberals, constructivists have attempted to demonstrate how power variables are not causally consequential in their explanations of empirical outcomes (Bernett & Duvall, 2005). Neoliberals have argued that how states with convergent create international institutions and arrangements that effectively limits state power, highlighting processes of social choice and participation thereby enforcing that attainment of power is not the sole motivation of a state (Keohane,1984; Keohane & Martin,1995; Keohane & Nye,1997; Krasner,1982; Oye,1985). Scholars of liberal school of international relation stresses that important international outcomes cannot be adequately analyzed with reference to power alone, instead there exists other commendable processes of democracy, particular objectives of domestic interest, liberal values, economic interdependence, international institutions (Moravsik,1997;

Dunne,2001:162- 181; Doyle,1983; Held,1995) Constructivists have attempted to demonstrate the causal significance of normative structure and processes of learning and persuasion (Katzenstein,1996; Risse, 2001; Finnemore, 2003).

1.2 Measurement of Power

The desire to measure power on a single dimension that will allow states to be ranked in an order often gets in the way of conceptual analysis. A common trend noticed is to ‘confound power with resources’ which is considered a fallacy in power analysis by Frey (1989:7-8) and Dahl (1984:21). The difficulty arises due to the absence of a standard measure that can facilitate the process of reducing various dimensions of power to a single dimension, “the search for an index of national power has been largely...based on the assumption that it is possible and desirable to find a currency of politics...”(Merritt & Zinnes, 1988:142). Thus, in absence of an absolute scale or unit like money as in terms with economics, the measurement of power remains incoherent and an area of disagreement and multiple variations.

1.2.1 Power in terms of military strength

The intent to rank overall power from highest to lowest requires comparing different dimensions of power relations without any agreed upon way to do this. Though varied there have been attempts to rank power in accordance to certain attributes. From the realist perspective power is defined by the disposal of material resources, focusing on military strength as the key factor: “I define power largely in military terms... because force is the ultima ratio of international politics” (Mearsheimer, 2001:56). Military power of a country potentially incorporates its economic and demographic resources and the national political process is the vehicle to convert these capabilities into military power (Tellis, 2000; Treverton & Jones, 2005). Thus states with larger military capabilities occupies the higher ranks having greater influence over international politics overall.

1.2.2 Power as Ideational factor

If the realist criterion is based on material resources of power, there exist many explanations of ideational resources of power to compete. Lake (2005:4) introduces the concept of authority, distinguishing it from coercion. In such scenario legitimacy

and moral obligation are the drivers that motivate followers. Noya (2005:7) asserts 'recognition' as a key variable to measure power. A resource becomes power only when it is recognized by others. Nye (2005:9) defines soft power as opposed to hard power, as the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments, 'simply put into behavioral terms soft power is attractive power.' Grant and Keohane (2005:37) argue that 'public reputation' is an ideational power resource and a mechanism of accountability at the same time. To sum up, ideational resources consist of political and social values, norms and culture of states. In the long term, credibility, legitimacy and moral authority may potentially contribute to strengthen position within the bargaining process.

1.3 Baldwin's dimensions of power

A third perspective is developed by Baldwin (2002:178-179) whereby he argues that power of a state might increase in one dimension while simultaneously decrease in another. Thus power rankings are subject to these various dimensions. Possible dimensions considered by him include

(a) Scope-refers to aspect of B's behavior affected by A. This calls in the possibility that an actor's power may vary from one issue to another. (b) Domain- defining the size of an actor's influence on others (regional, global) (c) Weight-describing the reliability of an actor's power (the chance to put one's will into practice against the will of the others) (d) Costs-indicating the price an actor is willing and able to pay to achieve other actor's compliance (e) Means – including symbolic, economic, military and diplomatic methods of exercising power. However, he accepts that there is no single right answer to which dimension of power should be specified for a meaningful study.

1.4 Ranking of Power in International Relations

Though the attempt to rank powers lack a standard universal measure there exists a fundamental categorical consent of ranking powers in terms of few basic units; Superpower, great power, middle powers and regional powers. The next section will try to define and distinguish each of these units in brief.

1.4.1 Superpower

In simple terms, a superpower is a state with a dominant position characterized by unparalleled ability to exert influence or project power on a global scale. The term emerged prominently in international politics of the 20th century to project a separate category of states owning nuclear weapons. The initial coinage of the term did not take into account the nuclear dimension into consideration rather the global reach of a nation as the criterion (Fox, 1944). During the Cold War superpower denoted a distinct category of new states possessing the ultimate weapons of destruction surely to be distinguished from the 19th century great powers. Presently the term is often interchangeably used for global power to showcase that possession of nuclear weapons is no longer the sole criteria rather a more encompassing role consisting of transnational competencies that permit interactions with non-state actors, regional forums and global institutions are to be fulfilled (Nijman, 1992).

1.4.2 Great powers

Great powers are those states that through their great economic, military and political strength, are able to exert power over world diplomacy. Great powers are also defined purely in terms of military capability, 'to qualify as a great power, a state must have sufficient military assets to put up a serious fight in an all-out conventional war...' (Mearsheimer, 2001:5).

Hurrell (2007) mentions the following four criteria characterizing a great power,

1. Capacity to contribute to international order.
2. Internal cohesion to allow effective state action
3. Economic power in terms of high levels of growth or a large market
4. Military power with the ability to compete with the other dominant powers in a conventional war.

Others respond to great powers on the basis of system level calculation about the present and near future distribution of power (Buzan & Waever, 2003:35).

1.4.3 Middle powers

As the term suggests these are states which are neither superpowers nor great powers, but still have influence internationally. Keohane (1969:298) defines middle powers as states whose leaders consider that they cannot act alone effectively, but may be able to have a systematic impact in a small group or through an international institution.

‘A middle power is a power with such military strength, resources and strategic position that in peace time the great powers bid for its support, and in wartime, while it has no hope of winning a war against a great power, it can hope to inflict costs on a great power out of proportion to what the great power can hope to gain by attacking it’ (Wright 1978:65). What are the criteria needed to be characterized as a middle power? Kelly (2004) focuses on superior material resources such as demographic and economy indicators as preconditions for middle power status. Cox (1996:245) notes that middle powers are closely linked with international organization as a process because of its interest in a stable and orderly environment. ‘Interests of middle powers coincide more with general interest than do the interests of the small powers or of the great powers’ (Reid 1983:161). Few scholars have viewed middle powers as little more than status seekers, looking for alternative roles to exercise leadership (Touval & Zartman, 1985). As such, middle powers, in essence, exhibit multilateralist approach, trying to build consensus on certain issues.

1.4.4 Regional powers

Regional powers are considered powerful in their own regions; irrespective of whatever they represent regional relationships of enmity or amity. So Wright (1978) distinguishes between regional powers and middle powers, the latter having a geographically more restricted range: “states with general interest relative to a limited region and the capacity to act alone in that region, which gives them the appearance of local great power” (Wright, 1978).

Huntington (1999:36) argues that major regional powers are pre-eminent in areas of the world without being able to extend their interest as globally as the United States. One of the initial efforts to develop a concept of regional powers was done by Osterud (1992:12) who used the notion of ‘regional great power’ defining it as a state,

1. Which is geographically part of a delineated region.
2. Which is able to stand up against any coalition of other states in the region.
3. Which is highly influential in the regional affairs.

Schoeman (2003:353) proposes the following precondition for regional leadership:

- a) Internal dynamics of the state's political system and economy should allow it to play a stabilizing and leading role in its region
- b) Willingness, the state should indicate the desire to assume the role of leader, stabilizer, at least peacemaker
- c) Capacity, the state should have the capacity or ability to assume the role of regional leadership
- d) Acceptance, the regional power should be acceptable to its neighbours. A broader or extra regional acceptance is perhaps a necessary condition but not sufficient.

Chase, Hill and Kennedy (1996:35) link the role of regional powers to the notion of 'pivotal states'. They are so important regionally that their collapse will result in total chaos, similarly, their economic progress and stability bolsters the region's viability and soundness.

A state may promote itself or be seen by others as the representative of a particular region, it should enjoy a degree of preponderance within the region. To conform itself as a regional power the state may foster regional coalitions or build consensus around regional institutions to assert its agendas with the other members of the region and also to support its external negotiations. The state may seek to play an active and assertive role in regional crisis management to solidify its own claim within the region and also to ensure that it cannot be excluded from any kind of crisis management that are undertaken by outside powers. Thus, the state to prove its regional leadership quality must fulfill certain managerial or order producing role.

A new approach to regional powers was developed that paid attention to local context and wider ambitions of regional powers beyond the region (Buzan & Weaver, 2003, Destradi, 2010, Narlikar, 2013). Some delved into analyzing how regional powers

mobilize the region to fulfill their global status claims (Hurrell, 2010). The regional–global nexus “captures the ideational and physical phenomena that are central in shaping the dynamics of intra-regional behaviour and that spills over across regional and global levels” (B.L Job, 2009).

Andrew Hurrell has similarly stressed “regional powers cannot be understood unless they are viewed within global context” (Hurrell, 2010). Destradi (2010) stressed on internal dynamics of the region and the role that dominant states in those regions have in contributing the contours of the regional order. Such analysis into the concept of regional powers makes it necessary to relate to the niche dynamics of the regions and how dominant states within those regions utilizes their capabilities not only to strengthen their influence over the region but to channelize their regional preponderance to further their global ambitions and aspirations. It highlights how regional powers are not restricted to regional dynamics rather they are constantly balancing their role in regional and global stages to assert their status globally. Thus, some regional powers are often referred as emerging or rising powers for their desire for upward mobilization to be recognized as a major power in the international system and to be confined to regional parameters.

However, it should be kept in mind that regions often can be sources of weakness due to unresolved regional conflicts (for example, Kashmir) or regional instabilities that present great difficulties of maintaining influence and may incur heavy costs on part of the incumbent. The claim to leadership is also not a smooth ride as the attempts to develop global role can stir animosity or raise concerns of regional neighbors who in turn might try to frustrate its agendas and even exhibit hostile and unsupportive demeanor. In short, a regional power despite its capabilities and authority has to tide over multiple hiccups and balance effectively the degree of interference so as not to breathe over the neck of the other states in the region. There has been a host of scholarly work depicting the region induced constraints and contradictions faced by the regional powers when they try to achieve a global role (Prys, 2012; Basrur, 2010; Hurrell, 2006). “The regional powers can mobilize discourses and practices on or about their regions as a part of a wider effort to project themselves on the global canvas” (Fawcett & Jagtiani; 2022).

The parameters to define the various powers have indeed given us a structure to simplify our understanding but states within such parameters do bring their own characteristics to unwrap new ways to view the power divisions. The study will try to frame the United States within the superpower parameter and India within the regional power parameter to identify how both of them retrain semblance to the general definitions while adding up new elements to make their distinct case.

1.5 The United States as a Superpower

At the end of the second world war U.S emerged with much lesser damage and casualties and growing industrial production making it the dominant power amidst the most rich and influential countries. U.S treaded carefully to craft a new world order that was to be open, integrated and having potential for free trade. Shedding the hesitance of joining the League of Nations, U.S was active in forming an international organization after the Second World War and incorporated a strong economic side to it for post war reconstruction. U.S was motivated to set out an idea of a new world order with trading benefits in absence of the dominance of the big European powers but was confronted by an alternative ideology emanating from the Soviet Union. According to the definition of superpower in 20th century as mentioned earlier, U.S achieved its nuclear power in 1945 making it the first country to achieve such a status. The Soviets achieved nuclear power in 1950 thereby confirming the presence of two superpowers.

Thus, what started as a struggle over ideas relating to the new world order soon became a struggle over amassing military resources. The end of the Cold War and the disintegration of Soviet Union ushered a new international system with presence of one unparalleled superpower. It not only exhibited unipolarity but most importantly the way The United States structured the international order thereafter added many new dimensions to the understanding of the concept of superpower. The United States formed ideas and strategies to construct an international system conducive to American interests and preservation of its primacy. In terms of material resources the United States has unparalleled nuclear superiority, the largest navy and the most dominant air force. Together with this it has the highest defense spending almost 778 billion dollars which out spaces the combined budget of the next nine high spenders and consists of 38% of the total global defense spending. The military prowess is

further enriched by its advanced information and technological developments and its investments in military research and development which combines to give it the unique capability to project power across the globe. Such military capability is maintained by only 3.5% of America's GDP (Brooks & Wohlforth , 2008).

What is distinctive in an international system with U.S as the sole superpower than those under erstwhile great powers is The United States preponderance over all spheres of power and its strategy to build an international order that not only secures its interests but assures benefits to others within the system. In comparison to previous international systems under great powers, The United States' huge power disparity with others presented it with the advantage to fashion institutions and international arrangements to structure an international order. U.S assumed the role of security provider and entered into military alliances and security arrangements in key areas of the world thereby minimizing the threat perception that is often associated with the presence of a dominant power in the system. U.S has substantially invested in distributing public goods and facilities and took up the responsibility to address global challenges. It transformed the perception and definition of superpower, it is no longer understood in only terms of power but America has added dimensions of protector and provider to it. The United States has invested its superpower capabilities to construct a world order and upholding a set of principles that preserves and extends the very world order. It has equated its own interests with that of the world order as asserted by Layne & Schwarz (1993) U.S interests are defined in terms of world order. The United States not only advanced its resources to retain its superpower status but was invested in shaping a system or order conducive to creating durability and acceptability.

1.6 India as a Regional Power

India has the necessary criteria of being considered a regional power, it is geographically the largest state in South Asia; has the most advanced military force including naval power and have strived to maintain a security order in the region by trying to limit the interference of external powers. Despite the capabilities India's role as a regional power has often been doubted over its inability to influence regional affairs on its own and its limited acceptability amongst smaller powers of the region

(Ingersoll & Frazier,2010).It has failed to weave regional integrity through region's key institution SAARC thus limiting its influence as a regional hegemonic power (Prys,2012). Often the notion of India's regional power is based on the acceptance by secondary powers and the limited or lack of recognition by them is diagnosed as the absence of regional dominance (DeVotta, 2003). While many have argued that the host of regional entrapments limits and will continue to limit India's strive to achieve a global status (Nayar & Paul, 2003; Ganguly & Hagerty, 2005). India has always considered South Asia as its security priority and has time and again acted and intervened to maintain its stability. It has assumed a dominant role in the region, a sense of entitlement largely based on the British policy of India centric approach to the region and thereby establishing itself as an example of a stable pluralistic democratic nation. India's economic growth, ability to maintain a secular democratic fabric has provided the region with much viability and strength in the otherwise anarchic and economically less lucrative region of South Asia.

India's regional power strategy must be viewed through the lens of its global status approach. It always utilized its regional power and influence capacity to project its claim for higher status in the global arena. After independence India projected itself in the global platform as the newly independent democratic nation in South Asia to renounce the bloc politics of Cold War and pioneered the non-alignment movement. India carved out a moral legitimacy in the international system and it gained acclamation among other developing countries as a nation that refuted the alignment compulsion of Cold War and augmenting autonomy in its decisions. India seeks to transform certain norms of the existing order which it feels restrain its goal to achieve higher status referred by Basrur and Estrada (2017) as 'counterorder efforts'. Post Cold War India shed in non-alignment cocoon and projected itself as a stable liberal democracy ready to integrate in the global economy and international institutions. It augmented and strengthened its engagement in the global arena by liberalizing its economy, establishing ties with U.S and other major powers and most importantly integrating in Asia. India is not only an emerging power in the economic field but also a system challenger and new norm builder (Destradi, 2010). It realized that it needed to engage with 'Asia Pacific' which included U.S, Japan, ASEAN countries which will give it the social recognition in a growing Asian economic that had come to include the world's major powers and the small but economically successful Asian

tigers (Menon,2012). Along with this India also integrated itself as a major part in the Indo Pacific and the recognition of its presence within this is seen as important to its claim as a major power (Saran, 2011). India's claim to global status is rooted in the region but embraces extended areas to exert the notion of its expanding influence beyond South Asia.

India's strategy has been to seek primacy and limit the involvement of outside powers in the region and thereby to project its acquired capabilities and its dominance over the region to strategically claim its position as an emerging power able to ensure stability in the region and in the extended Asian sphere. India's regional projects over time, it is indeed possible to observe how they informed Indian claims to status at the global level (Fawcett, Jagtiani, 2022). Within South Asia, India influences with limited interference mostly to maintain stability and security. India exercises prudence when it comes to South Asia so as to not be constantly restrained by regional perils (Basrur, 2010)

India has been consistent in its claim to great power status and status seeking is very much inherent in its worldview. This conscious effort to be recognized as a great power has led many to term India as an emerging power (Nayar & Paul, 2003; Rajagopalan & Sahni, 2008). “ Emerging powers are those states that have the capacity and intention to maneuver their way into great power status... they have the potential to play system shaping role in future and in various ways signaling their intention to do so” (Rajagopalan & Sahni, 2008:3). Thus, India must be viewed as transcending the region and acquiring a larger presence which is predominantly motivated by its desire to be recognized as a great power. It must also be noted that such claims have to be cognizant of the present international order and have to be attained within it. India's claims are needed to be structured within an international order maintained by U.S. Whether India wants its rise to be in consonance to the established order or it seeks alternative views will determine its interactions with the dominating power. India's stress on niche Asian regional structures, its support for a multipolar emancipating world order, its penchant for strategic autonomy thus contrasts with U.S monolithic world order based on alliances and status quo policies.

Irrespective of the power asymmetry both the United States and India seek to interact and engage with each other and with other states to forward their strategic interests

and strengthen their influence. While engaging they choose diverse modes to interact to achieve greater strategic benefits and to minimize threats. The next section deals briefly on the various modes of interaction that can be utilized by a superpower or a regional power under diverse circumstances to advance their strategic goals.

1.7 Processes of Interactions and Engagements

States in the international system irrespective of their global or regional reach try to pursue their strategies and policies to maintain and even extend their role and position. In doing so they have to reasonably interact and engage with other members of this system such interactions may be of co-operation or rivalry, consensus or differences, alignments or oppositions but the underlying idea remains to exercise one's influence over the other, the degree to which such influence can be exercised marks the game of international relations.

This section deals with the modes of interaction between a superpower and regional power and the possible ways in which they can engage so as to reassert each other's influence over the other and the larger consequences for international politics.

A superpower with its highest rank within power distribution enjoying unparalleled capabilities and influence on a global scale gets a free hand in getting what it wants? Desires are likely to expand with capabilities. Whether others will comply depends on the co-incident or discrepancy between the world others prefer and the one sought by the superpower. The superpower can apply few skills and make serious efforts to persuade or coerce the others to develop goals, values and beliefs that are compatible with its own. With its unparalleled capabilities it engages in conducive and punitive measures ranging from supply of public goods to economic sanctions to reassert its influence and power. Inducing such a consciousness of shared values over the long term is the cheapest and most secure form of influence (Jervis, 2009). To what degree or extent it can paint a world in its image is more or less dependent on the kind of engagement it harbours with others.

This can be partly answered with the growing importance of rising regional powers in different regions of the world which posit serious challenges to the unilateral plans of the super power. Buzan (2011) argues that the very category of superpower in its

modern sense arises from historical circumstances of the unrivaled power of the West in the 19th century, that world is fading fast. The Soviet Union's collapse transformed the international system marked the emergence of a sole superpower and to a lesser extent rise of few states in various pockets of the world. Industrialization, foreign aids, technology transfer and trade agreements over the years saw a steady economic growth though unevenly diffusing to China , India, Brazil and others, coupled with the lack of historical insights in The United States' policies towards these regions they carved out a niche system based on shared values, indigenous policies and a different approach to economic, security aspects. The World Bank annual growth rates indicated that from 1990 to 1995 China's growth rate increased from 9.3 to 14.8 and India witnessed an increase from 1.1 to 7.6 (Buzan,2011). The huge markets together with economic benefits and the strategic importance made these countries stand apart. Huntington talks about a strange hybrid 'uni-multipolar polar system with one super power and several major powers where no action on key issues can be taken without considering the rising major powers, 'the settlement of key international issues requires action by the single superpower but always with some combination of other major states' (Huntington, 2004:36). The importance of rising regional powers is recognized in extensive literature (Bandeira, 2006; Chin, 2010; Christensen, 2006; Shambaugh, 2004/2005; Walt, 2009). Three dynamics have to be considered before discussing the modes of interaction

- a) The global power or the superpower has strategic interests in multiple regions of the world. Hence engagement with such regions and especially with the preponderant power of the region flows naturally.
- b) The regional powers have primary preponderance in their regions and would like to pursue their interest without being subject to constraint, coercion and pressure from the superpower. However in their quest for recognition, semblance and stability in the region and outside necessitates its engagement with the superpower.
- c) Within each region the global and the regional power competes over the political economic and strategic interests.

Contemplating the above dynamics it clearly indicates that interactions of co-operation or opposition are necessary for executing the strategies and policies at any

level. There have been attempts to understand the specific ways in which such interactions flow, the kind of behavior that emerges and the multiple ways in which the states act under prevailing situations. The various modes of interaction undertaken by the states have the probability to change, intermingle and even co-opt to suit particular issues and situations. The study would like to classify the processes of interaction between a super power and regional power into two broad units: (a) Balancing (traditional and soft balancing), bandwagoning, hedging (b) Alliance formation or loosely defined sub forms of alignment, ententes.

1.7.1 Balancing

It is based on the age old assumption that as long as power is rising, it must be met by countervailing power. Any potential aggressor is deterred by the potential combined powers of all the other states, i.e any threat arising out of increasing power of one state will be balanced by others in unison thereby maintaining the stability of the system. (Pollard, 1923; Morgenthau, 1967; Waltz, 1979; Haas, 1953). The methods adopted to exercise such balancing states may form countervailing alliances or engage in arms build- up. Thus, if the superpower posits threat by its ever increasing capabilities, the regional powers can form coalitions within themselves to balance the situation.

1.7.2 Soft Balancing

With the end of the Cold War and the emergence of the United States as the sole superpower, many scholars argued that though there is absence of traditional means of hard balancing against the U.S but there exists a new and subtler form of balancing, termed as 'soft balancing' (Paul, 2004; Pape, 2005; Walt,2002; Joffe,2002).

The soft balancing argument initially rose to prominence in the late 1990's, as analysts such as Stephen M. Walt (2002) and Josef Joffe (2002) sought to articulate a distinction between traditional military balancing and subtler forms of balancing. T.V Paul provides a concise definition of this basic concept of soft balancing 'involves the formations of limited diplomatic coalitions or ententes...with the implicit threat of upgrading their alliance if the United States goes beyond its stated goals' (Paul, 2005:47). The states are avoiding military balancing because the United States no

longer posits an existential threat to them. They view the United States as a constrained hegemon whose power is checked by a multitude of factors. This does not mean that the U.S is a benign hegemonic power. Rather it pursues quasi imperialist policies through indirect means (Paul, 2005:47). Thus, the fear of a rapidly rising power that would subjugate them or challenge their physical existence does no longer exist but it does not mean that the current hegemon posits no concerns for the others. Soft balancing behavior occurs under following conditions:

1. The superpower's power position and military behavior are of growing concern but do not yet pose a serious challenge to the sovereignty of the second tier powers
2. The dominant state is a major source of public goods in both the economic and security areas that cannot be simply be replaced.
3. The dominant state cannot easily retaliate either because the balancing efforts of the others are not overt or they do not directly challenge its power position with military means. While pursuing soft balancing the second tier states could engage the hegemon and develop institutional links with it to ward off possible retaliatory actions (Paul, 2005: 1-25)

What are the methods through which soft balancing can work?

Soft balancing relies on non -military tools and it aims to have an indirect effect on the military prospects of a superior state. Mechanisms of soft balancing may include (a) Territorial Denial—denying the access to its territory, the second tier state can reduce the superior state's prospect for victory by increasing its logistic costs and compelling it to fight with air or sea power alone. It reduces the overall force of a stronger state. (b) Entangling Diplomacy – states may use international institutions and ad hoc diplomatic maneuvers to delay a superior states plan of action and can even withdraw its support to exhibit opposition to such plans. (c) Economic Strengthening – creation of regional trading blocs that increase the trade and economic growth for members. If the superpower can be excluded from most important of such blocs its overall trade and growth rate may suffer over time. (d) Signal of resolve to balance – the core purpose of soft balancing is not to coerce or impede the superior state's current action, but to demonstrate resolve in a manner that signals a commitment to resist the superpowers future ambitions (Pape,2005)

1.7.3 Bandwagoning

Some analysts believe that the sheer extent of U.S power not only precludes effective opposition but also increases the incentives to bandwagon with Washington. As Wohlforth put it 'the only option available to second tier states are to bandwagon with the polar power (either explicitly or implicitly) or, at least to take no action that could incur its focused enmity' (Wohlforth, 1999:25). Proponents of bandwagoning posit that the overwhelming power of the United States has made balancing unfeasible (Brooks and Wohlforth, 2008). In this view, engagement with the hegemon, including participation in institutions it has created, represents the only way forward for secondary states after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Thus, Schweller (1994) argues that bandwagoning is not synonymous with capitulation but refers to a more cooperative relationship that can be profitable to secondary partners.

The motives behind bandwagoning can be (a) by aligning with the dominant state, a weaker state hopes to avoid challenges or to divert them elsewhere. (b) A state aligns with a dominant state in order to share in the spoils of war or other forms of conflict (for example securing access to Middle East oil on back of support for U.S policy). (C) A state aligns with a dominant state in order to secure other political or security advantages (Walt, 1987: 19-21).

1.7.4 Hedging

The idea of hedging rose to prominence in the Post-Cold War period to accommodate the superpower in the unique international system. Hedging refers to national security or alignment strategy undertaken by one state towards another featuring a mix of cooperative or confrontational elements (Ciorciari & Haacke, 2019). Post Cold War many states (mainly weaker states) were motivated to undertake strategies to minimize risk without forwarding direct confrontations to the ascertained threats or siding with the great power. Hedging is often defined as the middle position between two straight forward strategies of balancing and bandwagoning (Lake, 1996; Goh, 2005). Hedging is not necessarily a well-calculated or cogently designed "strategy"; rather, it is best conceived of as instinctive behavior that prevails under high-stakes, high-uncertainty circumstances, i.e., when risks are real and potentially consequential to the prioritized values of a rational state (Kuik, 2021).

1.7.5 Alliance Formation

Alliances and its varied forms play a fundamental role in the theory and practice of international relations (Snyder, 1997; Christensen and Snyder, 1990; Schroeder, 1976; Walt, 1987; Wolfers, 1968) Alliances have been an integral component of international politics since ages. Alliance can be described as a formal agreement between two or more states for mutual support mainly to deter a common adversary (Hugland, 2019). Alliances and its varied forms play a fundamental role in the theory and practice of international relations. They are a ‘universal component of relations between political units, irrespective of time and place (Holsti, 1973:2). As Arnold Wolfers puts it ‘wherever in recorded history a system of multiple sovereignty has existed, some of the sovereign units when uninvolved in conflicts with others have entered into alliances’(Wolfers, 1968:269)

There remains substantial conceptual ambiguity over the definition of alliance. Walt defines alliance as ‘a formal or informal relationship of security co-operation between two or more sovereign states’ (Walt, 1987:1). According to Wolfers, ‘in technical language of statesmen and scholars the term alliance signifies a promise of mutual military assistance between two or more sovereign states’ the term connotes that ‘peculiarly far reaching commitment contained in military pacts by which a nation formally promises to join another in fighting a common enemy’ (Wolfers,1968:268-269).Thus for Wolfers the outstanding asset of an alliance is the military assistance expected in case of need and its deterrent effect on enemy.

Bruce M. Russett defines an alliance as ‘a formal agreement among a limited number of countries concerning the conditions under which they will or will not employ military force’ (Russett, 1971). On similar lines Glenn H. Snyder points out the main elements of alliances as ‘formal agreements; they are concluded by states; they involve collaboration in military matters; and they have other orientation’ aiming at ‘states outside their own membership’ (Snyder, 1997). This differs from Walt’s definition in its exclusion of informal or implicit relations and from Wolfers as this does not account for a prior identification of a ‘common enemy’. However, most of these definitions are focused on states and fails to account for other non-state actors such as terrorist groups to the list of potential enemy to better reflect the nature of contemporary security concerns and the viable grounds for forging new alliances.

Alliances fall into different categories related to different objectives. These could be bilateral or multilateral, defensive or offensive in nature. The tendency to align has had one key underlying determinant: perceived common interest against a common enemy. This common interest may stem from fear, a desire to expand or a need to deter the enemy from acting or pre-empt it from acting by joining hands with a likeminded ally (Russett, 1971)

Alliances therefore are a form of coalition between states with a formal military commitment. The element of military assistance is the binding factor in any alliance. During Cold War both the superpowers engaged in several alliances to preserve and protect their spheres of influence, the end of Cold War also witnessed several alliances of the sole superpower with regional actors with formal security commitments. It is pertinent to mention here that such alliances between a major power and minor powers are referred as asymmetric alliances. Morrow (1991) posits that asymmetric alliances provide different benefits to the parties involved—autonomy to the great power and security to the minor power (Morrow,1991:903) The difference in power capabilities often creates a difference in their perception of threat but side payments or trade -offs act as positive incentives for both sides to continue with the alliance (Kabir,2019:165)

1.7.6 Alignments

Alignment is a relative term that refers to the degree of amity between states in international arena but they lack formal military commitments as in the case of alliances. It concerns the ‘expectations of whether they will be supported or opposed by other states in future interactions’ (Snyder, 1997:6). Two states might be called aligned if their interests tend to overlap and their policies with respect to particular issues are often congruent. Alignments are issue or policy specific and they often precede possible alliances, ‘alliances are subsets of alignments- those that arise from or are formalized by an explicit agreement, usually in form of a treaty (Snyder, 1997:6)

Strategic partnerships that do not have the primary property of a security characteristic and are diverse in their cooperation can be best assessed through alignments. Alignment is a value neutral concept that neither infers nor connotes any

particular content to inter-state relationships (Chidley, 2014). Alignment is further defined as a structured framework for the collaboration between two or more parties, which is organized in a loose and non-binding way, aims to enable the pursuit of shared interests and the addressing of common challenges in different issue areas, and facilitates (future) co-operation (Wilkins, 2014).

1.7.7 Ad hoc Coalitions

Another form of alignments is the ad hoc coalitions which is a temporary congruence of convenience formed by two or more states to deal with emergence of a specific issue or threat. The concept was given a semblance by Andrew Bennett, Joseph Leggold and Danny Unger in their article on burden sharing during the Persian Gulf war, claiming that ‘the end of bipolarity promises more ad hoc coalitions, which will widen the opportunities of research on alliance burden sharing’ (Bennett; Leggold, & Unger, 1944:39)

The ad hoc coalitions are formed to deter sudden emergence of a specific threat, they move into close alignments but fail to upgrade to future alliances. Indeed the word ad hoc stresses on the informal, temporary character of such congruence. Because of their flexible design, ad hoc coalitions can enable cooperative actors to circumvent gridlock, lower transaction costs, maintain control and ownership, and respond more swiftly to address specific governance problems. As such, ad hoc coalitions can be perceived to be more relevant tools to solve urgent issues such as COVID-19, terrorist threats or disaster relief than existing mechanisms of conventional international institutions (Karlsrud & Reykers, 2020). Though ad hoc coalitions provide effective responses to immediate crises or challenges that require rapid action these are not efficient in managing long term challenges or commitments.

1.7.8 Ententes

Term entente is traditionally used to denote a particular kind of close alignment. Robert A. Kann calls entente ‘the classical case of flexible agreement of co-operation between two sovereign powers’ (Kann, 1976:611). According to Russett, in an entente states ‘pledge themselves to consult and/ or co-operate on political matters’ (Russett, 1971: 266). Compared to alliances, ententes are relatively informal,

not expressed in treaties or other agreements of legal standing. Entente partners thus retain greater flexibility in determining the appropriate degree of support to lend one another. As Kann puts it, the entente is 'by intent far more loosely defined' and is a 'far less conspicuous form of association... no definite commitments' (Kann, 1976:611,615-16). Ententes are primarily mechanisms of political co-operation and hence may lack military dimension. It might be limited to diplomatic consultation and support. Ententes unlike alignments are not specific interest centric. They entail a wide range of possibilities ranging from co-operation in environmental issues, peacekeeping operations, and humanitarian missions.

1.9 Engagement Strategies

It must be noted that balancing or bandwagoning are mainly defined as strategies that states adopt when confronted with the threat of a great power and as such they either try to balance or unconditionally associate themselves with the great power. However, the analysis based on threat perception alone is not suitable for an international system under a superpower that has constructed an order which has prominent benefits, distributes public goods and often attends to global challenges. Wohlforth (1999) argues that The United States is a benign hegemon that distributes public goods and not a territorial threat to other states hence states are not balancing against it. No balancing may signify elements of being adoptive or indifference or as the protagonists of soft balancing would term as implicit balancing. But it does not grasp the situation where states might actually want to engage with the superpower to forward their interests without bandwagoning completely and retaining flexibility to act on their own and choose their own policies. Thus, these strategies rather than being viewed as aimed to address threat perception should be considered as prominent engagement strategies adopted by states not only to address threat but rather as way to put forward their niche strategic affairs. The study will refer to these strategies as engagement strategies utilized by other states in an international system with a superpower.

1.10 Understanding INDO-US Relations within such an ambit

Relations between India and the United States dates back to the time when India was still under the colonial domination of the British empire, since then it has witnessed the prolonged phase of Cold War, the emergence of the new world order in the post-Cold War period and have curved its way into the 21st century. However this journey was historically besieged with mutual animosity and mistrust and is in the midway of significant improvements. From ideologically adrift during the Cold War, they have rediscovered common values for greater co-operation with changes in the global scenario.

To construct a framework of understanding relation between a superpower and a regional power will be based on the proposition that a superpower's prime motive will be to retain its primacy and to forward such strategies in the international order and in its various engagements with other states that will help to strengthen its dominance (Posen,1997:32). It will naturally try to balance the rise of potent rival powers that have the potential to undermine U.S dominance or to pursue an alternative power structure. U.S will try to solidify its engagements with rising regional powers by assisting and cooperating with them and will try to align them along its own interests and channelize such support to forward its intended goal. Regional powers or more specifically emerging powers are status seekers hence engagement with the superpower is vital to them. Assistance and acknowledgement from the superpower makes it much easier to secure a seat in the high tables of the international system. However, emerging powers are prone to project a distinct identity and would like greater strategic flexibility in the system to emerge with their full potentiality (Detradi, 2010; Flemes & Nolte, 2010). They will also like to have a broad status attribution base for which they need to convince others that their emergence will help resolve existing and upcoming global problems and will be able to act to bring about desired changes. Such a difference in strategic view envelopes the relation between a superpower and a regional power and within this they seek to engage and identify common grounds for cooperation simultaneously forwarding their own interests which thereby gives rise to utilization of various modes of interactions

The disappearance of Soviet Union from a long drawn ideological war created a void in the way international politics was to be conducted post 1990's. The international

system witnessed the emergence of a preeminent power, namely the United States with unmatched economic and military might. This moment required recalibration of its engagement policies, strategic vision and skills to build a world order to retain the newly attained superpower status. On the other side of the globe India found herself in an unfavourable scenario in absence of its long term ally and weapons supplier and griping with financial downtrends it was about time for reforms. Major reforms came in the form of economic liberalization and the willingness to expand its role in international politics shedding its non-aligned cocoon (Rajamohan,2022; Pant,2016).India exhibited a visible turnaround in its strategic orientation by slowly increasing its involvement in Asian politics through its Look East policy and meaningful integration with South East Asian nations; deeper engagements with Central Asia and West Asia to secure its energy ties and to build defense cooperation and perhaps most significantly it tried to minimize hostility within its own region building trust and imbibed the spirit of no reciprocity. India integrated in the liberal international order with the hope to attain its claim towards a great power status (Muni, 1991). The bilateral relation between them was attuned to the larger international structure and the quest to identify common interests. The overarching international structure was dominated and shaped by the U.S which has prioritized its primacy and sustenance as the cornerstone with minor changes in the form of strategies. The United States maintained its preponderance not only in quantity but managed to supersede others qualitatively. It became a system builder that distributes public goods, provides security and takes up responsibility to deal with global challenges. It based its preponderance not only on military and economic prowess but also in ideological sphere to influence others; something Gramsci (1971) considered as the key element to the survival of hegemony and later Joseph Nye (2004) identified as soft power. India needs to frame its policies within this international order and one of the most important relations for a regional or emerging power which seeks higher status is the one it establishes with the superpower. The most convenient way is to bandwagon with the superpower but if the emerging power wants a niche recognition and to play a distinct role in addressing challenges of the present system and intending to build an alternate system then bandwagoning is not always an option. The study will consider the Indo- U.S relation operating on some basic grounds,

- (a) Power asymmetry will continue to define the contours of their engagements.

India will need U.S more to fulfill much of its strategic and material needs than U.S will need India. India will find it difficult to restraint

- (b) The configuration of power in the international system will determine what kind of interests will be considered as common interest by U.S and India.
- (c) What kind of strategic possibilities are available within the pattern of power relation. The intended efforts and investments each side is willing to offer to construct better relation.

The economic ties, a growing political clout of Indo American community in US and India's nuclear tests marked the beginning of Indo US relations in the Post Cold War, since then the bilateral ties has showcased periods of remarkable cooperation and periods of visible fractures but engagements has been a constant factor.⁶ They have engaged on diverse issue areas to upgrade their bilateral relation into a global strategic partnership. Their cooperation however, is besotted with differences over long term strategic objectives, approaches to common interests and their vision of the international order. Despite such differences they exhibit deeper commitments to engage and have even integrated over core interests like security and defense. A superpower that prefers to work through formal alliance commitments and a regional power that insists on retaining strategic autonomy engaging in deeper strategic partnership signifies the importance of underlying engagement strategies that makes such cooperation plausible and essentially serves to promote their interests.

In the context of the above mentioned processes of interactions or engagements between a superpower and a regional power, the case of Indo U.S relations would be analyzed to understand the kind of engagement that is underway within these countries. Since the analysis is dependent on the existence of a single superpower, the case study will mainly focus on the period following the end of Cold War which marked the disintegration of Soviet Union and the establishment of The United States as the sole superpower. U.S as the superpower has maintained its preponderance through sustaining a norm based international order In the early 1990's many scholars argued that major powers would rise to challenge U.S preponderance after the

⁶ For data on Indo-U.S trade relations over the years refer to <https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/south-central-asia/india>, <https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5330.html#1991>, For information on Indo American community in U.S refer to <https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/fact-sheet/asian-americans-indians-in-the-u-s/#indian-population-in-the-u-s-2000-2019>

collapse of the Soviet Union and that unipolarity was largely an illusion that will not last long (Layne, 1993; Waltz, 1997; Friedberg, 1994; Kupchan,1998). By the late 1990's it however became evident that the international system is not giving way to multipolarity and reasserted the preponderance of The United States (Wohlforth, 1999; Mastanduno , 2009).

Along with the rise of a sole superpower the international system saw the rise of smaller units (geographically, culturally and historically bound units sharing common concerns and interests) in different parts of the world exercising unique levels of practice and analysis. The mid 1990's saw expansion of literature on 'new regionalism' (Buzan & Waever, 2003; Katzenstein, 2005; Hurrell, 1995). Regional powers have been discussed as eager to project themselves as distinct entities capable of constructing niche structures of regional integration and often as probable agents of change or shifts in the power structure (Flemes, 2009).

According to Huntington's classification the structure consists of three basic levels:

The United States is the sole state with pre-eminence in all domains of power, with reach and capabilities to promote its interest in virtually every part of the world. At the second level are major regional powers that are preeminent in areas of the world without being able to extend their interests as globally as The United States. "They include the German French condominium in Europe, Russia in Eurasia, China and potentially Japan in East Asia, India in South Asia, Iran in South West Asia, Brazil in Latin America, South Africa and Nigeria in Africa... At the third level are secondary regional powers those interests often conflict with the more powerful regional states. These include Britain in case of Germany and France, Pakistan in case of India..." (Huntington, 1999:36).

The analysis is concerned specifically with The United States as the superpower and the role of India as regional power or emerging power and the ways in which The United States and India engage with each other. As mentioned previously the modes of interactions depends on three basic dynamics

- (a) The United States has strategic interest in the South Asian region (for example, the sea lanes connecting the two volatile regions of vital interest to the United States- the Middle East and East Asia). Thus interactions with

India as the predominant state are almost unavoidable.

- (b) India strives to maintain its preponderance in the region on the basis of its economic growth, robust and stable democracy, its information technology prowess and its geo- strategic position. In its quest for recognition and semblance on larger international platform necessitates its integration with the superpower but at the same time it strives to maintain its autonomy in actions.
- (c) Both of them strive to achieve political, economic and strategic interests in the regional context and in alignments with global interests which may converge or diverge over issue areas.

Engagements and interactions are basic requirements of the present interdependent international order. Asymmetric relations are managed through consistent connection building and negotiations to advance common interests and avoid crisis or conflicts. Engagements must be viewed beyond means to address or manage threat perception as interrelated stakes; mutual gains are being prioritized in interstate relations. Thus, interactions or engagements provide the possibilities to further economic, political, security and strategic objectives in the international system. Engagements are motivated to enable the states to forward their interests and status consolidation. These strategies help to tide over differences, work through mediated spaces and provide a peaceful alternative to the inherent structural conflict between a superpower and a rising regional power. These engagement strategies need careful considerations to be effective in enhancing mutual dividends, diminish instances of differences or costs incurred and most importantly forward distinct interests of specific states irrespective of their power position. The Indo-U.S engagements exhibit how cooperation can be cemented through identifying areas of common interests while there remain substantial conflictual elements. A study into the identification of specific or combination of engagement strategies that are being utilized by U.S or India to build their partnership and extend niche interests will further enhance the understanding of superpower regional power relations.

The pattern of engagement strategies utilized by U.S or India can inform the overarching framework of Indo-U.S relations. Whether there is a possibility of alliance or do they qualify in having informal arrangements such as alignments or ententes? Does India exercise any particular means while engaging with the United States? Is it

completely bandwagoning or trying to balance the influence of the superpower in the region? The difficulty lies in confirming a perfect framework of interaction as they often indulge in situational drifts and turncoats. The quest will be to identify a dominant trend of engagement strategy that can duly assess the Indo-U.S relations within the ambit of superpower regional power relations. While there have been works on singular engagement strategy or specific state actor's choices but a comprehensive study into developing a structure of available engagement strategies to superpower and secondary powers has not been developed. This study tries to take an initial step to develop a framework of probable engagement strategies that can be utilized by superpower and regional powers to weave strategic partnerships despite structural differences and power asymmetry. Modes of engagements are means applied to forward specific interests and to construct relations with other states which again are largely determined by the strategic worldview of the superpower or the regional power. The next two chapters will try to define the strategic worldview of The United States and India respectively and how they are positioned within each other's worldview.

1.10 Chapter Brief

This chapter deals with the theoretical understanding of the concept of power in international relations, the measurement of power and various engagement strategies. It also posits the U.S as the superpower and India as the regional power and their relation to state what necessitates their interactions. Then it frames the United States within the superpower parameter and India within the regional power parameter to underline the distinctiveness they add to the idea of superpower and regional power. The United States as a superpower must be viewed beyond its exceptional power capabilities and as a system builder with niche norms and ideas that thereafter added many new dimensions to the general understanding of the concept of superpower. What is distinctive in an international system with U.S as the sole superpower than those under erstwhile great powers is United States preponderance over all spheres of power and its strategy to build an international order that not only secures its interests but assures benefits to others within the system. India's claim to global status is rooted in the region but embraces extended areas to exert the notion of its expanding influence beyond South Asia. India must be viewed as transcending the region and

acquiring a larger presence which is predominantly motivated by its desire to be recognized as a great power for which it is often labeled as an emerging power and added with it are its stress on strategic autonomy, building niche Asian security structure and a multipolar emancipatory world order. To construct a framework of understanding relation between a superpower and a regional power will be based on the proposition that United States prime motive will be to retain its primacy and to forward such strategies in the international order and in its various engagements with other states that will help to strengthen its dominance while India motivated to claim a global status will try assert its indigenous norms and ideas and be able to address existing problems of the international order or bring about desired changes.

The study stresses that engagement is unnecessary for a superpower to continue inducing the consciousness of the benefit of the world order it maintains and deal with the rise of new powers within the system with system altering traits. The emerging regional power seeks engagement beyond responding to power preponderance and more as a means to forward its ideas and integrate in the international order with the aim of enhancing its position and influence. The chapter then defines theoretical understanding of various engagement strategies like balancing, soft balancing, bandwagoning, hedging and omni-enmeshment. It also defines engagement patterns like alliance formation, entente, ad hoc coalitions and alignment. Indo U.S relations are then assessed within such an ambit to understand that engagements are necessary for both to attain common interests and specific strategic objectives. To tide over their differences they can adopt suitable engagement strategies. A Study into the engagement strategies utilized by India and the United States helps to understand how partnerships can be constructed despite structural differences and power asymmetry.