


1914 - 1960

~~1914 - 1960~~

An eternal dust-bin in which  
are to be thrown the harvests of  
all our sittings. What was, what is - and what shall  
be.

Jatil Gomar Montoya  
Secretary, Philosophical Seminar, 1944-45.



## Proceedings of the First Meeting

The first meeting of the Subject Seminar in Philosophy of Religion was held on the 5th August 1914 at 1 P.M. under the Presidency of Dr. Prabhu Bala Shastri.

On being requested by the president Pt. Brajendra Kumar Chaudhury read his interesting paper on "The unknowable". In the course of his criticisms of Spence's views, he told us that Spence cannot speak of religion at all as he asserts that ultimate religious ideas are unknowable. He then remarked that the question of the origin of religious sentiment cannot decide the case of its evolution. The essayist could not side with Spence in asserting that the subject matter of religion passes the sphere of intellect and adduced the statement of Martineau according to whom the apprehension truth & the enthusiasm of devotion blend together in the soul of religion. Commenting on the theory of Creation he blamed Spence for taking the word creation in the sense of origination at a particular point of time because the word really means, as shown by the Marvick, the development from the remotest point in the past. The essayist then refuted the statement of Spence that the ultimate scientific religious ideas are symbolic conceptions on the ground that the symbols are not fictions but imply corresponding realities. There was, again, no reason why Spence should ascribe a high personality to the Absolute because the highest thing we can conceive is personal. He showed that a contradiction is involved in the statement that we cannot know the Absolute: the very statement implies the some knowledge of its existence.

Bach P. B. Behari Datta observed that if we were to ascribe personality to the Absolute we should ascribe supra-personality; though we cannot imagine supra-personality we can think of it. Then there arose a discussion about the connotation of the word personality.

President Dr. Shastri helped the debate all through, sometimes by explaining the points of their argument and sometimes by elucidating the criticism with new facts & observations. He then referred to the Hegelian criticism of the Spencer's standpoint, which emphasizes the ~~fact~~ fact that the Absolute manifests itself in the universe & this comes within the range of our knowledge.

Presidency College }  
1914. } Manjandrao  
Secretary

<sup>confirmed</sup>  
D. Shastri  
President

Nov. 11, 1914

## Proceedings of the Second Meeting

The Second meeting of the subject seminar in Philosophy of religion was held on the 10<sup>th</sup> August 1946 at 1 P.M. with Dr. Prabhu Ball Shastri in the chair.

Babu Parth Chandra Ganguli being requested by the president read his paper on "The unknowable". He showed at the outset that Spence is not consistent when he says that the Absolute is unknown and at the next moment ascribes power and causality to it. If we have the knowledge of the effect we can also have some knowledge of the cause producing the effect. He then made explicit the meaning of the word Absolute which does not depend on anything beyond itself but may well have relation among its parts & thus asserted, if we know the things included under the Absolute we cannot say that the Absolute is wholly unknowable. He admitted the possibility of worshipping the Absolute since a man cannot worship a being whom he knows to be the creation of his own mind. He found fault with Spence for not providing us with any psychological or epistemological ground for his abrupt division of reality into the phenomenal & the noumenal. Science acc. to the essayist is not a self-contained whole; it is progressive & no ultimate limit can be put to it. He remarked that the theory of the Absolute advocated by Spence, is a logical abstraction. There cannot be any such distinction between thought and reality; what we can know to exist must be in harmony with our thought. He then confirmed his position by a reference to Spence himself acc. to whom the Absolute is immanent in the higher faculties of mind and reveals itself in human consciousness. Thus the Absolute cannot be unknown to ~~the man~~ who has attained to the necessary ethical & spiritual development.

President Dr. Shastri then made some  
general observations as to the philosophy of  
Spencer and drew the attention of all to  
the aprokhi patha of Spencer which is maintained  
by all right-thinking philosophers.

Presidency College } Mangamandan  
Nov. 11, 1914. } Secretary

configned  
P. D. Shastri  
President.

Nov 11, 1914

## Proceedings of the Third Meeting

The third meeting of the Subject Seminar in Philosophy of Religion was held on the 19<sup>th</sup> Nov. 1946, at 12 P.M. under the presidency of Dr. Prabhudatt Shastri.

Babu Bipin Vihari Sr. read his paper on 'The Religious Philosophy of Kant'. The essayist based his paper <sup>mainly</sup> on the Transcendental Dialectic, Critique of Pure Reason & Religion within the bounds of Pure Reason. He shows the steps by which Kant has proved the autonomy of Pure Reason to establish the concepts of Religion, God, freedom, & Immortality & granted to them only a regulative function.

In the Critique of Practical Reason Kant establishes the validity of the same concepts as the postulates of Reason in the practical guidance of life.

In his last work Kant identifies religion with morality and construes the function of the Church, the State the Bible & the life of Jesus all as factors & institutions leading to the building up of pure ethical life.

The essayist considers at great length, the Hegelian criticism of Kant's disposal of the ontological argument. Their main position is that the presupposition of pure Reason should have as great an objective validity as the presupposition of practical reason. The contention however proves untenable when we consider that the presupposition of thought and the presupposition of life cannot produce the same degree of conviction as to their objective validity.

Among the current criticisms of Kant he mentioned Kant's reduction of religion to morality & in this point he differs from Kant.



The president then explicitly showed the distinction between Kant's & Hegel's positions and the faculty dedicates Hegel. He compared Kant's rigid morality with the ideal of Indian yogis & showed it to be a higher religious attainment. Kant's sep religious view does not give us any complete system, as it leaves ~~can~~ no room for common people but it leads people to a high sphere of morality and religion when they have made advances in that direction.

Presidency College } Anangamsam  
The 25<sup>th</sup> Nov. 1914 } Secretary

Confined  
P. D. Shastri  
President

## Proceedings of the Fourth Meeting

The fourth meeting of the Seminar in Religious Philosophy came off on the 25<sup>th</sup> ultimo, under the presidency of Dr Shastri, when Babu Brajendra Kumar Chaudhuri read a paper on "Schleiermacher's Philosophy of Religion."

The essayist treated the subject under four heads: - 1) Relation of Religion to Epistemology and morality, 2) Sch's epistemology, 3) Sch's Philosophy of Religion, 4) his metaphysics. He was very earnest about proving that "in the heart of religion, the apprehension of truth, enthusiasm of devotion, and manifestation of activity inseparably blend." Sch, he maintains, has failed to do full justice to the cognitive and volitional elements in religious consciousness, in ~~to~~ his zeal to emphasize the emotional element, so long neglected by philosophers. He gave an analysis of Sch's views regarding the origin, purpose and factors of religion, his notion of God, development of religion, positive religions, dogmas, teachings and miracles. Roughly speaking, he sided with Sch, with regard to the 1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup>, 5<sup>th</sup>, 6<sup>th</sup>, 7<sup>th</sup>, 8<sup>th</sup> points, differing from him with regard to the remaining three. Under the last heading, our essayist analysed Sch's conception of freedom, immortality, optimism etc. Dissenting from Sch, he said that freedom means self-determination, immortality means personal immortality, and "good" can have no meaning except in relation to "evil."

Dr Shastri then spoke of the merit and demerit of the paper, and threw much light on many of the points touched and untouched in the paper. He pointed out in Sch's philosophy, the elements of Spinozism (e.g. feeling of unity, determinism etc), of Kantianism (e.g. in the negative attitude against reason so far as religion is concerned) and of Leibnizianism (in explaining the One & the Many as equally important.) He then spoke of the importance of Sch in the history of Philosophy as the first great philosopher after Kant who regarded religion as all important, being more a theologian than a metaphysician. The President agreed with Babu Brajendrakumar in holding that feeling as such forming the whole of the religious consciousness makes

religion subjectivistic. Indeed, feeling in itself is an abstraction + the correct conception of the mind is that of an organic whole of the cognitive, volitional and emotional elements. He however pointed out that Sch could not have meant religion as feeling, pure + simple — in all possibility, he meant it to be a state of consciousness in which feeling preponderates. But the great ambiguity in Sch is as to the feeling itself. Feeling of unity, + feeling of dependence appear in his <sup>earlier +</sup> later writings as constituting religious consciousness. Again he does not make it quite clear upon whom that dependence is. Babu Bipinbikari De said that the feeling of dependence is spoken of by Sch as emerging before the differentiation bet. subject + object takes place; but is this a psychological fact? Dr. Shastri agreed with him in holding that this feeling is rather the outcome + than the predecessor of reflection and asked the students to think out this psychological problem in the light of Child Psychology.

Incidentally, Dr. Shastri explained the idea of personality as essentially involving limitation — *Upādhi*.

The discussions were continued on the 26<sup>th</sup> inst. Dr. Shastri further explained the real meaning of Sch's emphasis on feeling as not altogether doing away with the other factors of consciousness + pointed out in this connection the injustice of Pfleiderer's criticism of Sch on this point. Bipinbikari De said that he found it difficult to reconcile the feeling of dependence + that of dependence and that of unity spoken of in the same breath by Sch. Dr. Shastri removed his difficulty by explaining that these two feelings are to be regarded as moments in the development of the religious consciousness.

Presidency College,  
Dec. 2, 1914.

Secretary.

J. Shastri.  
President.

1914.

## Proceedings of the Fifth Meeting

The fifth meeting of the subject Seminar in Philosophy of Religion was held on the 9th under Dec. 1914 under the presidency of Dr. Prabhudatta Shastri. Bhai Ananjanmohan Sam read a paper on "The Religious Philosophy of Hegel."

The essayist, first, gave a short summary of Hegel's view as to the evolution of spirit and of the religion through different historical religions. He also referred to his own novel interpretation of the trinitarian doctrine of the Christian Church & also considered the special meaning put upon the 'worship' by Hegel. The essayist then criticised the following features of Hegel's Philosophy. He showed that Hegel talking of logical categories & abstractions throughout, is inconsistent when he makes a transition to the development of reality evolving in time. "He pretends to give us a thought-process incarnate in reality but thought remains motionless & its transitions are really affected by the introduction of phenomenal becoming." Hegel evades giving any definite answer to the ~~world-old~~ questions ~~what lies~~ as to the nature of God and His relation to man. If the Absolute exist as completed self-consciousness, there remain in Hegelian system, no room for the Nature or finite selves. Again the identification of the Absolute with the subject of the development makes it impossible for us to rise higher than man's actual achievement. Hence ~~now~~ in the field of Ethics & Politics, Hegel's absolutism has been destructive of, because the assumption of finality is inconsistent with these sciences of the ideals.

Dr. Shastri then elaborately discussed the merits & demerits of Hegelian system. First of all he remarked that the idea of development, is a  
↳ introduced by Hegel

distinct improvement upon the previous systems  
of Philosophy, the defect being that he considers it to be  
logical. He has shown the connection of Hegel with  
Spinoza & Leibnitz and shows that the static sub-  
stance of Spinoza has been turned into a self  
which is making itself in the universe. He also  
shows that the whole structure of Hegel's Phil  
is based on the assumption that Real is rational  
& rational is real. How questionable the truth of  
this fundamental assumption the whole structure  
would come down. His idea of evolution can  
only be justified if the real is irrational.  
He held that Hegel's assertion as to the relative  
truth of every religion is noteworthy, but the  
place of absolute religion assigned to Christi-  
anity shows his intellectual dogmatism.  
He criticized the interpretation put upon the  
doctrine of Trinity by Hegel and showed that  
it was antagonistic to the ordinary explanation  
given to it by the Church. As to the definition  
of religion given by Hegel, he is right in  
emphasizing the intellectual element reason  
because the religions though primarily con-  
sisting of feeling as shown by Schleier  
should be developed by means of reason.  
In his discourse, he compared many details  
of Hegel with those of the Johannites.  
and said that since the whole is in  
a state of movement, this philosophy  
cannot be called an Absolute Philosophy  
which will only be misnomer.

J. F. Kas...  
President

Proceedings of the Sixth Meeting.

Date — January 5, 1915.

Subject — The Religious Philosophy of Fichte.

Essayist — Babu Pares Chandra Ganguli.

The following is a summary of the Paper:

We cannot, acc. to Fichte, infer from the world of sense the existence of an extra-mundane personal deity. The cosmological and teleological arguments are useless, because 1) the world is a self-contained whole; 2) the degrees of intelligence are only ideas or notions. The non-ego or the thing-in-itself of Kant is a phenomenal product of the ego, hence the impossibility of inferring God from the transcendental point of view. The consciousness of a freedom and of a moral purpose in our life are the grounds of our knowledge of God.

There are several stages in the philosophy of Fichte. In the earlier stages, he meant by God, the impersonal moral order of the universe and identified morality and religion. Fichte afterwards developed the objective aspect of his idealism & came to Ethical Pantheism. But in his later stages, he gradually differentiated morality & religion, regarding religion as much higher than morality, and held that life, love and blessedness are one & the same.

The essayist thinks that the different stages of Fichte's philosophy are not in contradiction to one another but form a continuous series of development. His system always remained the same — the monism of the moral will.

S. A. Alauddin Sabrawardy objected to the essayist's view that Fichte's later philosophy is a development of his earlier and he held that the later philosophy is altogether a new system. In the other one, God is given as "activity"; in the other, he is described as "pure being".

B. K. Chaudhuri maintained that Fichte's earlier Philosophy was purely subjective in opposition to Kant's Philosophy, while in his later philosophy his objective side was fairly developed which turned his philosophy to Ethical Pantheism. K. C. Deb pointed out how Fichte with his conception of religion as the love of God approaches Spinoza with the difference that while Spinoza's Pantheism is metaphysical, Fichte's is ethical, by which he removes the moral dualism of Kant's ethics by means of religion.

The President went over the whole ground again, lucidly explaining the main position of Fichte. He particularly agreed with S. A. Alauddin Surrawardy in holding that Fichte's later philosophy was something wholly different from his earlier.

Presidency College, }  
Jan. 25, 1915 } for Secretary.

Bipinbihari De

for Secretary.

P. D. Shastri

President.





fall is a ~~step~~ means of higher synthesis, brought about by redemption. In his *Philosophy of Mythology & Revelation* he insists that the real *philosophy of religion* should grasp religion in its historical reality & should not confine itself to the religion of reason.

The discussion about the paper was postponed as it was to be done along with the class lessons in connection with Pfeiffer's *Philosophy of Religion*.

Pres. de la Roche  
28<sup>th</sup> Jan. 1915 }

President.

Proceedings of the Eighth Meeting.

Date - Feb. 15, 1915.

Subject - Philosophy of Schopenhauer

Essayist - S. A. Albadri Subwardi.

The essay gave a brief survey ~~of~~ with Certain Criticisms of the Philosophy of Schopenhauer, after the reading of which discussions followed which mainly mainly turned round the questions, 1) whether <sup>the</sup> Summun Bonum of Schopenhauer can be identified with the Buddhistic or so-called ideal of extinction, 2) whether <sup>the</sup> Quietistic ideal of Sch. is at all conceivable, 3) whether Schopenhauer is a pessimist in the sense in which he is generally understood to be.

Dr. Shastri pointed out that Schopenhauer did not advocate absolute annihilation - nor does Buddhism, as commonly supposed, do it - but spoke only of a higher state of existence resulting from the renunciation of the will and death to all its desires. He substantiated his statement by referring to a passage in <sup>W</sup> *Moria* as Will and Idea: "Behind our present existence there is something else, which we can only reach by shuffling off this world." Schopenhauer is not a pessimist absolutely; he does not advocate suicide, he does not regard this world as the ~~world~~ worst of all possible worlds; he, on the contrary, finds aesthetic consolations and moral truths in this world. He declares: "To say that the world has only a physical & not a moral significance is the greatest & most pernicious of all errors." As to the inconceivability of a state of pure changelessness, Dr. Shastri said that it is equally impossible to conceive a state of infinite and incessant change (as in Bergson) and it is more

to think of pure existence as the reality and Change  
as simply an accident of it.

Dr. Shastri then read some letters & extract from a  
German work on the life of Schopenhauer, bearing on  
his influence on Browning, Tolstoi, Beethoven and on  
art in general.

Presidency College, } Bipinbhanu De  
Calcutta. } for Secretary.

President

## The Ninth Meeting.

Date - Feb. 22, 1915.

Subject - Anthropologism & Positivism.

Essayist - Babu Brajendra Kumar Chaudhuri.

The following is a brief outline of the essay:

The essay begins with a historical sketch of the development of Positivism. "It is impossible," says the essayist, following Comte, "to fix the precise date of this mental revolution viz. Positivism, we can only say that like all other great human events it took place continuously, and at an increasing rate specially since the labours of Aristotle and the Alexandrian School." In recent times it has got a new impetus from Bacon, Descartes, Galileo, Hume, Mill, Comte, Spencer & others.

The main principles of Positivism is to discover by a well-combined use of reasoning and observation the actual laws of phenomena - their invariable relation of succession & likeness. Anthropologism only deifies man and fanifully makes him absolute.

Feuerbach holds that man cannot go beyond his own true nature; in conceiving God, he only mirrors himself. The Subject of the deity is reason, but the subject of reason is man. Man makes God in his own image. Feuerbach later on passed from irreligious Anthropologism to immoral naturalism. With him now, "Man is what he eats." The essayist here adds a few points of criticism and touching upon one or two points with regard to Strauss, passes on to Comte's Positivism.

The essayist here tries to explain at some length the philosophical meaning of Positivism & is of opinion that "Positivism as a consistent system of Philosophy cannot have any religion in it."

true sense of the term. Following Edward Caird and Robert Flint he also adds a criticism of the so-called Law of Three States. After explaining what Comte meant by Positivistic religion, he criticises the conception thus: "What Positivism gives to the world as religion is really something else. It has given a ~~short~~ picture not of religion but of morality and has completely confounded religion & morality."


After summarising the Religious Philosophy of Mill & Spencer, the essay ends by saying that Positivism should be modified by idealism into idealistic Positivism or Positivistic idealism.

After the reading of the paper, some informal discussions took place connected more with the class lessons on the subject than with the essay itself.

The meeting came to a close with a brief resumé & critique of Positivism from Dr. Shastri.

Presidency College,  
Calcutta }  
Dipankar De  
for Secy.

P. S. Shastri  
President



THE FIRST MEETING

DATE — Sept. 18, 1916

SUBJECT — "A critique of Agnosticism"

ESSAYIST — Mr. Debnarayan Mukherjee BA

PRESIDENT — Dr. P. D. Shastri

The following is a brief outline of the  
Essay: —

The essay deals with the following topics  
of Agnosticism.

- (1) Its origin and application.
- (2) Agnosticism as an epistemological theory is equivalent to philosophical skepticism: Agnosticism and Gnosticism doubt and faith.
- (3) Eminent views of Agnosticism — Know-nothingism, atheism, Positivism and Skepticism.
- (4) Its history — ancient, mediæval and modern — with special reference to Rant, Comte, Hamilton, Spenser and Royce.
- (5) Grounds of Agnosticism — a priori and a posteriori — as offered by Hamilton and Spenser.
- (6) Objections from theory and practice
- (7) Reputation by Royce
- (8) Agnosticism — its elements of truth for faith  
morality, religion, science, progress and mystery  
ending in Healthy Optimism.

Dr. Sastri opened the debate by saying that the paper is a comprehensive one.

Amal chandra supported the Hegelian conclusion. The absolute exists to give existence and validity to the finite, but is not known ~~to~~ by us owing to the relativity of human knowledge. He advocated the Hegelian identity of thought and being, because we stand in need of unity and not utter dualism. But it maybe asked — Do not this assertion, a *petitio principii*?

To the president's question — "In what way the table is identified with reason?" — Amal chandra

replied "In as much as it is a factor in the life and perfection of reason". In Jayendra Nath's opinion, epistemologically, agnosticism is quite sound, but it has very little constructive value, though this position is better than the dogmatic one. Human nature cannot ~~be~~ rest satisfied with the finite and conditioned only, but necessarily rises to something infinite and unconditioned.

The writer is of opinion that the idea of Agnosticism is not to pull down all positive and constructive theories, but to make certain distinctions. If there is no distinction between appearance and reality, then what are all the philosophers quarrelling for? If reason could fathom the transcendental world, then there would have been no mystery, no religion.

The president is of opinion that we cannot have an analytical, empirical, mathematical finite knowledge of the Absolute, but only a



higher unity with the absolute. Thus in a sense the absolute is unknowable. Everything is known by being unknown. The ultimate problems cannot be solved in the same way in which scientific objects are explained.

So long our piety and a general principle for our life remain intact, we do not require the assumption of God's personality.

Razemuddin supported more or less the writer's position.

Mohima Makul Hajra referred to the agnostic element in the Sankhya philosophy and to its *Vedānman* (वेदान्त).

Now this वेदान्त or अज्ञान saves the Purusha from its bondage. The Sankhya does not deny God, but only denies the proof of God's existence in the Kantian sense.

In conclusion the president referred to the loose sense in which the writer applied the term 'Agnostic' to Bacon, Descartes, Locke and Hume, as also to the ancient philosophers, thus considerably thinning the term of its connotation.

The writer <sup>applies the term</sup> ~~a uses the~~ in the sense of the negation of the illusion of knowledge and of fancied power of knowledge — the sense referred to in the beginning of the paper. The meeting came to a close after 3 o'clock.

Presidency College } Debnarayan Mookerjee  
Calcutta } Secretary

Sept. 18. 1916

J. S. Shashi  
Sept. 29, 1916 President

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## The Second Meeting

Date — September 29, 1916

Subject — "Religion and Science"

Essayist — Mr. Kazimuddin Ahmed B.A.

President — Dr. P. D. Shastri

The paper dealt with the criticism of Spence's statement about the antagonism between Science and Religion, its historical survey in Greek, mediæval and modern philosophy and some reflections on it. The antagonism is not so much between two doctrines as between the scientific spirit and the religious spirit. A reconciliation is possible not between traditional religion and positive sciences, but between Philosophical Religion and Science — a reconciliation by mutual apology effected by Philosophy.

The President commented on the merits and defects of the paper. Mr. Moni Bhawan Muzumdar took part in the discussion.

Mr. D. N. Mookerjee is of opinion that "the conflict of Religion and Science must be taken as analogous to the conflict of different members or forms of vital activity in one organism, a competition which in the healthy organism is always subordinated to cooperation."

Scientific knowableness of the world must be grounded on a belief in the creative divine reason. The phenomenal world of Science is only one half of reality. The other half contributed by our inner spiritual nature is more significant.

On the other hand the representationists of Religion possess the treasure of spiritual truth only in earthly vessel, in symbolic representations, so that Science ~~be~~ rightly separates the eternal truth from its temporal vessel, the spiritual Real from its sensuous shell. The presence and activity of God is to be found not in rare exceptional occurrences (miracles), but in the whole constant order of nature, not in the mysterious miraculous revelations in the remote past, but in the whole development of the moral and religious life of humanity. In this Science offers a friendly service to Religion. F

The discussion not being finished during the time allowed was postponed.

P. D. Shastri  
President

Debnarayan Mukherjee

Secretary

On the 1<sup>st</sup> Oct, 1916, the discussion of Religion and Science was resumed and the members of the Seminar took part in it. Then the president treated the problem at length by considering all its aspects. F. M.

Debnarayan Mukherjee

Secretary

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P. D. Shastri  
President

## The Third Meeting.

Date — Nov. 26, 1916

Subject — The Idea of God.

Essayist — Mr. Gopal Chandra Bhattacharjee B.A.

President — Dr. P. D. Shastri.

The essayist began by showing the innate universal craving of the human mind to reach a supersensuous principle so as to connect, coordinate, and explain our varied and manifold experiences. Then after having traced the evolution of the idea of God through the three successive stages of animism, polytheism, and monotheism, he gave a historical orientation from the history of European and Indian philosophy. He next showed how the human spirit starting from the anthropomorphic standpoint, externalised itself in its fetishes and gods and then returned to itself with deeper and richer fulness in the conception of the Atman as Brahman, as in the Vedanta where as Max Müller said, the human mind seems to have reached the very acme of speculation. When this conviction of the essential identity of the Atman and Brahman is reached, all difficulties as to the personal and other attributes of Godhead are seen to be devoid of all meaning. But this conviction has to be reached through Sādhanā.

The president opened the debate by clearing explaining the problem and pointing out a few defects in the paper.

Mr. D. N. Mookerjee was opinion the writer's treatment of the problem was one-sided and mainly historical. He then offered some epistemological and metaphysical grounds for our belief in God. The idea of God is always

presupposed in the consciousness of man. The consciousness of the finite and the relative presupposes the idea of the infinite. Pfliderer has clearly shown how the idea of the infinite rises to an explicit consciousness of itself in the human mind. Dr. Caird, in his Evolution of Religion, has shown how all science and positive religion lead up to Absolute Religion or Panthe Panentheism. The ordinary consciousness sees things, self-existent, independent or externally related. The scientific consciousness interprets the relation of things by causality. The world is scientific world is a vast causal nexus. While the philosophical consciousness supposes one unitary principle underlying the causal nexus. The ontological proof of God's existence offered by Descartes must be considered in the light of Hegel's philosophy. The relativity of subject and object demands that the world as object must be related to a Supreme Subject, of which it is the expression. In Hegel's dialectic of Idea, we see how an Absolute Idea realises itself in and through the world-process as well as is the principle of man's evolution. Hence it is the absolute idea of God that is working in nature as well as in human minds showing how the idea of God is always present in the human mind. Hence is the necessity of Religion. Hence is our unrest incessant sense of unrest in all that it is: finite and particular, and continual movement towards the Infinite in which alone we have our final satisfaction.

Mr. Raza-uddin Ahmad ~~was~~ is of opinion that we ~~do not~~ proceed from nature-worship to the worship of God. Experience does not verify this. We get the idea from revelation. He then offered some idea of God from the Islam religion.

The discussion not being finished during the time allowed was postponed.

P. S. S. S.

The fourth meeting

Date — Dec. 4, 1916

Subject — "The Idea of God"

President — Dr. P. D. Shastri.

The President continued the debate on the problem of God and asked the members of the Seminar to state their position clearly.

In Mr. Razemuddin's opinion, revelation is the necessary element of our belief in God.

Mr. S. N. Mitra supported Mr. Razem's position by quoting <sup>the well known</sup> a passage from the Gita: ~~यदा यदा धर्मो~~ "yada yada hi dharmasayo glānirbhavati Bharat etc"

Mr. M. M. Hajra put forward the question — 'Is there any justification on religious grounds for personifying the ultimate object of worship by the term 'God'?

In Mr. D. N. Mookerjee's opinion, the essayist has not clearly stated the problem of God as it now stands. Then he stated the modern problem, and the modern philosophers either hold either monism or theism, absolute substance or infinite and unconditioned subject. Further he was of opinion that the writer had not clearly shown the development and

in a systematic way.

The President went over the whole ground and did full justice to all the aspects of the problem. Man is essentially religious. No amount of epistemological and metaphysical considerations could ~~make~~ create belief in God, if its germs were not already present in every human heart. Though the idea of God is innate, yet at the same time it is capable of development. Religion is never found without a reformer or religious mind. Though the word of God might be at the beginning, yet revelation gets coloured through individual vehicle. Hence some imperfections inherent in human nature creep in the idea of God.

The Psychological process also has its place. If we start with the notion that religion is complete from the beginning, then there will be no ~~progressive~~ evolution ~~whose law~~ which is true of all departments of nature.

Debnarayan Mukherjee

Secretary,

P. D. Shastri

President



Date — Dec 11, 1916  
Subject — "Hegel's Conception of Religion"  
Essayist — Mr Sudhiranjau Raychowdhuri B.A  
President — Dr. P. D. Thakur.

The essayist began by giving Hegel's definition of Religion as an effort of the finite mind to raise itself above its own finite and temporal circumstances; and rise to a consciousness of the universal power and plan, and also its identity of nature with the absolute evolving power and its superiority to the things and forms of the physical world by being part of the power which evokes the world. He then stated the relation of Religion to the circumstances of the time, to philosophy, to the different positive religions, to the religious consciousness of the present day, the ~~di~~ and to the absolute religion, viz. Christianity, and also the difficulties in the way of philosophy of Religion, the division of the subject, and the problem of evil.

Mr Amal Ch. Maitra took up the question of physical evil and *vakti*. Physical evils maybe explained by the conception of *sub specie aeternitatis*. Every action contributes to the realisation of the Absolute. The stage of *vakti* is reached by identifying our will with God's will.

Mr Provas Chandra Mandal asked the president whether Hegel's solution of evil was correct. Now, Spinoza does away with the existence of evil altogether. But Hegel admits it.

existence. The question of evil is too real and palpable a fact to be ignored or lightly brushed aside. The point is that we have to determine whether there is any physical evil with reference to absolute spirit or it is merged in the whole evolutionary process losing its evil character.

Mr Nagendra Nath Rammakar pointed that if evolution was to go on for ever, how Hegel could consistently speak of Christianity as being the absolute religion.

Mr Analyach. Mukherjee stated that Religion not only consisted, was not merely intellectual but also took cognisance of feeling also.

Mr. D. N. Mookerjee is of opinion that the whole superstructure of Hegel's philosophy stands on the identity of thinking and being. Hegel tries to justify this identity by saying that nature is essentially spiritual. There is a spiritual organic unity in and through nature which is its mere expression. Religion is not solely a matter of intellect, but also takes cognisance of feeling and willing also to some extent. If everything, If evolution is to go on forever, then we cannot say that Christianity is the perfect and absolute religion. Moreover Hegel's classification of definite religion is entirely based on abstraction. Here the superficiality of his triple method is most apparent. Moreover Hegel's religion is not a religion for the mass. We must have Vakti in addition to Jnana. Hegel leaves Hegel's absolute philosophy leaves very little room for the freedom of finite souls, who ought to be regarded as fellow workers with God even. If the Absolute needs the finite for its manifestation, if the finite souls are also factors in the development of the absolute, then surely we cannot <sup>ignore</sup> them.

Hegel condemns Spinoza's ~~static~~ substance as static inert and static, while his own <sup>Absolute</sup> ~~System~~ is essentially dynamic and evolving the worldprocess as necessary factor in ~~the~~ its development. But we do not find any sufficient explanation of the fact how the worldprocess arises from the absolute. Hence he does <sup>not</sup> think that Hegel's <sup>dynamic</sup> Absolute any better than Spinoza's static substance.

The President commented on the paper which sums up Hegel's philosophy of Religion within a short space. The paper gives a fine exposition and takes up all the necessary facts. To facilitate discussion, the president referred the members of the Seminar to several ~~points~~ issues in connexion with Hegel's philosophy of Religion.

How to evolve is to make itself real. Does it follow, then, the absolute is ~~never~~ <sup>real</sup> and is always in the process of realising itself? Evolution by its very name implies higher development, then it is the very nature of the absolute to keep itself developing higher perfection. What is the good of employing the word 'potentiality' if we ~~have~~ <sup>find</sup> absolute out of time and yet realising in time. Do there exist two absolutes, if time and space are objectively real? We must ascertain how God and man are identical. It appears that God in time becomes man and realises itself, and God out of time is the absolute spirit. Does evolution necessarily <sup>imply</sup> ~~mean~~ all round perfection? Hegel says that the world on the whole has necessarily developed. There has been material

civilisation. But does it follow that there has been spiritual development too? Were the old Greeks necessarily imperfect than us? Hegel says that there is something to be realised. Now what is the end or purpose of this evolution? Is it the realisation of God's own nature? But is He not ~~eternally~~ always realised? Again how do finite things existing in time attach themselves to that which is out of time? Is He affected? Now new evolution is possible from the finite point of view. But how is it possible from the absolute standpoint? How can the Absolute spirit realise itself? How can the reality of time and the Absolute be reconciled? What is the meaning of evolution then? How can we know and speak of potentialities of the Absolute spirit without surveying the whole content of reality? Are all these problems of Hegel mere assumptions? What is the function of thought, if Hegel is so very angry with the term 'abstract'? Hegel as well as Boethius, Hegel and Spinoza denied independent reality to the finite as such. Spinoza does concede dependent reality to the finite souls which are real in as much as they are modes. Judged from the absolute standpoint they are merged in the all-encompassing Substance. Now the crux of the discussion is - whether even in time we are real? As Hegel derives the many from the one, so he has to bring the many to the one. What is the necessity of the bombastic language? Of what significance are the processes of thesis, antithesis and synthesis?

What is the end we are drifting on?

Hegel is no doubt outwardly professed monism but we find his system dealing with finite things pluralistic through and through. What is purpose is gained by reducing the whole nature possibly to the three stages? Shall should we not first ascertain whether the facts of nature do yield to the three stages or not? What is the necessity of extending these stages to morality and religion also? His method is deductive and superficial. Its only use is intellectual logical discipline. This determinism is challenged both by external and internal nature.

In worship the individual realises its essential identity with God. Now what kind of worship does Hegel mean?

We ask whether man's will is to be made ~~with~~ identical with God or it is left to man to identify his will with the will of God. Again we have to ascertain whether nature helps ~~man~~ <sup>man</sup> in ~~his~~ <sup>his</sup> process of evolution or man has to counteract nature.

How does Hegel know that all religions contain an element of truth? If evolution goes on for ever, and if Christianity is the

absolute religion, ~~of Jesus~~ <sup>been</sup> ~~has the past~~ ~~Christianity~~ is the present Christianity, ~~identical with the~~ <sup>then</sup> present past? Now if perfection depends absolutely on time, if the latest is the best, then why is this degradation or depravity of man's character that we actually find at the present time?

~~The discussion~~

Further discussion on the problem was postponed.

DD Shastri

## The Sixth meeting.

Date — December 18, 1916

Subject — "A Critique of Pantheism"

Essayist — Mr. Mohima Mahul Hajra B.A.

President — Dr. P. D. Shastri:

The President after treating at length all the issues raised in the last meeting, asked Mr. M. M. Hajra to read his paper.

The writer began by considering the different theories of the universe predominant from time to time in the European and Indian history of Religion. He traced the historical development of the conception from the ancient down to the modern time mentioning its various forms and chief exponents, its relation to theism, deism, materialism, panphenomenalism, mysticism, and other systems. He ended by referring at length to the Vedantic conception of Pantheism.

The discussion about the paper was postponed.

D. N. Mukherjee  
Secretary

P. D. Shastri  
President  
Jan. 15, 1917

## The Seventh meeting

Date — January 15, 1917  
Subject — "Mysticism"  
Essayist — Mr. Saroj Kumar Das. B.A.  
President — Dr. P. D. Shastri

The Secretary having read the proceeding of the last meeting, the president asked Mr. S. K. Das to read his paper on mysticism.

The writer began by considering the abuse of the word 'mysticism' and its derivative meaning as a secret teaching which corresponds to what we mean by Upanishad, then its various definitions offered by the eastern and western philosophers, some words of justification for the mystic tendency as a recognition of the limitation of our intellect and the presence of a superior faculty. We man to apprehend truth beyond the reach of intellect — found in this sense almost in all philosophy, east and west; that mysticism is at home with itself in religion, that it is not to be confused with pantheism, psychology of mysticism <sup>is</sup> necessarily ~~the psychology of religion,~~ ~~regress from particulars to the unity revealed in them~~ — an act of necessary psychological abstraction, some remarks on nature-mysticism and symbolism, and ~~the distinction of the~~ ~~mystic passion for God from sexual passion,~~ the mystic way as a fivefold stratified process, the relation of mysticism to the problem of time and

good and evil. It is here that the writer can stress on the infinite value and destiny of individuality. Time has value and importance only in relation to desires and practice. The mystic sounds the note of resolute optimism and infinite peace. Mysticism, like philosophy, is an attitude of the individual towards the world around him and towards life as a whole, and not a creed about the world.

Mysticism should not be confounded with pseudo-mysticism insinuating the discredit and surrender of reason as hostile, but consonant with reason as a harmonising faculty. Then the writer pointed out the ~~temperamental bias~~ <sup>temperamental bias</sup> of the western philosophers when they distinguished between the eastern and western mysticism. The Indian philosophy which upholds the Atman as the sole reality cannot be said to ~~lose the~~ <sup>annihilate</sup> ~~the self~~ <sup>the self</sup> mystic life in the grave of the all-devouring One, with no life-giving message transcending mortality. The Buddhist annihilation is not the supreme end of the Indian mystics. Even admitting the spirit of reform preserved by the western mystics, we must concede to the eastern contemplative life a higher place than the life of action. The supremacy of faith over works was vindicated ~~by~~ even by St. Paul and Cerygeu. Finally as to the significance of the exalted experiences of the mystics



for the life of the unmystical the writer  
asserted that they responded to the crying  
needs of the human heart and ~~are~~<sup>are</sup>  
necessary also for understanding the history  
of humanity. The difference between  
the mystic and the unmystical is a difference  
of degree and not of kind.

The discussion about the paper was postponed.

D. N. Mukherjee  
Secretary

29.1.17

P. S. Shastri

President

## SESSION 1916-18.

Date .. 1<sup>st</sup> October, 1917

President .. ~~Dr~~ Principal W. C. Wordsworth.

Subject .. Philosophy of Values

Essayist .. S. S. Saroj Kumar Das.

The first meeting of this session came off on the 1<sup>st</sup> of October under the presidency of Principal Wordsworth. S. S. Saroj Kumar Das read a paper on the "Philosophy of Values". The following is a brief summary of the paper:

~~The problem of value is grounded in the conception of a~~  
~~supreme good date so far back as~~

The philosophy of values has to encounter two deadly foes in the rigid intellectualism as that of Hegel and naturalism as that of De Bois Reymond, and Spencer.

To begin with, a philosophy of values must dispel a gloomy sense of the worthlessness of human life. It must be grounded in a ~~solid~~ faith - faith in the worth of human life. This is an ultimate postulate of life. Life like thought is in fact the constant repetition of scepticism.

Schopenhauer's pessimistic theory is combated and the pragmatic validity of a will to believe in the worth of human life is set ~~over~~ upon its place.

Here a passing reference is made to the problem of evil which is properly speaking a side issue of the problem of values, atleast in its negative aspect.

Historically considered the anti-intellectualistic tendencies in modern thought paved the way for a philosophy of values by showing how Naturalism or its later form Positivism and Intellectualism failed as an adequate conceptions

of the universe - the former in ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~pragmatic~~ <sup>pragmatic</sup> ~~of~~ <sup>of</sup> ~~Herbert Spencer~~ <sup>Herbert Spencer</sup> and in Bois Reymond's 'Ignorabimus' and the latter in Bradley's modified scepticism and intuitionism and He Jaffar's mythical 'immediatism'. All the clamant voices of Neo- and Empirio-criticism, Con-

Pragmatism and Intuitionism, Voluntarism and Pragmatism are brought to reason in the Philosophy of Values. In ancient philosophy Socrates is regarded as having for the first time broached this problem of value in his formulation of the 'good'. In Modern Philosophy Kant is universally credited for having re-asserted the question in his theory of the Primacy of Practical Reason which subsequently branched off into three grooves: (1) first, Pragmatism and Humanism, (2) secondly, Intuitionism and Intuitionism and (3) the third the Philosophy of values or <sup>the</sup> better styled as Voluntaristic Idealism. There are, broadly speaking, three types of the philosophy of values: (1) first, the Psychological initiated by Renouvier and developed by Pragmatism and Humanism, (2) second, the Epistemological, exploited by Rickert and Windelband, (3) and the third, the Metaphysical championed by Fichte and Lotze and carried out systematically by Münsterberg, Royce and Eucken in its idealistic line and Nietzsche and Lyman in its biological - evidential forms. These various types may be again classified according to the relation between value and reality they set forth: first, Value as superior to reality - the Sollen the prins of the Sein (Rickert); secondly, value as co-ordinate with reality (Münsterberg); thirdly, reality as the ground and essence of values - hence superior to reality. (Bradley and Bouanquet); and lastly, reality not superior to reality but as the concrete fulfilment of all values which belong to the core and essence of reality (Royce, Lyman, Lotze etc)

The essayist ~~upholds~~ sides with Royce who in his definition of the ~~individual~~ individual as an "object of exclusive interest and love" and holds <sup>as against</sup> on this point that finite individual experience is not 'lost' or 'absorbed' or 'transmuted' in ~~human~~ experience but is a concrete

embodiment <sup>life of the</sup> in toto of the Absolute, <sup>Prasanna's conception of the</sup> <sup>diff. conceptions, not intended to discuss</sup> the last word of a philosophy of values is that our Weitanschauung must ultimately be based on a Lebensanschauung. Life is the melting pot, the glowing crucible out of which values evolve - not destroying the old ones as one species does another in the biological world but by conserving all that can stand the test of time tend toward a consummative value.

Sj. S. Roy Chowdhury and Sj. J. Maltra criticised the paper and the President in summing up the debate pointed out the defects of the paper.

Secretary.

President.

P. D. Shastri

### Second Meeting

President ... Dr. Prabhudatt Shastri.

Subject ... Pragmatism.

Essayist ... Sj. Sudhiranjan Roy Chowdhury, B.A.

Date - November 29, 1917.

The second meeting came off on the 29<sup>th</sup> Nov, 1917 under the presidency of Dr. P. D. Shastri. Dr. S. Sudhiranjan Roy Chowdhury read his paper on "Pragmatism". The following is a brief summary of the paper:

Pragmatism is neither a revolt against philosophy nor a revolution in philosophy, except in so far as it is an important evolution of philosophy. It has arisen naturally in the course of philosophical reflection. It has come into being by the convergence of distinct lines of thought pursued in different countries by different thinkers. It is in the scientific world, Darwinism, internal convulsions of philosophy itself, religion and psychology.

Pragmatism is a temper of mind, an attitude; it is also a theory of the nature of ideas and truth, and finally it is a theory about reality. It is a way to make the our ideas clear. "Make the distinction and there is no occasion for any further dispute." Its great question is - does it work? and this is for two reasons: in the first place, because its working is practically more

important than its merely theoretical truth; and secondly because, the only test he has for its truth is its successful working.

Pragmatism represents the empiricist attitude in a radical form. The pragmatist turns away from abstraction and insufficiency, from verbal solutions, from bad a priori reasons, from fixed principles, closed systems and pretended absolutes and origins. He turns towards concreteness, adequacy, facts, action & power. But pragmatism does not stand for any special results. It is a method only.

Pragmatism agrees with nominalism in always appealing to particulars, with utilitarianism in emphasizing practical aspect, with positivism in its disdain for verbal solutions, useless questions and metaphysical abstractions.

Pragmatism says that ideas become true just in so far as they help us to get into satisfactory relation with other parts of our experience. James puts it thus: New truth is always a gap between, a smooth-over of transitions. It marries old opinion to new fact so as not to show a minimum of gilt - a maximum of continuity. We hold a theory true in proportion to its success in solving this problem of maxima and minima. Purely objective truth is no where to be found. The only test of probable truth is what works best in the way of leading us, what fits every part of life best, and combines with the collectivity of experiences demands, nothing being omitted.

Pragmatism means in the broadest sense the acceptance of the categories of life as fundamental. It is the bio-centric phil. The life which pragmatism recognizes is not any absolute eternal life, but life lived by empirical individuals with their infinitely varying interests. Hence pragmatism is an anti-thesis alike to Absolutism, Intellectualism, and Naturalism. Pragmatism is thus the utilitarianism of Mill & Bentham extended not merely to the moral life, but also to the aesthetic and cognitive functions.

We may distinguish two essentially different types of Pragmatism. viz. The Objective realistic Pragmatism of James and Dewey, which recognizes a plastic environment which the function of the ideas is to shape, mould & thereby make better, i.e. more serviceable; and the Idealistic Subjectivistic Pragmatism

of Schiller acc. to which the function of the idea is not to mould any given material so much, as to create the material itself by its own activity. Opposed to both these, there is another type viz the Absolute Pragmatism or Voluntaristic Absolutism of Royce acc. to which there is not merely particular truths but also an absolute system of truths embodied as the content of an absolute experience which is differentiated into a manifold of individual truths in relation to a manifold of unique purposes.

Then the essayist gives a detailed account of the Instrumentalism of Dewey, Humanism of Schiller and Pragmatism of James. In the course of discussing James's Pragmatism, the writer discusses his Psychology, Epistemology, Philosophy of Religion and Metaphysics.

In conclusion, the essayist adds his critical appreciation: Pragmatism is right in emphasising an element of activity in all functions of the mind, but its error consists in obliterating all distinction between the knowing process & willing. Cognitive being is not practical doing. The belief that reality has nothing determinate about it, that it is plastic matter that will yield to our every whim, maybe useful in so far as it increases the sense of our responsibility, but is contradictory to human experience. An action is not always successful which shows that we can modify our environment only in part. But Pragmatism emphasises crucial importance of human efforts. It is melioristic since it speaks for the spirit of making better and denounces alike the spirit of despair. It is non-fantheistic and non-mythic. It attaches less importance to the direct relation between man and God and more to that relation to his fellows which make a man the servant of the collective life and so lead him to a ~~new~~ new conception of God as the basis of common cause.

P. S. Shastri  
President

Date - 3<sup>rd</sup> January 1918

President - Dr. P. D. Shastri

Subject - Bergson's Doctrine of Creative Evolution.

Essayist - Sri Sailish Chandra Chatterjee.

The following is a very brief outline of the paper:

The place of evolution is very important in modern philosophy. Spencer gives it an all embracing place, so also Bergson. Bergson goes beyond the natural scientific values of evolution. He compares organic life with ever changing psychic life. Change is the only reality in psychic life. In organic world also change is the life main thing. Time plays the same role in the organic life as in psychic. This peculiarity of time process is ignored both by the mechanical and teleological theories of evolution. Mechanical theory is unsatisfactory even in its proper sphere of ~~biological~~ the evolution of life. Teleological explanations, both orthodox (as held by Leibniz) and moderate, ignore the influence of time. Teleology is inverted mechanism. The various theories of the development of the organism, including those of Darwin, Vries, Lamarck are found to be unsatisfactory. There is a profounder impulse behind this change wh. Bergson calls 'Elan vital'. The course of the vital impulse is not premeditated. The course is various and is in different directions. It proceeds by "canalisation". The vital impulse moves on, and as it moves it gathers strength. The plant, the insect and the animal kingdoms are the three directions in wh. the elan vital has developed, but these are not the only three. It is due to 'canalisation' that in some we find one quality fully developed and in others not. Instinct and intelligence are two developments of the same impulses.

impetus which has divided itself, one is not the development of the other as is held by all philosophers since Aristotle. Bergson and Kant have some points of similarity in their dealing with intelligence.

Reality is one original current and in it a counter-current is formed, as if a cross section. This inverse current is matter. The interaction of these two currents, the original trying to overcome the latter gives rise to intelligence and instinct which have different ways of dealing with matter. Instinct, the function of knowing reality, is instinct made perfect. By creation Bergson means, not creating something absolutely but means the introduction of the largest amount of organisation in the chaos of matter.

Bergson's style is very impressive and charming. It is a reaction against the intellectualism of Kant & Hegel, which has other phases in the spiritual philosophy of Rudolf Eucken and in the Pragmatism of W. James, Dewey and Schiller. Bergson's theory is peculiar which can be understood ~~as~~ <sup>by</sup> none except by a Bergsonian.

A discussion followed in the hall of S. Ray Choudhury, G. J. Mukherjee and others took part. The President in summing up the debate with some criticisms of the paper, pointed out <sup>clearly the defects of</sup> Bergson's theory.

Shri  
Secretary

Date . . . 17<sup>th</sup> January, 1918  
President . . . Dr. Prabhudatt Shastri  
Subject . . . Pessimism and Optimism  
Secretary . . . S. Preetinidhan Roy

The two most salient aspects of Pessimism are, according to the writer, first, hopelessness of the present and secondly, despair of the future. These two aspects have given rise to two philosophical problems viz. 1) the problem of evil and 2) the problem of the Destiny of Man.

The latter problem did not receive any very serious attention from the philosophers of ancient Greece. The "highest good" of the Greek philo



Sophers was essentially the highest good for the present life, because most of them identified the summum bonum with felicity.

The medieval theologians offered a solution of the problem in their own way; but their extreme other-worldliness was a marked contrast to the this-worldliness of the Greek philosophers. If one was the 'thesis', the other the 'anti-thesis' and for the synthesis of the two we must look to the Vedānta.

In modern philosophy the problem has engaged the mind of philosophers rather seriously and various solutions have been offered by Spinoza, Leibnitz, Hegel and Schopenhauer.

The problem of evil has started into existence the various theories of evil. These may be broadly classified under two heads viz. I) Mythical and II) the Philosophical

I. The mythical theory of evil attributes the presence of evil to a supernatural agency e.g. the Parsees to Ahreeman and the Christians to Satan.

II. The philosophical theories may be further subdivided into a) Optimistic and b) Pessimistic.

(a) Optimistic theories of evil :- (i) the theory that all evil is only good in the making, (ii) the theory that the cause of moral evil is the abuse of the liberty with which God has endowed every individual.

(b) Pessimistic theories of evil :- (i) the theory that certain irregularities in the moral world follow from the finite nature of things — finitude implies imperfection and imperfection implies evil. (ii) The Psycho-physical theory that pain is the only positive form of feeling while pleasure is the mere absence of it.  
(Schopenhauer)

These two problems viz. those of evil and human destiny have been dealt with by almost all the systems of Indian philosophy. About the cause of evil or suffering they but one answer to give (though under different names) the viz. false knowledge - the Veāntā giving aiwya ornescence; the Sāmkhya, aviveka or non-discrimination between the Puruṣa and Prakṛti; the Āyāya, mithyā-jnāna or false knowledge.

About human destiny, they all hold out the hope of a blissful state of existence capable of being attainable by every individual.

Shy. Das  
Secretary

Dr. Shastri  
President

Date, Jan 24, 1919.

President Dr. Prabhudutt Shastri.

Subject Religion and life

Essayist S. Prorash Chandra Mandal, B. A.

The writer of the paper shows after a brief historical survey of both ancient and modern philosophy that many philosophers while calling attention to important facts of life failed to form adequate theories to comprehend life. The Pragmatists contend that the test of truth lies in its value for life - if a fact is most useful in life, it is ipso facto the true view of life. But there is no cosmic conviction present in consciousness to proclaim that the action is worthwhile at all

costs. Indeed truth is a matter of life and action, rather than of mere intellect. It is something deeper than mere "passional decisions". Truth is truth not merely because it is useful but because it is independent of our experience of it and is gained intuitively through a life of action' as Eucken puts it. Truth, therefore, is grounded in spiritual life.

Now, this spiritual life is deduced not from metaphysical speculation but from the study of life itself. It is a life brought to consciousness and is a living, working, creating, self-active vital energy which at its highest level possesses the attribute of personality. Hence religion, from this standpoint, would be, as Eucken points out, an action by which the human being appropriates the spiritual life. The first great concern of religion must be the conservation — not of ~~man~~ <sup>as mere</sup> "man" but of the spiritual life in the human being and it is nothing but "a mighty concentration of the spiritual life in man". Religion is not gained once for all; it must be gained continually afresh and sought ever anew. Thus the fact of religion becomes a perpetual task and leads to the highest activity. Indeed, if the soul of man is brought in tune with the infinite soul it has but to act. It may never know all about reality, but that is no matter; it may know with or within reality & be thus enabled to act in the best way under various circumstances.

Saraj Kumaradas.

Date 31<sup>st</sup> January, 1918

President Dr. Prabhudutt Shāstrī.

Subject Types of Idealism

Essayist S. J. Anandchandra Mahtre, B.A.

The writer holds that <sup>the</sup> present-day Idealism which was consummated in Hegelian Absolute Idealism has for its initiator ~~in~~ Berkeley's doctrine 'esse est percipi'. Kant saved the situation by steering clear of Berkeleyan subjective idealism and generalising <sup>or universalising</sup> the individual consciousness. Now once this Universal Mind is attained, it only remained for the later idealists to deck it with all the trophies that have been won by speculation.

The opponents of Idealism, hailing from the Neo-realistic camp have, however, challenged the idealists with implements rough-hewn from the material of crude common sense that bid fair to demolish the ~~or~~ aerial castles built by the idealists. They questioned the validity of their basic assumption — the very ground-work of their philosophy — viz that the psychological mind may be universalised. The task of bridging the gulf between thought and Reality is not so very facile as the idealist seems to take it. It is exactly the point at issue but the idealists start with it without once thinking that they are making a grand and at the same time an unwarrantable assumption. The idealists, particularly Berkeley, have to prove that the cognitive relationship is essential to the existence of a thing, though, no doubt, the realist admits, it is essential to the knowledge

of it:

But the realists again, we must say, do not give us something very positive. They have indeed done a great service to (philosophic) pursuit of truth in combating and finally vanquishing the Berkeleyan attempt to make "epistemological idealism the basis of metaphysical idealism" wherein, as Paulsen remarks, consists the historical importance of Bishop Berkeley. The <sup>attitude</sup> realists remains merely polemical. They only rest content with pointing out 'predicaments' but never show us the way out of such predicaments.

The writer concludes with the remark, the fallacy inherent in contemporary idealism may be purged off if we revert to the idealism of ancient Greece and India, according to which reality is not so much a problem of knowledge as of existence.

Saroj Kumar Das.  
Secretary.

P. D. Shastri

President

President..... Dr. Prabhakant Shastri.

Subject..... Spinoza and Kant on One and the Many.

Essayist..... Sr. Satindra Kumar Mazumdar.

The starting-point of Spinoza's philosophy, so goes the writer to say, is the idea of the One or unity which is the basis of all our thought. Spinoza terms the Substance. It is the first principle; and as such it is the pre-supposition of all finite things and beings and is their productive source. Substance is not merely causa sui but causa omnium rerum. But so great a stress is laid upon the unity of substance that Spinoza finds it difficult to ascribe any objective attribute to the


pure identical nature of substance, so it is only the human understanding that invests the substance with extension and thought. It is in his doctrine of modes that Spinoza fulfils his mission of 'causa omnium rerum'. True it is that Spinoza says 'omnis determinatio est negatio', self still he attributes a self-maintaining impulse or conatus as he styles it to every individual thing.

So Spinozism is not altogether a 'pantheistic denial of the reality of the individual' - at least in an unqualified sense. Spinoza's failure lay only in his defective logic.

Kant's view of the relation of the One and the Many is, at first sight, not very clear. Kant's One or 'Ding an sich' is that it is an ideal principle from which nothing positive is excluded and of which everything is an expression."

Saripkumar Das  
Secretary.

President.





Philosophy Seminar.

Session - 1930 - 31.

Secretary - Swatik Chandra Chakravarty  
Fourth year B.A.

Or 30



First meeting held on 23<sup>rd</sup> August, 1930.  
Subject - Realism & Idealism.

Reader - Mr Smitish Chandra Chakravarty.

President - Prof. N. K. Brahma, M.A., P.R.S.

Time - 1.30 P.M.

Present - 1. Mr Sachi Kanta Ganguly, IV<sup>th</sup> yr.

2. Mr Kartik Chandra Mallick, III<sup>rd</sup> yr.

The ~~Reader~~ <sup>As this is</sup> the first meeting of the session and as there ~~are~~ <sup>are</sup> no proceedings left of the meetings held last session, the reader at once starts to read his paper. The paper is in brief:- The reader ~~at once~~ dealt with mainly with the historical development of the ~~two~~ <sup>two</sup> contesting parties, viz, the Realists & the Idealists. He first gives an introductory sketch, stating that the solution of the problem - which ~~has~~ <sup>is</sup> said to be the "great battle-ground of metaphysics", ~~has~~ <sup>has</sup> a great influence on the daily activities of the human beings. Everyone of us, ~~as he~~ <sup>as he</sup> says, ~~has~~ <sup>has</sup> a certain kind of notion regarding the world - some ~~take~~ <sup>take</sup> it as it merely ~~is~~ <sup>is</sup>, some ~~take~~ <sup>take</sup> it in an ideal way, thus identifying the world with the "idea", either subjective, or objective, or absolute. He then passes off to an exposition of "Realism" as it ~~is~~ <sup>is</sup> understood from the common standpoint. This ~~is~~ <sup>is</sup> what ~~he~~ <sup>he</sup> ~~knows~~ <sup>says</sup> as the naive Realism - After criticising it, he passes to over to Critical Realism, the inadequacies of which, he ~~says~~ <sup>says</sup> naturally & logically ~~leads~~ <sup>leads</sup> to "Idealism". He proved the fallacies of Critical Realism, from the standpoint of physiology, & that of the distinction made between the primary & secondary qualities.

Next he takes up the for Consideration Berkeley's Subjective Idealism. - He deals with it at length, stating that according to Berkeley the world outside ~~is~~ not the real actually existing world, but that it ~~is~~ merely an idea. ~~is~~ The world ~~is~~ as ~~one~~ <sup>perceived</sup> ~~is~~ it, i.e., it is ~~exists~~ subject to the existence of an observer, either the finite observers or the Infinite God. ~~But~~, he says, the outstanding defect of Berkeley's Philosophy ~~is~~ <sup>are</sup> his assertions without proof of the existence of the finite selves & that of God. Berkeley's denial of the outside world, ~~leads to~~ Kant's phenomenalism, which as the name suggests, makes the world phenomenal. The real world, the thing-in-itself ~~is~~ unknown to mankind, though Kant ~~does~~ not go so far as to say that it ~~is~~ unknowable. Fichte ~~is~~ the next idea exponent of the idealistic development. He writes proceeds that Kant's assertion of the thing-in-itself, produced the Fichte's Solipsism - making the ~~world~~ world or the non-ego only apart of the Ego. To escape from this Solipsism, ~~he~~ Hegel, the writer said, ~~has~~ <sup>goes</sup> ~~far~~ <sup>farther</sup> his objective Idealism which ~~takes~~ <sup>takes</sup> account of both the ego & the non-ego, which ~~gives~~ <sup>gives</sup> reality to both ~~the~~ the world, external & external, yet merges both, as mere manifestations, into the Being of being of a Superhuman, Super-sensuous, Absolute Being, or into God.

Mr Sachikanta Ganguly, then, asked by the President, deals with the story of Realism as it is understood by modern Realists, such as Bertrand Russell, Aristotile & others. In his discussion, he ~~is~~ <sup>is</sup> lay stress on the point that the ~~modern~~ Berkeleyan standpoint of idealism ~~is~~ <sup>has</sup> ~~been~~ <sup>been</sup> completely overthrown by these modern ~~less~~ exponents of the realistic school.

The President then <sup>spoke</sup> of the merit of  
of the Paper and ~~threw~~ <sup>cast</sup> much light on the points touched  
& untouched. He says that the writer ~~has only~~ <sup>has</sup> dealt  
with the problem ~~or~~ <sup>from</sup> the epistemological standpoint  
and ~~has~~ <sup>has</sup> completely overlooked its metaphysical aspect.  
Moreover the paper has the defect that by ~~any~~ <sup>any</sup> ~~form~~ <sup>form</sup>  
reading of it, one ~~fails~~ <sup>fails</sup> to understand the ~~aim~~ <sup>aim</sup>  
of the writer, ~~from~~ <sup>whether</sup> his bent or inclination is towards  
Realism or Idealism, though from the conclusion it

may ~~be~~ <sup>be</sup> ~~guessed~~ <sup>guessed</sup> that the writer had sympathy  
with the Idealistic School. He says that on the whole the paper  
~~is~~ <sup>is</sup> well-written & satisfactory. He then ~~discusses~~ <sup>discusses</sup> the epistemological

& metaphysical aspects of the problems of ~~sense~~ <sup>sense</sup> that in  
a word, Spiritualism & materialism stand for idealism  
& realism in epistemology. He deals <sup>with</sup> the metaphysical

aspect at length & also with the problem brought  
forward by Mr Sachchanta Ganguly as to the exact  
nature of the realistic standpoint of the modern age.

He says that though the age modern age is  
a day of triumph for the realist, yet he is a  
believer in the idealistic ~~the~~ exposition of the problem.

He ~~he~~ <sup>he</sup> ~~says~~ <sup>says</sup> that the realist argues  
that there ~~is~~ <sup>is</sup> no knowing whether the table exists  
or not in the absence of any one's perception, ~~to~~  
~~which~~ <sup>which</sup> Prof Royce ~~argued~~ <sup>argued</sup>

& ~~therefore~~ <sup>therefore</sup> the idealistic standpoint falls down,  
to which Prof Royce; the President says, ~~and~~ <sup>and</sup> ~~we~~ <sup>we</sup> ~~should~~ <sup>should</sup>  
not think that the very fact that the realist ~~that~~ <sup>that</sup> ~~thought~~ <sup>thought</sup>  
of the existence of the table proves the idealistic standpoint,

for if they ~~do~~ <sup>do</sup> not think of its existence, it ~~is~~ <sup>is</sup> ~~not~~ <sup>not</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup>  
same thing as to assert that it ~~does~~ <sup>does</sup> not exist. Their  
thinking of it, though the existence of the table & thereby  
gives a ~~very~~ <sup>very</sup> solid ~~and~~ <sup>and</sup> ~~firm~~ <sup>firm</sup> foundation for

the idealistic ~~set~~ school.

The President then expressed his sorrow at the meagre presence of the members & expressed that though the meeting was thinly attended, yet he expected that it ~~will~~ will do good to those present for the discussions held ~~and~~ will come to some help for their examinations.

SchaDaravatti,  
Secretary,  
6<sup>th</sup> September, 20.

Confirmed.  
N. Subrahmanya  
President.  
6<sup>th</sup> September.

~~Proceedings of the Second Meeting,~~

~~6<sup>th</sup> September '30~~

~~Subject — Morality & Religion.~~

~~Reader — Mr Subramanyam Bannayal.~~

~~President — Prof N. K. Brahma, M.A. P.R.S~~

~~Time — 1.30 P.M.~~

~~Present — Mr.~~

~~Mr.~~

~~Mr.~~

Philosophy Seminar

Session 1931-32.

Secretary: Kartic Chandra Mallik

Fourth year Arts.

1931.

Session 1931-32.

The First meeting.

Date — The 29<sup>th</sup> September, 1931.

Subject — "Attributes of God."

Essayist — Mr. Monojmohan Mukharji

President — Dr. P. D. Shastri.

As this was the first meeting of this session and as there was no proceedings of the previous meeting, the president asked the essayist to read his paper on "Attributes of God".

The following is a brief summary of the paper :-

Man cannot think of God without ascribing to Him any attributes whatsoever. God, the First Cause is not only all-powerful, all-intelligent and self-existent but also all-perfect. God is thought of by man as the Cause of this hamacious world, in which there is the display of intellect, power and freedom of will. Similarly from the moral consciousness which man possesses, he rises to the conception of God who is all-moral and all-perfect. The moral authority which man feels, points to a Being who is the source of all morality. From the moral point of view God is the highest spiritual Being, blending in Himself the superlatives of all that is great and good. God is good and benevolent; justice is ascribed to God; unity towards like being is attributed to Him.

The apparent conflict which we think to exist between God as Cause and God as perfection is not real. Because, even in human beings we find the existence of these two virtues <sup>side by side</sup> without any conflict at all.

But this view is not however universally accepted. The Agnostics, for example, oppose this view. Philosopher like Herbert Spencer holds that the Absolute is unknown and unknowable. In the sphere of religion, the attempt of knowledge and experience is futile. ~~However~~ the gradual development of science ~~may~~ only imply but does not reveal what is unknown and unknowable.

In the first place, human intelligence is incapable of any absolute knowledge. Every ~~and~~ ultimate conception, religious or scientific gives rise to 'alternative impossibilities'. <sup>of things</sup> Whatever knowledge can be gathered is always relative. Absolute, ~~things~~, therefore be simply unknowable.

Thus, the theory advocated by Spence is that we are constrained to believe in the existence of the Absolute. ~~But~~ There may not be any positive knowledge but there is always present a consciousness of it.

There are however many inconsistencies in the theory of Spence. It is impossible for a theist, who holds that human knowledge can never transcend the finitude, to hold that the human mind is aware of the existence of the absolute. Moreover his Unknown and unknowable is nothing more than a fiction. ~~But~~ ~~to~~ again it can be held that the absolute ~~is not~~ or the thing-in-itself is not unknown and unknowable, because the effect itself reveals to some extent the thing-in-itself, which is the cause.

The other objections which are brought forward against the ascription of attributes to God are those which have been brought forward by Spinoza. According to Spinoza all determination is negation. As God is the totality of all things we cannot apply limiting predicates to Him. Again God is the source of all that is. Consequently he must be sufficient for the production of the phenomenal world. There rises a contradiction — on the one hand God is indeterminate, having no qualities whatsoever and all the attributes <sup>God is the source of all that is</sup> ~~the possession of all the qualities~~. He starts with a notion of transcendent God as self-identical explanation of the ~~is~~ existence of a finite world. Process from unity to difference is impossible when there is no element of difference in the unity. Thus there are many inconsistencies in Spinoza.

Then from the standpoint of Mysticism it is held that in one sense it is impossible to ascribe any attributes to God while in the other sense it is quite possible. Personal God according to this view has a necessity for



practical purposes. The highest reality is beyond all qualification it is the Absolute or Brahman. It can be apprehended through intuition and supra-rational experience. It is the highest development of Spirit and the Ultimate Reality. It is not therefore clearly expressible through intellectual categories (अविशेषः शब्दः).

God is supra-paternal still the highest reality can be conceived only in terms of human perfection. God cannot be found quite apart from the world. God is revealed in and through the world and not wholly immanent in it. Therefore it is impossible to conceive of God, without any attribute. If the universe is to be understood through God, God must no less be expressed through the universe.

God is the ideal of all the supreme qualities such as, truth, beauty and goodness. These qualities have their objective ground in God. Some may describe this view as anthropomorphic but it is impossible for us to get rid of this higher form of anthropomorphism. Human beings that we are we must, ascribe the greatest human perfection to the highest reality we can conceive of.

After the essay was read, the President pointed out the merits and demerits of the essay and asked to start the discussion. Some gentlemen took part in the discussion. The meeting came to a close with a short but thoughtful speech from the President.

K. M. Mallick  
Secretary

Confirmed  
S. S. Shastri

3.10.31

## The Second meeting.

Date - The 3rd October 1931.

President - Dr. P. D. Shastri.

In this meeting no paper was read. The President addressed the students and spoke on the Problems and Scope of Philosophy, with special reference to the origin and development of the philosophical Studies both in the West as well as in the East. Before the President began his speech the Secretary had read out the proceedings of the previous meeting which was then signed and confirmed by the President. Following is a summary of the speech: -

The primitive instinct, which is the source and the starting-point of all philosophical investigations, dating from the very dawn of the human civilisation is wonder. Again at the same time it can be said that "Philosophy ends in wonder".

In Europe Pythagoras is said to be the first one to speak of Philosophy. He waded at the working, ~~over~~ existence and creation of the objects of nature was the fundamental instinct that actuated him to philosophise. Next came the Socratic period of Greek Philosophy. Plato also made wonder the source of Philosophy. Philosophy is the true enquiry into the earliest presuppositions.

But among the races of the whole world the Indians were the first to catch hold of the glimpse of philosophical culture. When Europe was completely enveloped in the darkness of ignorance and there was not a single spark of enlightenment India was at the highest flight of her enquiry after the Truth. Even here in India the source of the philosophical enquiry is in wonder. The evidence of this ~~is~~ <sup>is</sup> found in the verses of the Tenth Mandala (Rigveda) of the Rigveda.

Turning to the Problem of Philosophy it can be seen that it Philosophy always aims at the unification of the experience, because the present experience will not give any answer to the regarding to the ultimate problem. It is a Science which gives us the correct notion of our life. The thinking consideration of things according to Hegel is the function of Philosophy.

Philosophy has a special feature of its own as regards its methods. It can never be expected to solve its problems. The main interest in philosophy is the problems and not their solutions. Thus in philosophy the task is to state the problem in an adequate and scientific manner that to attempt any dogmatic solution. According to Hegel if the problem be rightly stated the reality will reveal itself.

The least and utmost a philosophy can do is to state the problem in the clearest way. These are number of eternal problems - "2/16/45)E-102 3101:"  
"Man should not try to force these into arguments. These are beyond thought"

The philosopher only has some power to see the Reality. Truth, Beauty and Goodness, these are the three convenient modes through which the glimpse of the Absolute can be received. We shall have to fall to the mercy of God. He will reveal himself. The philosopher is the first man to have a glimpse of the ultimate reality.

Science has always to accept its field in piecemeal. It studies things in compartments.

The Metaphysicians business is to approach the super-sensuous by generalising the results which science puts forth.

Problem: The Problem of God lies in eternal interest. Other sciences may possess the spirit of utilitarianism, but in the case of philosophy no such considerations come in.

The next problem is what is the greatest in human being? Mind is always superior to matter. Science cannot tell anything of mind, what science gives is the better control of nature.

The ultimate problem is what will be going to happen to human life. The valuation of the human life is the ultimate.

The Being (purpose) of Existence (life) is the task of philosophy. The business of philosophy is to show that holy living is necessary for human life. This will mean holy death. Philosophy has given sublime touch to the inspired people to a higher and nobler life. This is the task of philosophy.

After the speech, the meeting dissolved in usual manner. The Fourth year Honours students were present at the meeting.

K. Mathias  
Secretary.

J. S. Shankar  
President.

### The Third meeting

Date — The 22<sup>nd</sup> January, 1932.

Subject — "The Behaviouristic School of Modern Psychology"

Essayist — Karbi Chandra Mallick.

President — Dr. P. D. Shastri.

The Secretary having read the proceedings of the last meeting, the President asked him to read his paper on "Behaviorism".

Following is a brief summary of the paper: —

With the development of the ~~not~~ physical sciences Psychology takes a different form both in subject-matter as well as in the method of investigation. Psychology should no more be treated as a hand-maid of Philosophy.

The tendency to free psychology totally from the influence of Philosophy attains its climax in the hands of the Behaviorists. ~~The~~ The Behavioristic School of Psychology may be said to have begun with the appearance of McDougall on the stage. According to him the subject matter of Psychology is the study of "the behaviors of the living things". Though McDougall ~~do~~ denies the soul substance he does not at all deny consciousness.

McDougall's doctrine ~~is~~ <sup>is</sup> however ~~soon~~ <sup>is</sup> apt to shade by the acute type of Behaviorism which has been started by Watson. ~~Therefore~~ In the most recent days the word Behaviorism means the Behavioristic doctrine of Watson.

Watson calls the Behaviorism of McDougall as mere half-hearted Behaviorism, ~~which~~ he further thinks that McDougall's Behaviorism or the purposeful Behaviorism is a harmful check to the ~~for~~ scientific development of Psychology.

Behaviorism, according to Watson, ~~should~~ <sup>should</sup> make Psychology ~~as~~ <sup>as</sup> and Physiology quite identical. Watson does not believe <sup>even</sup> in the existence of consciousness and mind. Everything is done by stimulus either external or internal. Psychology is a science which deals with stimulus and response only.

The Behaviourist takes up every fact and arrives at the proper solution by adopting the method of observation and experiment. There is no room for introspection in the method of Psychology. The Behaviourist by his method of observation and experiment solves the most minute and complex phenomena.

The Behaviourist by carrying on his new method hopes to solve even the problems of morality, religion, sociology, philosophy etc. He thinks that the doctrine of stimulus and response is sufficient to explain everything.

Now after hearing all that the Behaviourist has to say we cannot <sup>look upon</sup> ~~accept~~ this school of ~~Psychology~~ as the Ideal ~~school~~. It is no doubt a great ~~shock~~ shock to us to see that Psychology has been made identical with Physiology. No mind, no consciousness, nothing of the sort! If we are at all inclined to adopt modern method in the field of ~~Psychology~~ Psychology we may adopt the doctrine of ~~McDougall~~ McDougall. McDougall's Behaviourism is ~~undeniably~~ <sup>undeniably</sup> acceptable because it does not end in direct renunciation of everything - mind + Consciousness.

Further it can be said, that if the Behaviouristic doctrine of Watson is accepted ~~then all~~ <sup>then all</sup> religion, morality, philosophy and sanctity of life ~~will be~~ <sup>will be</sup> ~~given up forever~~ <sup>given up forever</sup> and even the equilibrium of Society <sup>will be</sup> difficult to maintain.

Thus, if we are very keen about adopting ~~the~~ Behaviourism we may adopt the Behaviourism of McDougall ~~to~~ and not that of Watson.

One thing may be further added that we cannot ~~ignore~~ <sup>ignore</sup> the services done by the ~~francians~~ <sup>francians</sup> in the field of Psychology - both normal and abnormal <sup>by maintaining the existence of the</sup> <sup>sub-consciousness</sup> <sup>and</sup> <sup>the</sup> <sup>scientific</sup> <sup>method</sup>. ~~If~~ <sup>In</sup> this case ~~side~~ <sup>side</sup> with Watson we should have to call ~~them~~ <sup>them</sup> 'quacks'!

Hence, we conclude that the Behaviouristic doctrine as advocated by Watson cannot in any case ~~negate~~ <sup>negate</sup> the ~~old~~ <sup>old</sup> introspective psychology. We give the Behaviourists the full credit for their accurate observation making and laborious experiments but we cannot agree with them in ~~making~~ <sup>making</sup> Psychology identical with Physiology. "This Introspection, <sup>which is fact + no fiction</sup> ~~which~~ <sup>which</sup> shows the absurdity of ~~this~~ <sup>this</sup> statement such attempt.

After the ~~paper~~ <sup>paper</sup> was read the President pointed out the merits and demerits of the paper and asked to start the discussion.



## The Fourth Meeting.

Date - the 26<sup>th</sup> February.

Subject - "The Method of Descartes".

Essayist - Probodh Hari Chatterjee

President - Dr. P. V. Shastri.

The Secretary having ~~so~~ read the proceedings of the previous meeting, the President asked Mr. Probodh Hari Chatterjee to read his essay on "The method of Descartes".

The synopsis of the essay is given below:—

The struggle which ensued from the beginning of the Renaissance, between the new 'Scientific spirit' and the scholastic tendency of the Middle Ages was brought by Descartes to a victorious close. The most marked feature of this struggle<sup>was</sup> that men after the Renaissance grew ~~totally~~ disgusted with ~~the~~ knowledge ~~achieved~~ of ancient times and also with the method of achieving such knowledge; and so they all resolved to start de nova into the fields of human knowledge with the help of a true, scientific and 'fruitful' method.

~~Descartes~~ In the field of philosophy it was Descartes to take over this task and chalk out a new path or method by which new regions in the world of philosophy might be explored. Like many others, previous to him, Descartes also began <sup>his</sup> search after ~~truth~~ ~~by~~ denouncing all that was ~~de~~gotten of the past and start anew. So he disbelieved every thing that had been held as true in the ~~past~~ and doubted everything, even the existence of the world, <sup>his own</sup> the body and the ~~of~~ Spirit.

He even grew totally dissatisfied with the method of old logic and formulated for rules to guide his own searchings. These are:— (1) ~~to~~ That which is not clearly and distinctly perceived must not be held as true. (2) ~~to~~ <sup>you should</sup> dissect every difficulty into several parts according as ~~it~~ is thought convenient for solving it. (3) ~~to~~ <sup>you should</sup> conduct your investigation in an orderly manner ~~to~~ proceeding gradually from the easier to ~~the~~ understand to the more difficult (4) you should make accurate and complete enumerations and illustrations.

With these four guiding principles, Descartes began to doubt the truth of ~~some~~ every content of knowledge previously achieved.

He analysed ~~so~~ his every thought, examined it and found nothing of truth in it. ~~on which~~ He doubted all and believed nothing. Thus Descartes grew to be a sceptic.

But this very doubting enables a man to reach a principle which can never be doubted. The doubting implies a thinking; and thinking, a thinker. (Cogito, ergo sum). The very fact that I doubt, signifies that 'I' exist. Thus Descartes reached the certain principle of self-consciousness from his thoroughgoing scepticism. Now as the principle of self-consciousness was clearly and distinctly perceived, Descartes formulated a criterion of truth for himself, which would guide his later researches: - "Everything that is clearly and distinctly perceived must be true."

Now Descartes proposed to go on in his investigations by deducing his further truths from these certain and indubitable ~~truths~~ principles as proofs of geometry are deduced from certain axioms. Thus Descartes divides his method into two halves: - the former is known as psychological, ~~half~~ and the latter, geometrical half. The first task is analytic and the second is synthetic.


After the paper was read, the President remarked that the exposition of the method of Descartes had been very good and elaborate, but the defect ~~+~~ was that there were few criticisms attached to it.

Owing to this insufficiency of criticisms, no discussion was begun, and the meeting ended ~~after~~ a few minutes later.

Trolooth hari Challoje.  
Joint Secretary

President.





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Philosophy seminar.

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Session 1932-33.

Secretary - Probodh hari Chhajje Roll-66

fourth year Arts

1932.

Session - 1932-33.

Work done at the Seminar: -

4.8.32.

Mr. Probooth hari Chalorje read from Höffding's Psychology the chapter on the "validity of the law of relativity in the field of feeling" from 12 to 1 P.M.

17.8.32.

Mr. S. H. Nassod read the book on ~~the~~ the Philosophy of Francis Bacon by C. H. Good. from 12 to 1 P.M.

22.8.32

Mr. Sirajul Islam read a few pages from Windelband's history of philosophy from 2 to 3 P.M.

Mr. Probooth hari Chalorje read a few pages from Modern Philosophy by Rogers from 10 to 11.

2.9.32.

Mr. Probooth hari Chalorje read Windelband's history of philosophy on Leibniz, from 2 to 3 P.M.

Mr. Sirajul Islam read Shilly's history of philosophy on Descartes & Spinoza from 1 to 2 P.M.

1877

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A joint meeting of the Philosophical Association and the Science  
Association of this College was held on ~~the~~  
Dr. P. D. Shastri gave an interesting lecture

Philosophy Seminar.

Session - 1932 - 33.

Secretary - Prabodh hari Chatterjee.

First Meeting.

Philosophical Society.

①

Under the auspices of the Science Association, a joint meeting of the said association and the Philosophical Society of this college was held on 14<sup>th</sup> August last in the Physics Theatre at 2 P.M. Dr. P. D. Shastri delivered an interesting lecture on the subject of "Science and Philosophy". Principal B. M. Sen took the chair. He, however, left the meeting ~~shortly after~~ a short time and Prof. P. Neogi of the Chemistry Department occupied the chair for the rest of the meeting.

The speaker, at first, stated in brief the antagonism between science and philosophy as it is held in popular thought and then tried to reconcile in a most impressive manner the so-called antagonism between philosophy and science. He mentioned the grounds where science and philosophy could shake hands with each other and mind their respective duties. In doing this the speaker first pointed out with a rapid glance in the history of human thought that almost every philosopher from Thales downwards was a scientist. Indeed philosophy started its course with the object of finding out the reality of behind this world which is also now regarded as the avowed task of the physical science. The first line of separation between science and philosophy was drawn by Socrates declared that the true subject matter of philosophy is the inner self of man and not the outside nature. Ever since that time, philosophy busied itself with the ~~mind~~ or soul, <sup>or mind</sup> and science with nature or matter. Still that really there is no antagonism between these two divisions of study <sup>has been</sup> proved by history by the fact that almost every great philosopher of the past were scientists also. ~~For~~ "Moreover" continued the speaker, "philosophy is science if we take the latter in its general meaning. Physical science also, a few years ago, was called natural philosophy." This shows that philosophy and science

have no real enmity between themselves. This fact again goes to show that philosophy is higher than the particular sciences. Really, Philosophy takes into account all the result of the particular sciences, and on the basis of them proceeds further with deeper questions of God, soul etc with which it is no business of science to deal with. Thus philosophy is a bigger circle which contains all the particular smaller circles of particular sciences. Moreover, "science is solidified logic". Science is science only because it is logical, and logic is but a branch of philosophy. Thus philosophy and science is related on the sound basis of logic, yet the former is higher than the latter. Because of the growing complexities in subjects of study, a line of difference is certainly drawn <sup>for</sup> ~~between~~ <sup>to the</sup> ~~of~~ <sup>own</sup> advantage between science and philosophy on the basis of their subject ~~of study~~ <sup>matter</sup>. The speaker, in the end, refuted the charge that philosophy deals with abstractions by pointing out that science is no less abstract when it conceives of electrons & protons, energy and force etc. The speaker also pointed out that <sup>now-a-days</sup> science is growing more and more to be friends of philosophy, with the growing popularity of the dynamic conception of nature in the physical science. The lecture continued about more than one hour. It was very interesting and the sometime impressive as it was free from all technicalities of philosophy.

The president in closing the meeting opined that really the difference between science and philosophy was not a fundamental one. It was only a superficial difference made only on the principle of division of labour.

The meeting ended with a vote of thanks to the chair.

P. S. Shankar  
President.



Date - 24<sup>th</sup> September, 1932.

Subject - Concrete spiritualism of Leibniz.

Writer - Probodh hari Chatterjee.

President - Dr. P. D. Shastri.

Present - Mr. Kartic chandra Mallik B.A.

As the meeting began, the writer proceeded to read his paper at once. Below is a resumé of the paper is given: -

Leibniz is a sort of reaction in philosophy against the mechanical conception of nature. Mechanism looks upon reality in its quantitative aspect. Instead of it Leibniz gives a qualitative view of things and this will, according to him, be a true explanation of them. So he argues out that all things are spiritual in this that they are made of spiritual simple parts. Also, to serve the theistic interest of his time, Leibniz reacts against <sup>the pantheist</sup> Spinoza <sub>and of unitary</sub> and asserts that the parts are <sup>totally</sup> independent of the whole. Thus reality consists of, Leibniz says, infinite parts which are so many spiritual substances.

Leibniz begins his philosophy, by an analysis of matter. The essence of matter, says Leibniz, is not extension, but motion or force. The universe is composed of an infinite number of ultimate elements or atoms which are filled with force. This force-atom is called by Leibniz a monad. A monad is a simple, indivisible and indestructible substance 'which enters into compounds'. The monad is also called a metaphysical point, a spiritual substance for force which constitutes its very essence, is a metaphysical notion and can best be designated by the name, spirit.

Every object in this universe are compound things made of simple substances called monads. The essence of every monad, again, consists in force or activity which is

indwelling in it. It contains the principle of development within itself. Its two functions are (1) perception, i.e., representation of the universe, and (2) appetite, i.e. tendency to change from one perception to another. Every monad represents the universe from its own point of view and tends to change by its own appetite, so that no single monad is like another.

Now the monad is a dynamic unit, and the world is composed of them. So there must be an infinite plurality of them. Moreover, there is a hierarchy of monads. The monads are qualitatively different from each other, and they are arranged in a gradual series, from the highest to the lowest, from God to gross matter. Monads differ from each other according to the degrees of clearness of their perceptions. On this principle the monads are classified in three divisions, viz., the unconscious monads (i.e. material things), the subconscious monads (i.e. plants and animals), and the conscious monads (men and other rational beings).

But how are the monads related? Yes, the monads are related in this that they all represent the same universe, though each in a different way. Thus the unity among the monads is a unity in ~~pl~~ multiplicity which is the highest kind of unity. Again, the monads form a gradual chain. God is pure activity and as such he is the highest monad; and all others are more or less active and passive, so that each monad is in a process of evolution for realising the highest perfection, i.e. actus purus.

This is Leibniz's concrete spiritualism. In conclusion, the reader, criticized Leibniz's pluralistic position and compared it with that of Spinoza, which he defended.

No happy discussion was run owing to the absence of most of the students. ~~were absent~~. After a few minutes, the President showed the merits and demerits of the paper and at last dwelt on the character of Leibniz's philosophy and its influence on later European thought.

Challinor

P. S. Sheehan  
President.  
22.11.52

## Third meeting.

Date - 22<sup>nd</sup> and 23<sup>rd</sup> November, 1932.

Subject = Science, Philosophy and Religion.

Essayist - Rai Harendra Nath Chowdhury. of the 3<sup>rd</sup> yr. class.

President. - Dr. P. D. Shastri.

— o — on the 22<sup>nd</sup> Nov.  
As the students met in the seminar, the President asked Mr. Harendra Nath Raichowdhury to read his paper.

Below is given a brief exposition of the paper:—

In this paper the writer ~~has~~ made clear the meaning and implication of the terms involved and ~~has~~ then proceeded to point out the interrelations existing between Science, Philosophy and Religion.

Science - Science has been defined by various writers in different ways, but they all agree as to its special features. The most notable of them are accuracy, universality, confinement to a particular department of knowledge and rationality; in other words science may be defined as "a systematized body of knowledge concerning a particular department of the world." There are several classes of sciences, e.g., physical; social, formal etc., which are either positive or normative in character. Science ultimately must lead to philosophy and religion. The end of science is the beginning of metaphysics or philosophy.

Philosophy:— Philosophy is ultimately the coordination of the various sciences. It aims at arriving at a systematic conception of the world as a whole and of our own place, purpose and destiny in this world. Philosophers all agree as to this characteristic of philosophy. Philosophy is after all a great mental culture or intellectual enterprise. It ~~is~~ aids man not to view <sup>the</sup> things and incidents as isolated masses but as members of one organic whole. It views the world as a totality. Philosophy the connection between philosophy and religion is also a very

close one. Philosophy aims at rationally justifying religious beliefs and practices which are involved in every religion worth the name. Each of the higher religions of the world has a philosophy of its own.

Religion - Religion is so fundamental and ultimate that it is indeed difficult to define it. Commonly viewed, it implies a belief in a super-human majesty, the well-being of human destinies. There are several forms of religion - viz., monotheistic, Polytheistic, deistic and ~~for~~ pantheistic. Religion is not the exclusive possession of a particular set of people. It is the common heritage of humanity. Religion is not merely the culmination of science and philosophy but of morality as well.

The debate on the paper was carried on on the 23<sup>rd</sup> of November. The secretary pointed out that the method of procedure had not been very happy, & also, <sup>that</sup> the writer had not developed <sup>fully</sup> point of interrelation among science philosophy and religion. Besides this defect, the paper was well-written. The president, in concluding the meeting said that seeing the status of the essayist the paper was a great achievement. He then mentioned one serious defect of the paper viz, lack of a historical background of the topic.

R. K. Bhatnagar.  
Secretary.

J. S. Shastri  
President.  
29.11.32

## The Fourth Meeting.

Date - 29<sup>th</sup> Nov. 1932.

Reader. - Anandaprasad Sinha, M.A., F.R.S.

Subject - Problems of Philosophy.

President. - Dr. P. D. Shastri.

The 4<sup>th</sup> meeting sat on the 29<sup>th</sup> November 1932 with Dr. P. D. Shastri in the chair. Being asked by the president, Mr. Anandaprasad Sinha began to read his paper of which a summary is given below.

The reader before going to deal with the problem of philosophy, first mentioned the three branches of it, viz. philosophy of mind, philosophy of matter, and philosophy of God or the Absolute. The philosophy of mind begins its investigation, goes on the reader, with the phenomenology of mind i.e. describes the various processes and functions of the human mind and makes general laws out of them (Psychology); then it goes deep and penetrates into the seeming phenomena, the changing processes and reaches some substance behind which supports the various processes and attributes (metaphysics of mind). The philosophy of matter takes the whole world of material objects in its totality sees the relations among them and leads to some single reality which is the source and support of them all as a material substance. The philosophy of God tries to arrive at an adequate conception of God, offers and refutes arguments for His existence and shows the relation that exists between him and the world of mind and matter.

Now in each of these three great branches of philosophy, the inquiry leads to a few fundamental problems. Philosophy consists in determining the meanings and solutions of these problems and also in applying these solutions to the conception of mind, world and God. Of these problems we may mention the problem of substance, the problem of causality, the problem of evolution, the problem of good and the problem of value. These four problems may be said to cover up roughly the whole scope of philosophy.

In our common experience, we see only the appearances of the changing processes, <sup>things</sup> from them we try to reach a conception of substance, the substrate or support of such changing processes. On this very problem innumerable schools of philosophy have sprung up. Now as the substance manifests itself through attributes, as it maintains its identity all through and yet undergoes constant change of state or relation, we are apt to think that one change is caused by another and that by another and so on. Hence arises the problem of causality. Again the changes going on in these worlds of mind and matter are found to be not only causally connected, but to cooperate with one another so as to produce definite, complex effects which are again in their turn better coordinated for the production of more complex effects. This process of coordination goes on unceasingly. This process is called the process of evolution. But, ~~again~~, evolution results in evolving or producing some thing, i.e. some ultimate effect or end. Hence arises the problem of evolution along with the problem of end. Again, the different aspects of this world goes on revolving towards some ultimate end simply because that end is considered as the right or the supreme good to which all other effects are subordinate. Thus we reach finally to the problem of value or worth. In thus, we trace the whole field of philosophy by dealing with these above-mentioned problems.

After the paper was read, the president pointed out the defects of the paper and also its good parts. Among the defects, he mentioned one as serious which was that the writer of the paper had merely gathered materials but had not given any of his own opinions on any of them. Otherwise, Dr. Shastri opined, the paper was quite a readable one. The secretary also pointed out that the essayist had omitted the mention of the problem of knowledge in his list of philosophical problems.

Owing to insufficiency of criticism and independent opinions attached to it the paper called forth no serious discussion with the order of the president the meeting then dissolved.

Thakurji  
Secretary.

J. S. Shastri  
President.



above & the moral law within" are enough to generate  
the feeling of Religion. The object of nature around us,  
he says, is quite enough to prove the existence of God.  
The essayist proceeds to show that the religious Consciousness  
is in the very nature of man as man as Principal Caird  
has said. The quote to the effect, are, according to the writer,  
Perfection, Goodness & Wisdom. The writer goes on  
to associate himself with the views of Bosanquet  
expressed in his famous book "The ~~Real~~ "What  
Religion is". Bosanquet tells us that ~~that~~ religious  
Consciousness originates from the query, "What must  
I do to be saved?" And he also tells us that whatever  
is not of faith is sin. Religion, according to Bosanquet,  
is justification by faith". The essayist goes on  
to describe the views of eminent Philosophers re:-  
instrument of Religious Consciousness. He says that  
Faith & Knowledge are the sources of Religion.  
The Paper is concluded with the definition of  
Religion as given by St. Augustine.

After the reading of the paper was  
finished, the President opened the same for  
criticism & discussion.

The Secretary Mr. Chatterji, on  
being requested by the President, to criticize the paper,  
said that Religion is not complete in mere belief  
as the writer has somewhere said in his paper.  
Every Religion contains elements of Cognition  
& Volition as well. The President in reply  
said that though the remark of the Secretary is true,  
yet the feeling side of the human mind is predominant  
in Religion.

Mr. Senapati Jnan said that the  
statement "above & Moral law within" generating  
a sense of Religion is a dogmatic statement, but as  
he could not make his position clear, his remark  
was not taken into account. The President pointed  
out that the above saying was first uttered by Kant  
& ~~so it could not be a dogmatic statement~~  
its meaning should be clearly understood.



as Sr. Jagje I. slon has said. The President therefore  
rejected his point of criticism.

Mr. Anan Rajan Mukherji, of the  
3<sup>rd</sup> year Pass class, then criticised the paper on the  
ground that Religion is possible without God. On the  
President remarked that this is not always true. Buddha  
is often cited as a Religion without God, but that was  
not quite correct. Because the latter form fit  
to the Mahayana school is this he is spirit,  
unlike the old Hinayana school.

on being requested by the President  
the joint secretary Mr. Rai H. Chaudhuri, read  
his paper of criticism looked at the said essay.  
After the reading of the criticism was finished the  
President, Congratulated Mr. Chaudhuri, for his  
fine exposition of the weak points of the essay &  
also said that the criticism discloses criticism  
reasoning & thorough grasp of the subject, (the  
Paper of criticisms is annexed herewith)

The President then Congratulated the  
Essayist, Mr. Mani; for his first class paper  
on the "meaning of Religion" & said that the essay  
in question, was thoughtful, brief & well written,  
judged from the standpoint of a 3<sup>rd</sup> year boy, the  
writing, revealed good thinking, & breadth of  
vision of the Essayist. The ~~writing~~ paper was  
also written from a catholic point of view, as there was  
no partiality re: the essence of Religion. The  
subject was also a very nice one, & the Essayist  
was not expected here to deal with all the problems  
connected with it. The chief defect of the paper  
was that the Essayist had not shown precisely the  
connection bet. Man & God & the two forms of Religion -  
higher & lower. The meeting came to a close at about 3-15 P.  
with the offering of thanks by the President to the members present.

Rajendra Chaudhuri  
Jt. Secretary

President. 172-33

# The Special Meetings of the Semester 1932-33

President - Prof. P. D. Shastri

Subject - The trend of the modern world & its attitude towards Religion & Philosophy

Essayist - Mr. Rai H. W. Chaudhuri - Secy (3<sup>rd</sup> year)

Place - The Seminar Room

Date - The 17<sup>th</sup> January Friday

Time - 12 noon

## Present

(a) Prof. P. D. Shastri in the chair

(b) All the 3<sup>rd</sup> year Phil. Hons. Student except Mr. Ali

(c) All the 3<sup>rd</sup> year Pass Phil. Student except two

sixth

A special meeting of the Phil. Seminar was held on Friday, the 17<sup>th</sup> January 1933, at 12 noon with

Prof. P. D. Shastri in the chair.

After the proceedings of the last meeting was read by the Secy & confirmed by the President the Essayist, Mr. Rai H. W. Chaudhuri, orally reported by the President, began to read his paper on the trend of the Modern World & its attitude towards Religion & Philosophy specially composed by him.

Below is given a brief summary of

the paper.

The Essayist dwells at the outset on the main current of the present day civilisation. He gives a lucid description of the westerner's mad pursuit, phrenzied craving & rest less hankering after material wealth & consequent deification of it. The Essayist quotes several authors & philosophers in support of his chief thesis, & thereby strengthens

his argument. He also shows in the sequel, the individualistic temperament & materialistic taste of the Western people. Secondly, he describes the peaceful dietime of the Ancient India as portrayed by Rabindra-nath & Sri Raskhishan through their poetical & philosophical works respectively. The essayist also shows the distaste of the Indians for material prosperity & sensual gratification. The Indians chose the path of self-realisation through self-suffering & renunciation. Towards the end of the essay, the writer proceeds to dwell upon the Eastern Ideas of the Spirit & lack of spiritual excellence amongst the Westerners. & concludes his essay by pointing out that the way to emancipation, lies not in inconsistent ~~and~~ deification of material wealth but in reviving these Eastern Ideas of the Spirit.

After the reading of the essay, was ~~found~~ finished, the President, remarked that the essay, in question was thoughtful well written & reveals the essayist's wide-reading & thorough grasp. The President also congratulated the essayist, for his independent view about the matter. The President then opened the same for criticism & discussion.

On being requested by the President, Mr. S. A. Masud, criticised the paper on the ground that "the picture of Ancient Indian Civilization as presented by the writer is a bit partial." "The Westerners mistake of their hankering after wealth are not surely atheistic or irreligious. The real position is that the Westerners are not are not critical & serious about Philosophy of Religion." He also pointed out that the materialistic consideration was absolutely necessary & cannot therefore be ignored. "What is necessary is a combination of the Western & Eastern Ideas".

P.S.

Mr. Ajit Bose of the 3<sup>rd</sup> year Pass class, then criticised the paper & said that "Philosophy is ignored simply because there is no money & food." Abstract metaphysical speculation could only be dealt with if there ~~was~~ <sup>is</sup> sufficient food in the belly & money in the pocket."

Mr. Ajit Roy then expressed his disagreement with the views of Messrs Bose & Masood. Acc. to him, "India is the <sup>home</sup> life of philosophy & religion. For the Indian, it is a duty to study Religion & Philosophy in utter disregard of food & money. The proof of this lies in the fact that that Religion & Philosophy still holds sway over a large number of people in India."

Mr. Anuraj Mukherjee then said that the Eastern ideal tended to dwarf the intellect & it would have been a blessing if India could imbibe the materialistic zeal of the westerners. "Religion & Philosophy," acc. to him "is a curse upon the Indians."

Messrs. Anuraj & S. D. Ghosh expressed their perfect agreement with the views of Messrs. Masood & Bose.

Mr. Sarajit Ghosh of the 3<sup>rd</sup> year Honors class, criticised the paper on the ground that it was written from a partial point of pessimistic points of view. He said "that neither the ancient Civilisation was wholly good nor the modern civilisation is wholly bad."

Mr. Ananda Prasad Saha, of the Honors class, associated himself with all that had been said by the essayist, Mr. Chandhuri, but expressed his disagreement with only one point of view viz: "that India alone was not the birth place of all cultures"

civilization. The Early Greeks with the persons of Aristotle, Socrates & Plato, also contributed important & valuable phases in the building up of the Ancient Civilization of the World.

After the criticism & discussions were finished, the President concluded the debate by defending the newspaper by the Essayist, Mr. R. N. Chaudhuri, in his excellent essay. He first of all pointed out that the Essayist did neither condemn nor ignore the materialistic culture, that is prevailing in the West. The Essayist has only pointed out the evil effects that have resulted from the materialistic civilization of the West. The President associated himself with the main spirit of the essay & said that the way to emancipation as suggested by the writer <sup>"seems"</sup> "the only possible one under the present circumstances." "We must go on to get practice & emancipation" - said Dr. Shome - the President, He also congratulated the Essayist for his fine ~~and~~ exposition of the present day position of the world & especially of the West. The Sacrifice of the internal Culture & civilization for the so-called outward beauty is the main feature of the present day. He also pointed out that Ann Mathew is wrong in thinking that there is shame in being proud of the glory of our ancestors. This is only genuine & natural. The President then pointed out that there is nothing to be envious of the Western materialistic a Mem. Soc. & Mand. & especially Ann ~~Soc.~~ seemed to have been. The evil effects of the materialistic civilization have been adequately exhibited by the last Great War. What is necessary therefore is not to hanker & far more & more money but to

reduce our wants to the least possible minimum  
then then only the craving for material wealth  
will cease & men will have more time & leisure  
to devote to the culture of spiritual excellence.  
In this point Mrs. Chaudhri is perfectly right  
when she says "simplicity of manner is absolutely  
necessary" "we must be in & above the  
world," said Jesus. The great pains & misfortunes are  
our own creation. These are the issues of our past  
accumulated social ~~issues~~ sins. The present  
~~is indispensable necessary at the present position of~~  
~~the world & if there are hundreds such the~~  
character of the world becomes transformed. We  
are pointed out at least that religion is not care  
for by the western nations since they are in religion.

The meeting came to a close  
at about 1-25 PM with the offering of thanks by the  
President to the members present at the meeting.

Raid J. J. J. J.  
18.2.33  
J. J. J.

P. D. J. J. J.  
President  
18.2.33

The ~~Seventh~~ Seventh Meeting of the Session 1932-33.

The seventh meeting of the Philosophy Seminar was held on Saturday, the 18th July at 2 PM, with Prof. Dr. P. D. Sharma in the chair. Mr. Rohodh Han Chatterji of the 4th year Honours class read the first part of his essay on "Kant's Conception of Morality".

The paper was divided into 2 parts - Constructive & critical. In the Constructive portion, the Essayist dealt with all the principal points of "Kant's Moral Law". He defined the terms 'Categorical Imperative', 'Good will', 'Duty', 'Highest good' & 'Complete good etc.'. He ultimately said that acc. to Kant, "There is nothing good other than the Good will". The universality & formalism of the Moral Law was also shown by the Essayist lucidly.

After the reading of the Constructive portion of the said Essay, was finished, the President congratulated the Essayist for his thoughtful & well-written essay.

The President then bid his thanks to the members present at the meeting & the meeting came to a close at about 2-4 PM.

Raj. H. Chaudhry,  
Secretary  
22.2.33

P. D. Sharma,  
President.  
24.2.33

The eighth meeting of the session 1932-33

The eighth meeting of the seminar was held on Saturday the 22<sup>nd</sup> July, '33, at 2 P.M. Dr. Kalini Kanta Borahma was in the Chair. Syed S. A. Masud, <sup>of the IV<sup>th</sup> year Hon. class</sup> read a paper on "Science and Philosophy".

The essayist, at the outset, dwells on the general misunderstanding as regards science and philosophy and also on the fascination of the modern people towards the study of science by ignoring that of philosophy. The essayist, explaining the functions of both science and philosophy separately, shows that their relation is not that of opposition but that of mutual dependence and concludes by saying that science, as it is, only makes truth realized partially and when philosophy too is taken into the field, we have the fortune of having truth, in the true sense of the term.

After the reading of the essay was finished, the President congratulated the essayist by saying that the essay in question was a very good paper and remarked that although he, as the President of the meeting, should not observe the paper from a critic's point of view, yet he must make some comment about it. He asked the students present to make a discussion on the essay and all of them responded to him by saying something about the essay. After this, the President declared that he was very glad at the lively mood in



the seminar meeting but he asked to make the meeting more lively and active, so that this sort of attitude will surely culminate in producing good results on the bearings of our Practical life. He, then, drawing the attention of the essayist, said in length about the true place of science in our life and also about the tendency of the paper in condemning ~~the~~ science. Students of philosophy, he observed, should be impartial and look at things from a broad point of view.

After these important observations of the President - which ~~certainly~~ <sup>certainly</sup> are adequate enough to change the outlook of the biased mind - the meeting came to end at about 3-20 P.M.

Anand

Secretary  
28. 7. 33.

M. Brahma  
President

The ~~ninth~~ <sup>ninth</sup> meeting of the Session 1932-33.

The ninth meeting of the Seminar was held on Saturday, the 19<sup>th</sup> August '33 at 2 P.M., with Dr. M. K. Brahma in the Chair. Mr. Ananda Prasad Singh of the IV year Hons. Class read his paper on "The Necessity of Religion".

The essay was mainly based upon Caird's Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion. The work at the outset dwells on the fact that religion is necessary for man as man and he approached it from two points of view: firstly, in the very notion of a spiritual

being is involved what may be called potential  
infinitude; and secondly, <sup>that</sup> the idea of our finitude  
and limit implies the idea of an infinite, unli-  
mited power beyond us. The essayist points out  
that there is a gradual growth from the  
lowest kind of religion up to the highest and  
every part of religion must partake of the  
growth. Religion is universal and hence it is  
true not for any particular man but for all.  
and then he concludes by saying that man's  
endeavour towards reaching God is a necessary  
completion of his thought, of his feeling, & of his  
willing.

After the reading of the paper was  
finished, a discussion began on the paper  
and then the President remarked that  
although the paper was a good one, yet  
there <sup>were</sup> ~~are~~ some points in it, which the  
writer only touched without elaborating  
the ~~points~~ <sup>explaining the points</sup>, left by the writer on the subject brought  
then. The meeting ~~then~~ <sup>closed</sup> ~~to end~~  
at 3-15 P.M.

*Amesbury*  
Secretary  
1.9.33


N.L. Graham  
President

The tenth meeting of the Seminar 1932-33

The tenth meeting of the Seminar was held on Saturday the 9<sup>th</sup> <sup>or 10<sup>th</sup> September</sup> September '33 at 2 P.M., with Mr. R. K. Brahma in the chair. Mr. Syed Mohammad Ali of the IV year B.A. class read his paper on "Freedom and Necessity".

The writer begins his essay by explaining the terms 'Freedom', & 'Necessity' and shows that without the postulate of Freedom, ~~no~~ <sup>no</sup> question of morality cannot arise. The writer all through the paper tried to give out that <sup>both</sup> the existence of freedom & necessity, although seem to be contradictory in its extremist form, ~~can~~ have their existence in our life, and concluded by remarking that we are partially free and partially bound up in the chain of necessity.

The debate on the paper could not take place for a long time, owing to the <sup>very</sup> poor attendance in the meeting. The President, however, <sup>revealing</sup> ~~giving~~ the merits and the demerits of the paper, brought the meeting to an end.

  
Secretary

M. Brahma  
President

## The eleventh meeting of the Seminars

The eleventh meeting of the Seminars was held on Saturday, the 11<sup>th</sup> November, at 2 P.M. Mr. Serajul Islam read his paper on "The development of Idealism from Locke to Hume". Dr. N. K. Brahma was in the chair.


The writer distinguishing between <sup>(from Descartes to Kant)</sup> Platonian modern Idealism from the Platonic Idealism says that the former is essentially epistemological. He continues by writing that the Locke's distinction bet. Primary & Secondary qualities is the starting point of the modern Idealism and Berkeley takes up this point and <sup>that</sup> denies the possibility of any such distinction. In Locke's system, the writer adds, the material world is half retained but in Berkeley it is denied altogether. Next comes Hume who gives us an 'Idealism' which is generally known as 'Phenomenalist Idealism', as he reduces the whole world into ideas and impressions. The writer then concludes by ~~saying~~ remarking that Idealism receives a new shape and interpretation in the system of Kant and his

a long lecture on the Subject brought  
the meeting to an end.

W. Massey

Secretary. 8.12.33.

P. McFarlane  
President



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Philosophy Seminar.

Session 1934-35.

Secretary - Anil Mohan. Gupta.



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Session 1934-35.

First meeting.

Date - 17<sup>th</sup> Feb 1934

Time - 2:15 P.M.

Place - Philosophy seminar  
President - Sr N. K. Brahma.  
Subject - Relation of religion to philosophy.  
Essayist - Mr Anil. Mohan. Gupta.

As the proceedings of the last meeting was not submitted by the previous secretary the essayist was asked by the president to begin with his essay.

'To begin with the subject', the essayist said, 'we must first of all define the terms philosophy and religion to avoid all sorts of naughty confusions.' He defined philosophy as the quest of reason to unveil the hidden face of reality; the unification of all knowledge. Religion, he said, is the quest of our inner self to establish the missing link between ourselves and the absolute, infinite reality, the God. And he described the relation between religion and philosophy as between the affectionate mother and her strong inquisitive son. He showed briefly that there is no difference between the subject matter of religion and philosophy and then proceeded on to criticise their organs. He took reason as the organ of philosophy and intuition as that of religion, and attempted to show that intuition is nothing but synthesised reason. Reason can, he said, criticise intuition only because there is reason in it.

In the conclusion he said: Ignorance is vice. Without knowledge we cannot step forward.

to be religious. Reason, on the other hand, can neither begin nor end without intuition. True knowledge, true philosophy must culminate into religion.

A general discussion on the paper took place after the essay was read, in which Mr. Sureswar Mitter, Mr. Abdul Kader Mulla, Mr. Surogadas Agarwala, Mr. Ajit Mitter took part.

Then the president remarked that the paper was a good one for the first attempt, but, he added he expected a better paper still. Before his deliverance on the subject he regretted the lack of interest on the part of the students to join the seminar meetings. He said ~~said~~ that everyone should take the subject selected for the seminar meeting to be his own and prepare it. This, he added, when fully utilised is the best mechanism for improvement.

Then he showed the relation of philosophy to religion from various other aspects which the essayist omitted; and the meeting came to a close at 3-15 P.M.

Anil Mohan Gupta.  
Secretary

W. S. Subramanyam  
President.

## Second Meeting.

The second meeting of the session 1934-35, of the Philosophy Seminar, was held in the seminar room, on Saturday the 17<sup>th</sup> March 1934, at 2 P.M., with Dr N.K. Brahma in the chair.

For several inconveniences and holidays the seminar joined a fortnight after the due time, and the meeting was held just a month after the 1<sup>st</sup> meeting of the session.

Mr. Tamprasad Das, of the third year honours class, read his paper on "The Substance of Spinoza".

He began by defining Spinoza's Substance, and touched all important problems about it. He showed that Spinoza's Substance is identical with God, and explained him as *Natura Naturata* and *Natura Naturans*. In the conclusion he pointed out the difficulties in Spinoza. In his criticism of Spinoza the writer said, "Spinoza introduces two contradictory ideas in the doctrine of Substance. He conceives God as 'indeterminate unity', and again, makes him to be the source of diversified universe; and remarked ~~that~~ it to be an unsolved problem.

After he finished, a general discussion on the paper took place and all the students present took part in it.

Then the president in his speech remarked: "The essay is really a very good one and all that can be ~~be~~ said about the subject is told. But, he added, "We expected one thing and we have missed it. No particular stand point is taken by the writer, and in a seminar paper that is absolutely necessary; for here we meet ~~to~~ develop our own thoughts, and various presentations arise not enough for ~~that~~ <sup>the</sup> purpose."

Then he took up the problem of contradiction in Spinoza, and remarked it to be no contradiction at all. He pointed out that in 'parts' we find such simulating contradiction almost in every page, but, he remarked, if we enter ~~into~~ deep into the thing this contradictions melt away. God is neither only <sup>the</sup> whole, nor only parts, but he is both part and the whole at the same time, and there can be no better mode of expressing it than that of Spinoza.

In the conclusion he said, ~~that~~ "Spinoza may present difficulty to European philosophers for he introduces a new thought in the continent, but an Indian student who is acquainted with our 3."

A. N. S. Gupta  
Secretary.

N. S. S. S.  
President.

### Third Meeting.

The third meeting of the seminar was held in the seminar room on Saturday, the 21<sup>st</sup> July, at 2 P.M., with Dr N. K. Brahma in the chair.

Due to the illness of the secretary the proceedings of the previous meeting were left unread, and Mr Ajit. K. Mitra went on with his essay ~~upon~~ the views of life.

The writer began by stating the doctrines of materialism and Idealism and ended by supporting Idealism of Hegel, as the proper view.

When he finished his paper a general discussion took place in which both 4<sup>th</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> year students participated.

Mr Sukumar ~~has~~ <sup>Mitra</sup> expected that the essay <sup>has</sup> ~~did not~~ touch the problem of life at all, but he admitted that, <sup>himself</sup> ~~however~~, at that moment, not prepared to give any adequate constructive method to tackle with the problem.

Mr Sathendryoti Nagunder of this year honours class said that he had not been able to enter into the technicalities of the essay; and as to the views of life he raised the question of 'sorrow', 'optimism', and pessimism as views of life.

The president admitted that the essay had taken quite a different turn than he had intended it for; but he ~~said~~ <sup>said</sup> that from such a broad point of view as Mr Mitra had taken the ~~essay~~ problem of the views of life could not relevantly be developed. He pointed out that the essayist could have easily shown ~~that~~ ~~the~~ ~~failure~~ ~~of~~ ~~materialism~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~practical~~ ~~life~~ and could have made the essay more successful.

At last he left with the views of hedonism and asceticism, optimism and pessimism as views of

right. He told ~~that~~ "many think of the view of Indian thinkers about life is pessimism. But this is highly fallacious. Indian thinkers do not show pessimism of the to be the end of life but they open the door of a world where sorrow is unknown."

✓ It was decided that essayists will submit their papers to the secretary 3 days before the date fixed for the seminar meeting. It will be circulated among the students so that it will be ~~be~~ helpful for the critical observation on the paper.

Anil Mohan . Gupta.

Secretary

~~Mr. Mohan~~  
President

## Fourth Meeting.

The fourth meeting of this session was held, in the seminar room, on the Saturday, 18th August, last, at 2 P.M., with Dr N. K. Bishma, M.A., Ph.D., P.R.S. in the chair.

Mr Lutfal Kabir read a paper on "mechanism and Teleology". He exclusively employed mathematic arguments and examples to support the Teleological view.

After this a general discussion took place in which all who were present participated.

Mr Kartick Ch Mallik of the sixth year M.A. class said that, there is no antagonism between mechanism and Teleology, when the former is determined by the past the latter is determined by the future, and he explained it with an illustration.

Then the president congratulated the essayist for his good essay, and thanked Mr Mallik for his kindly joining the seminar meeting. He agreed with Mr Mallik that there is no antagonism between mechanism and Teleology. He pointed out that they answer quite different problems, while the former answers the how of the thing, the latter answers the why. A good theory of Teleology does not exclude mechanism but includes it. ~~Events are~~ Events are worked out mechanically but if we ask why — teleology answers the question. They commit mistake when one tries to enter into the other's territory, and then on the false antagonism issues.

Anil Mohan Gupta

Secretary

President



## Fifth Meeting.

The fifth meeting of the session 1934-35, of the Philosophy Seminar, was held in the Seminar room, on Saturday the 29<sup>th</sup> September 1934, at 2 P.M., with Dr N. K. Brahma in the chair.

Mr Sureswar Mitter of the 4<sup>th</sup> year B.A. class read a paper on "The Absolute of Philosophy and the God of Religion."

In the introduction the essayist began by showing the apparent differences between philosophy and religion. He then defined the philosophical conception of the Absolute as reached through the Teleological and the Cosmological arguments and presented in this connection the conceptions of the Absolute by the immortal thinkers like Spinoza and Hegel.

"Religion", he next told, "may be defined as the evaluation of human spirit into union with the Divine. The aim of all higher forms of religion seems to be realization of the Ultimate reality." And showed that philosophy also in its quest tries to find out the ultimate reality."

Absolute of Philosophy, he held in the conclusion, must be the highest synthesis to which nothing can form the Antithesis, must be an Unity. Again a person in Religion when a person reaches the Absolute Unity, he feels that all his functions are attained and there is the God of religion. Whole man realises, with the entire dimensions of his existence. And thus he concludes that the Absolute of Philosophy and God of religion are not two things but one and the same.

After this general discussion took place in which all who were present took part.

Then the president in his speech said that the essay was a good one and congratulated the essayist for his nice essay. ~~He is~~ "Essayist", he said, "has pointed out all the points which can be ~~discussed~~ on the subject.

After his speech the meeting came to a close at 3.15 P.M.

President

Secretary.

6th Meeting


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Session 1935-36.

Secys.

Shubhendu ~~ji~~ Majumdar.

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IV<sup>th</sup> Yr. B.A.

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Joint Meeting.

Spinoza's Metaphysics: Relation of  
Substance and Modes:

In our last meeting the subject for discussion was Spinoza's Metaphysics: The Relation of Substance and Modes.

Mr. Primal Majumdar (of the third yr. Hon. Class) read a brilliant paper. We ought to thank the essayist for lucidly clearing up certain intricate problems involved in Spinoza's philosophy.

The essayist observed that modes can neither exist, nor be conceived without substance. They are indeed the affections of the attributes of God. Like waves in an ocean they are but ever-varying shapes.

The main problem here is this: whether the finite being has a separate existence apart from the absolute; and in



this connexion the point to be discussed is, whether Spinoza is a Pantheist. The essayist contended that Spinoza is not a pantheist. Finite beings have an existence which can be traced even when they are explained into the unity of the Absolute.

If modes are only transient forms there ~~must~~ be a reason in the nature of the substance for their existence. Even though the world be resolved into negation, the negation itself exists. If world of finites be a phantom — the phantoms must still be accounted for.

There is an element in all finite things which is eternal and universal. So Spinoza is rather an Deosmist; but not a pantheist.

Then followed a short discussion and after that the president observed that the problem is solved if we refer to the grades of our knowledge. To the lower understanding, Imagina-

Modes are real no doubt. But the  
higher understanding discerns the real  
relation. There is no opposition  
any more between Acosmism and  
Pantheism; and Spinoza is perfectly  
right in what he says.

M. B. B. B.  
President.  
6.7.35.

Sundarabijendar.  
Secy.

## Second Meeting.

In our last meeting, held on the 6<sup>th</sup> July, Mr. Nivamal Chunder Majumdar read a paper on: "God and Absolute." The problem was, whether the Absolute of philosophy is the same as the God of Religion.

The essayist observed that God is the highest "consummation of human values," while the Absolute is the "highest synthesis of human experience." ~~So~~ At the first sight an opposition seems inevitable. But further reflection reconciles the two.

Human mind cannot be satisfied with a God who is "One of the eaches." It is the highest synthesis<sup>alone</sup> that can serve the purpose of God of religion.

Again, the highest synthesis of philosophy, Absolute, is not simply ~~an~~



## Proceedings of the Third meeting.

We had an interesting sitting last time when Mr. Haripada Das read a paper on "Evolution". Apart from a critical estimate of the theory of evolution, we had an animated debate — a set of questions from the students present and a lecture from the chair that threw much light upon the subject.

The space at our disposal at present does not permit us to do full justice to all the various points touched in course of our discussion. We only give here in brief the main propositions.

The essayist first dwelt on the importance of the theory of evolution — its far reaching influence on almost every development of our thought.

He then referred to the scientific researches establishing this theory. Then the essayist contended that "Present is the child of past and father of the future."

He then criticised the theories of Bergson and Alexander. ~~The~~ Creative Evolution's conception of a "growing universe" has some truth in it. But the romantic conception of the French professor — a present determined neither by the <sup>past</sup> ~~present~~, nor conditioned by the future — with this our ardent essayist could not agree.

And he summarily dispensed with the

thesis of Emergent Evolution for its upholders fail to bring out fully the exact nature of the nexus or the driving force.

The essayist contended that this universe is an expression of the Absolute Spirit. An empirical account is hardly satisfactory. The explanation is to be found by seeking the key to the beginning in the end, not to end in the beginning.

~~The~~ The president observed that evolution means introduction of something new. This is indeed a creation. So Creative Evolution is a tautology.

~~He~~ further remarked that Bergson's anti-intellectualistic tendency

M. B. Adams

President.

10/8/35

President - Dr. N. K. Brahma  
Speaker - Ajoy K. Basu  
Subject - Determinism & Free Will.

In our last meeting Mr. Ajoy Kumar Basu read a paper on "Determinism and Free Will." According to him, He differentiated between freedom as reality and freedom in an ideal sphere of existence. According to him the conception of freedom as reality, which is advocated by the materialists is more or less a consoling myth. We are determined so far as our physical life is concerned, although it is a fact that we can rise up to a realm where transcend our limits and reign in the realm of true freedom.

The president thanked the essayist and himself took part in the discussion. He deterministic theory he said fails to explain the nature of causality. It tells us that the Cause is always determined by another cause, of which it is an effect. But viewed from this standpoint the cause is a mere cause by contrast. The real cause is what Schopenhauer called the ground. It is an uncaused more a *Causa sui*. And true conception of freedom can be made in this level of existence.

On the 14th December a meeting of the was held under the presidency of Dr. Mahendra Nath Sircar. The subject for discussion was 'The ultimate validity of Morality.'

Mr. Nirmal Ch. Mazumder opened the discussion. He maintained that our moral consciousness is not ultimately valid. Firstly our moral judgements are entirely relative. They are modified to a great extent by the environment. Again a man who just manages to keep the wolf out of the door cannot afford to be moral. His discrimination gradually becomes tarnished. Morality presupposes freedom of choice, reason and personality. But the less fortunate brethren of our society do not even get the opportunity of exercising these. "Back to nature" says Nietzsche, "Everything good is instinct." The law of life is far more valuable than the laws of morality. Whatever comes within our life stream is good and whatever stands in the way is bad.

This position he strengthened by the pantheistic argument. He observed that according to Spinoza, the ultimate causality of all things can be traced to God. Everything in this universe seems to be determined by divine necessity. Man has no freedom; so morality has no meaning. "Morality" as the essayist remarked is 'is' for the lower level of existence. It is in the lowest stage of imaginative knowledge that we can



stage and view objects sub specie aeternitatis, the distinction between moral and immoral is transcended.

Mr. Joy Kumar Basu observed that it has been a fashion of late to depreciate morality, and every dilettante repeats the same cant. This depreciation has its origin in the immoral tendencies of our age. Again this support of what is immoral, rather this disbelief in the ultimate merit of morality has grave consequences upon our society.

Mr. Indrendujoyi Hazumdar in course of his criticism of the original paper questioned the truth of the position of the essayist. He thanked the essayist for his sympathies for the poor. But he observed that a man not feeling any throbs of moral life is merely an abstraction. Even in the darkest corners of society there blossom unseen the fairest lilies of our morality. Morality is interwoven with the very tissue of our life. Life does not even allow moral scepticism. Life, if it is to have any meaning, must be organized and morality is the very principle of such organisations. The unfoldment of life is best possible when there is harmony of a rhythm at heart. As regards the pantheistic argument, he observed that pantheism is not merely a barren intellectual theory. It must be realised through life; and for this crowning realisation moral discipline is absolutely necessary. The whole course of Sadhana as we find in Hinduism, leads man to this one goal. But this preliminary discipline

which leads to the attainment of spiritual ~~existence~~  
experience, is almost analogous to our best moral efforts.

When the moral eye opens even in the feeble  
promptings of the lowliest of the low we notice an  
expressive effort, a striving, a sprouting of the spirit  
of the Holy. In its whispers we seem to notice an  
attempt at seeking its place in the harmony of the  
Grand Melody.

Not only do we understand that everything follows  
necessity but we also resign of ourselves joyfully  
in to the divine necessity. This is the fulfilment,  
the climax of the moral man.

The president summing up the debate observed  
that man realises his freedom in the freedom of the  
absolute. So in one sense he transcends morality,  
in another sense it is the very fulfilment of his  
moral life.

Indrenduji K. Mahad.

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President -

Secretary  
Fletcher Hall  
Chicago

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Session - 1936-37.

President.

Dr. P. D. Sastri.

Secretary: —

Jitendra Nath  
Chatterji.

III year. B.A.

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Fletcher Hall

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Resident. Sr. P. S. Sastri.

Date - 29.2.36

Subject The doctrine of substance in Descartes and Spinoza.  
Essayist. Jitendra Nath Chatterji.

A meeting of the Philosophy Seminar was held on 29th Feb '36 under the presidency of Sr. P. S. Sastri. Mr. Jitendra Nath Chatterji read a paper on 'The doctrine of substance in Descartes and Spinoza'. The essayist began by an exposition of the Cartesian doctrine of substance and proceeded to show that the Spinozistic conception of substance is only a logical conclusion from the Cartesian premisses. Descartes defines substance as that which is conceived through itself. So also Spinoza. To both of them substance is one, Infinite and Absolute. But in Descartes there are relative substances - thought and extension. They are relative in the sense that they are created by God, the Absolute and so depend for their conception upon him. This applying of the term 'substance' to thought and extension, though qualified by the term 'relative' is according to Spinoza invalid. For, what is a created substance? God surely does not create something that will remain outside himself or he loses his infinitude or something that is related to him only causally (i.e. thought and extension cannot be the effect of the transformed cause God. The idea is preposterous) What are thought and extension then if they cannot be regarded as substances though qualified by the term 'relative'? The answer that Spinoza gives is that they are nothing outside God, they are not created by God but are the attributes of God's things which we perceive to be the essence of God. They are what we know of the one substance, God. Everything

Ge. 2/20/14

that is, is God. That is a settled fact in Spinoza.  
Existence = Substance.

Then the essayist turned on the question of modes and said 'Since modes are in something else i.e. in God, God can be known through and a understanding of the modes. On this statement Mr. Tagore remarked that in Spinoza an understanding of the finite modes as such can never lead to a knowledge of the infinite. Rather in the knowledge of the infinite the mode loses its ~~infinite~~ individuality, here there are no particular modes but only the one substance i.e. infinite and Absolute.

The president pointed out the merits as well as defects of paper and gave a brief exposition of the main points of controversy on the subject. He then thanked all present in the meeting and afterwards the meeting was dissolved.

Countersigned by the President.

O. S. Ghosh

Jitendra Nath Chatterji.  
Secy. Philosophy Seminar.



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On 28th March a meeting was held under the P<sup>r</sup>esidency  
of Dr. Sastri. The subject of Discussion was "Proofs of the Existence  
of ~~God~~".

The president made some critical observations on the paper  
of Mr. Sourindra Kumar Ray. The paper was elaborately dealt  
with; It needed further discussion, so the meeting was  
adjourned till Tuesday, the 31st March.

NS  
President

Jitendra Nath  
Chatterji.  
Secy. Phil. Seminar.

Session - 1956-57  
The First Meeting

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Session-1936-37.

## The First meeting

Date- 9th Aug-1936.

Subject- Relation between Mind and Body.

Speaker- A.K. Fazlul Haq.

President- Dr. P. D. Shastri.

Students present:-

- 1) Jitendra Nath Chatterjee. IVth year
2. Gourindra K. Roy. IVth year
3. Sebi P. Chatterjee. IIIrd year.
4. Anil K. Sen- Sanskrit College. IVth year

The 1st meeting of the session was held on 9th Aug. '36 when Mr. A.K. Fazlul Haq. read a paper on "The mind-body relation" Dr. P. D. Shastri was on the chair.

Mr. Fazlul Haq began his essay by a direct attack on the opponents of Interactionism. "largely on the credit of the term 'inconceivability' " - he said, " these opponents seek to refute the theory". And added quite convincingly, that there ~~are~~ was not much sense in the refutation. When the opponents could not gain much by the allegation against the theory that it violates the principle of the conservation of Energy, the falsity of the allegation being easily shown, they fell back in the opinion of the essayist " helplessly" solely on the term 'inconceivability'. " But " the essayist asked, " where lies the 'inconceivability' about the theory of interactionism? " If conceivability has any meaning, then, in his opinion, that meaning is to be found brimful in the proposition " Interaction between Mind and Body. " Any one can see that if he cares to " ~~was~~ is the opinion. The charge why the mind, on the theory, could not throw the moon out of its path, he met quite simply. " It cannot because it cannot " was the verdict. " Interactionism ", he said, " never for a moment dreams of granting omnipotence to the mind. "

And he added that the moon was too much out of the way, and that the mind, even consistently with the theory, could not for the life of it ~~even~~ move even the ears of the same body it pervaded: all that the theory asserts is that the mind can act on the body only within certain limits.

In his refutation of Parallelism he said that the theory was untenable both psychologically and metaphysically. The theory, in his opinion, could never prove a point-to-point correspondence between the physical and psychical states. "The suggested explanation of the parallelism is not likely to be realized these few million years" and he added, with evident pleasure "For" and "if the human species should go extinct in the meantime, the explanation may go for ever unrealised." "Metaphysically speaking" he said, "it is not a very intelligible proposition that when no causal link ever stretches across from one series to the other i.e. when the two series are independent of each other, there should yet be a point-to-point correspondence between the two." And even supposing it did as a matter of fact, this could not, according to him, help the theory very much. "For, if we allow ourselves to think for a moment that one of the two series has been destroyed, this destruction can give <sup>us</sup> no ground for supposing that the other also has vanished, since the two series are causally independent. And this very conclusion finishes the theory, because it does away with that universal parallelism of the theory which is its very essence and sole basis."

Mr. Jitendra Nath Chatterjee opened the discussion by bringing in certain points from the Hegelian Philosophy, but these points according to the President were not quite relevant and did not touch upon the essay. The President in his speech pointed out the merits and demerits of the essay. He said that the essay had not done full justice to the parallelistic theory and that it had failed to criticise certain

important arguments in favour of that theory. In favour of the essay he said, it was a clever thing and well written.

Countersigned

Jitendra Nath Chatterjee.  
Secy. Phil Seminar

### Proceedings of the 2nd Meeting.

President - Dr. P. D. Shastri.

Essayist - Sourindra K. Sanyal.

Subject - Hume's Critique of Causality.

Date - 23rd May '36.

The second meeting of the Seminar came off on 23rd May. When Mr. Sourindra K. Sanyal read a paper on "Hume's Critique of Causality". Dr. P. D. Shastri was on the Chair.

The Essayist gave a beautiful exposition of the Humean doctrine of Causality. He said that Hume fully realised the force of the belief in a necessary connection between cause and effect, but this was, according to Hume, after all, only a ~~but~~ belief. What we actually experience are two phenomena, what we call cause being the prior one, and when two such phenomena are often found together, we dovetail these two by supposing that there is some necessary connexion between them. But

Such a connection, according to Hume, could be no better than a subjective tendency, a figment of the mind. In fact, the mind could never discern a necessary connection between the two.

The essayist then proceeded to establish a necessary ~~connection~~ Will-Causality in place of Hume's Belief-Causality. In this he followed Nietzsche.

There was a lively discussion on the constructive part of the essay in which every one present took part.

The president in his speech gave the opinion that the first part of the essay was a faithful exposition of Hume's position, but the second part of it was not very clear and difficult to maintain.

*[Signature]*  
Authenticated

10.10.26

Jitendra Nath Chatterjee.  
Secy. Philosophy Seminar.

Session ~~1937-38~~

Date 11<sup>th</sup> March 1937.

Proceedings of the first meeting.

President : Dr. P. D. Sastri.

Essayist : Jayanta Bhattacharya.

Subject : The doctrine of Substance in Descartes, Spinoza and Locke.

A meeting

~~The first meeting~~ of the philosophy seminar came off on the 11<sup>th</sup> of March 1937 with Dr Sastri on the chair. In this meeting Jayanta Bhattacharya read an essay on the doctrine of substance in Descartes, Spinoza and Locke.

In his treatment, the essayist gave more stress on the doctrine of substance as has been stated in Descartes and Spinoza. Since the doctrine of Descartes and Spinoza on substance was very much different from that of Locke the essayist treated it a bit separately.

He proceeded first of all to show what Descartes and Spinoza meant by substance. According to the essayist Spinoza's substance <sup>was</sup> practically the same what Descartes meant to be the Third Independent Substance viz God to whom the two other finite substances, mind and matter were dependent. To the essayist Spinoza's doctrine was a gradual, ~~and~~ systematic and consistent development from Descartes. The writer tried to show the difference in the two philosophes about this treatment ~~of~~ on the same subject and the three substances were reduced into one in the hands of Spinoza. He identifies Spinoza's



Absolute Substance with the Vedantic  
conception of Brahman and the Nirguna Brahman  
of the Gita.

Subsequently the essayist treated  
Locke's doctrine ~~and~~ of substance in a general  
manner. He tried to show the startling  
anomaly in Locke's doctrine. Locke's conclusion  
does not follow from his premises. According  
to <sup>Locke</sup> the idea of substance ought to be grasped  
by experience, since it is the only  
source according to that empiricist philosopher  
but he denies the possibility definitely,  
still he maintains that there is the ~~idea~~  
in our mind and it is our supposition  
which <sup>alone</sup> justifies the existence of substance  
over and above the primary qualities of  
objects. So a criticism was attached on this  
doctrine.

~~The~~ of the students who were present  
were Aralindo Bose of the 3<sup>rd</sup> year Honours  
of this College Sanjit. K. Ganguli of the same  
class and Bhowani Prasad Dasgupta 3<sup>rd</sup> year  
Honours from the Sanskrit College.

Mr Aralindo Bose ~~spoke~~ spoke  
something. He said that according to  
Locke, therefore, it follows that we know  
the bare existence of something in which  
the qualities inhere but any further

5.

Knowledge of we cannot have. This is the position of the agnostics, too. We know the 'that' but we know not the 'What'. The other two gentlemen spoke nothing.

Dr Pastri in his presidential speech said something of Personality in Religion. He said that if Spinoza's doctrine of substance be looked upon as atheistic what is true then? Which is the more rational belief? The personal god, who is called forth and referred at every physical and worldly affairs, which acts as a *deus ex machina* to disentangle every inexplicable physical ~~thing~~<sup>knit</sup> is not a god worth believing. That infinite <sup>absolute</sup> and substance or intelligence or whatever he is — he from whom follow all finite things — he who gives unity and coherence in all diversified object — that infinite substance which is in itself and is conceived by means of itself is the only <sup>real</sup> entity at the back of this mundane existence — it is the only Substance and not substances to which all worldly objects are attributes.

The anthropomorphic conception is found in primitive religions. People whose thought and insight has not developed adequately believe in personal gods. As it is the aim of philosophy to attain the unity from ~~the~~ plurality Spinoza's Substance is the ~~rational~~ outcome of a systematic rational thought. It <sup>has been</sup> able to get at the conceivable unity.

Jayantabhattacherjee  
Secy. Philosophy Seminar.



The first meeting was held on ~~the~~ Saturday the 28<sup>th</sup> August at 11-15 A.M. Dr P. D. Shastri was the chairman. In this meeting Deviprasad Chatterjee of the IV<sup>th</sup> year honours class read a paper on Leibnitz's "Monadology".

The writer tried to show that though Leibnitz's system began as an antithesis to Spinoza's doctrine, as a matter of fact, it amounted to a round about re-statement of what ~~of~~ the proposed antagonist had said before. Leibnitz, according to the essayist, harmonized what he thought to be the correct halves of the views of Democritus and Descartes, and maintained, unlike his predecessors that the monads were existent though without parts. Monads <sup>are</sup> ~~some~~ alive, dynamic and active.

The monads though 'without any window' are the mirrors of the universe. Each reflects the universe in its own way. For the creation and destruction of the monads only God the 'monad of monads' can be held responsible.

Quoting the language of Sir Radhakrishnan the writer says "Leibnitz represents in the history of philosophy the pluralistic reaction against the monistic idealism".

About the nature of <sup>the</sup> monads the essayist says that the monads are ~~machines~~ but they are self-directed or spontaneous machines.

Individual freedom of the monad —  
Leibnitz found the necessity of pluralistic ~~of~~



conception which alone can restore the freedom of individuals. But complete freedom if allowed to the monads, would ~~be~~ lead to a chaotic universe. Hence Leibnitz conceived of both "freedom and necessity" of the world. Absolute freedom is denied (indirectly) to monads since they are guided by the general law of pre-established harmony, changes everywhere are not hap-hazard or incoherent but are guided by this principle. Leibnitz according to the essayist ~~was~~ <sup>goes</sup> so far to argue that even God is not absolutely free. As the world is ~~the outcome~~ <sup>created</sup> out of the moral necessity of God there is an element of determinism even in the will of God.

The writer, at length, dealt with the problem of evil in this work and explained the optimistic outlook that Leibnitz <sup>took</sup>, ~~was~~ <sup>as opposed to</sup> Voltaire's opinion that this world is all evil. Though the essayist denied ~~the~~ the originality of Leibnitz, still he could not but hold that Leibnitz should be regarded as the harbinger of the present day philosophy.


Arabinda Basu of the 4<sup>th</sup> year Honours class raised a question in the subsequent discussion that followed. He argued that since the monads in Leibnitz were spiritual entities and so unextended, how (extended) matter could ever come out of it.

The main point to which Jayantabhattaraj tried to drive at was that, as a matter of fact ~~the~~ there could not be more injustice done to Leibnitz than by putting him strictly to the Spinozistic school. Though Leibnitz very politely ~~maintained~~ maintained at the outset of his philosophical career that his

system would be an unification of the doctrines of Democritus and Spinoza, we as students of philosophy must judge and read quite impartially and as a result should acknowledge with due regard the originality that had been exhibited in the pages of Leibnitz's 'Monadology'. In his criticism Jayanta Bhattacharya ~~differs~~ <sup>where</sup> pointed out the points ~~which~~ he differed from the essayist. Philosophers of the present time with their scientific <sup>bent of mind</sup> ~~own~~ <sup>own</sup> enormously to the system of Leibnitz.

Dr. Shastri in his speech took up all the points of discussion and set them in their proper context. He thoroughly dealt some points raised by Jayanta Bhattacharya and expressed his own opinions regarding certain points. He also elaborated the proper merits both of the paper and of the objection and enjoyed the discussion. Criticisms were also offered by him that threw new light on the subject.

President:



Jayanta Bhattacharya

Secretary:

## II <sup>nd</sup> Meeting of the Seminar.

A meeting of the Seminar was held in ~~July~~ <sup>April</sup> 1937 with Dr. P. D. Shastri on the chair. In this meeting Mr. Arabinada Basu of the 3<sup>rd</sup> year class read a paper entitled "The conception of freedom in the system of Spinoza".

In the paper the writer explained what Spinoza understood by freedom. The word 'freedom' had been used by Spinoza in a sense different from that which we ordinarily mean by it. The French philosopher Rousseau said "Man is born free, but every where he is in chains". This may be true from the standpoint of politics. But Spinoza's freedom did not ~~only~~ mean absence of restraint. Every where Spinoza found determinism getting upperhand over man's activities and movements. No where is man absolutely free according Spinoza. Finite and imperfect as he is, man is always guided by ulterior motives. Ordinarily we say, we are free when we become the author of our actions and laws. A country is said to be free and independent when the citizens of that country <sup>themselves</sup> make the laws and rule according to those laws. But according to Spinoza freedom is a very difficult thing to attain. We are bounded on all sides by ~~external~~ <sup>causal</sup> laws and various other injunctions that make it extremely difficult for us limited creatures of earth to reach the height of absolute freedom.



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
Of course we are not free when our individual actions are crippled or curtailed to a considerable extent for the general welfare of the whole community. Freedom does not mean ~~less~~ lawless whims and caprices of an insane man. Generally we say we are free we as agents determine the course of our actions. That is to say when we are actuated by external forces to our actions. The conformity to a certain course of actions and law is there but that in no way stands on the way of ours being free beings because out of a series of alternative possibilities we have chosen a particular line of action. In this sense we use the term freedom and maintain that ~~we~~ of all creatures on earth it is the proud privilege of man only to be free. 'But' says Spinoza "where is your freedom". As we are conditioned by external objects and laws and hence determined externally so also in choosing a particular course of action out of many possibilities the motive or end guides our activities. It is not we as independent beings ~~that~~ choosing a particular way but there stands quite a fair number of ulterior considerations which we generally call motives or ends, those ends determine wholly our process of the realisation of any one of them. So Spinoza holds true freedom can not be found here.

The paper being read by the writer discussion on the topic followed. Jayantabhattacharya

asked the question that how far Spinoza's conception is admissible from the point of view of moral science. Ethics ~~the~~ starts with the presupposition that man is free and in choosing the right path out of a number of possibilities ~~exists~~, he becomes moral. In other words psychological causality is quite a different thing from pure determinism.

The president in his speech explains the true spinozistic spirit. Spinoza's absolutism can be compared with the system of Vedantā. There it is stated, as the president pointed out, प्रज्ञा-ज्ञान-स्य :- i.e. freedom consists in acquiring true or absolute knowledge. Spinoza also maintains that true freedom consists in deliverance from false ignorance & false illusions. The chief point of the doctrine of Socrates was that everyone should acquire knowledge. The president congratulated the essayist and apart from his own view about the question discussed also some points taken out from the paper.

President



Jayanilabhattacharya  
Secretary

The third meeting of Seminars came off on Thursday, the 10<sup>th</sup> September in the seminar room when Sanjit K. Ganguly of the 4<sup>th</sup> year Honours (Philosophy) class read a paper under the title "~~the~~ <sup>Critique of</sup> ~~Kant's Critique~~ Pure Reason".

Dr. P. D. Shastri was the chairman.


The paper was short and took only 15 minutes to read through. In this paper the writer stated ~~clear~~ though briefly the main problem of the 'critique of <sup>sure</sup> reason'. The essayist maintained that Kant's aim was to attain mathematical certainty in regard to every proposition. Till the time of Kant investigation in field of philosophy was more or less, as Kant himself said, dogmatic. So in order to attain apodictic certainty Kant proceeded through the a priori method. Though Kant was a rationalist in maintaining mind's part in the "formation of knowledge, he could not dispense with the claims of empiricism. Hence the question Synthetic judgements arose. Ultimately, as the essayist pointed out, the main problem of the critique lay in the question 'how are synthetic judgements a priori possible'.

Very little discussion on the essay was followed, only Jayanta Bhattacharya of the 4<sup>th</sup> year class remarked that the treatment of the subject did not as a matter of fact correspond to the title. The title would have been the problem of the critique. (But we may take it ~~as~~ for granted that the writer has committed the

rather inattentively).

Dr. Shastri in his speech remarked that the paper ~~was~~ ought to have been more elaborate and that the writer perhaps did not take much care in writing the paper. He also pointed out some points that were absolutely neglected by the writer.

President:



Jayanta Bhattacharya:  
Secy: Philosophy Seminar.

IV<sup>th</sup> Meeting - 1937-38

The IV<sup>th</sup> meeting of the Seminar was held on the 1<sup>st</sup> of October 1937 at 11 A.M. in the Seminar room. In this meeting Jayanla Shattacharya of the IV<sup>th</sup> year philosophy (honors) class read a paper ~~on~~ on Causality in Hume and Kant.

Dr. P. D. Shastri took the chair.

The writer began by writing "the philosophies of Hume & Kant stand in bold contrast in reference to the law of causality". This point he illustrates in the subsequent treatment in his paper. Hume was an empiricist — better a sensationalist, Kant a rationalist, naturally the views that these two philosophers took on the universal law of causality ~~was~~ were totally divergent. As a sensationalist Hume could say what a particular cause ~~does~~ <sup>did</sup>, a posteriori — but he couldn't predict why it ~~does~~ acted like that. He did not accept any a priori necessity underlying the causal sequence and so to him heat was the cause of expansion, not because of anything inherent in it to produce the effect, but only because of its priority in the occurrence. He reduced causality to a rule of time succession. He rejected the mechanical view of causality, because he didn't find any impression that proved its validity. ~~निवृत्त~~ ~~निवृत्त~~ ~~निवृत्त~~ (Niyata Purvyabartityam Karanam) so the necessity we <sup>speak</sup> of, as existing in the causal nexus, is nothing but the creation of our mind and hence, according to Hume may be classed under illusion. As a rationalist Kant differs from Hume in this point ~~also~~ regarding the law of causality. Hume didn't ~~find~~ <sup>perceive</sup> any trace of universality & necessity in the causal bond.

and being an empiricist out and out, he refused to accept universality + necessity. To Kant, though the necessity in the causal bond is not objective and cannot be revealed through <sup>sense-</sup> experience - it is a category of the understanding which is a priori and lies ready in the mind. Hume's theory is more psychological than metaphysical. Causality in Kant, is not an outcome of experience but rather the pre-supposition of all experiences. "We think in terms of causality" since it is a category of the understanding.

In the discussion that followed after the of the paper Aravinda Basu and Debendra Ch. Gopfer of the 4<sup>th</sup> year (Philosophy pass) took parts.

Dr. Shastri in his speech treated the subject throughly and ~~emphasised~~ <sup>took</sup> ~~up~~ the following points. He summarised the logic of causality + discussed the merits and defects of Mills position. Causation is necessary and unconditional sequence. He argued that if the notion of causality is to be formed only from experience apodictic certainty in that case will be lacking. He also explained the idealistic interpretation of the causal law. This theory maintains that cause and effect are not two different things but are perfectly homogeneous and at heart both are the same. As against the view that ~~maintains~~ bases the causal law purely on time succession the president argued that causation is also co-existence. He compared the views held by ~~European~~ western philosophers with those ~~of~~ which the India thinkers put in the Nayya Darshana.

President

*[Signature]*  
21.12.37

Jagan De Bhattacharya  
Secy:-

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Liberty + Necessity

Hume here begins with the doctrine of necessity  
Our idea of necessity originates from the uniformity  
of nature's phenomena.

Philosophy Seminar.  
Session 1937-38.

President - Dr. P. D. Shastri

Secretary - Md. Abdur Raquib.

Seminar meeting  
for the session <sup>1937-38</sup> 1938.

Seventh  
The First meeting.

Six meetings  
have been held  
ahead. Jayanta  
ought to have recorded  
the proceedings.  
a/c

In the <sup>seventh</sup> first meeting for the year, 1937-38 of the Philosophy Seminar held on the 3rd February '38 under the presidency of Dr. P. D. Shastri, Mr. Harindra Nath Gok of the 3rd year Hon. Class read a paper on Spinoza's conception of substance.

In the first portion of the essay the writer wants to show that the substance of Spinoza is the only infinite being, in the light of which all individual things are to be understood. Philosophical investigation begins, unlike ordinary scientific investigation, with the highest universal which thought involves. In Spinoza's philosophy the popular conception of isolation and superficiality of individual objects vanishes in the infinite substance which is the totality of being—the only being which is itself and is conceived through itself. We have to conceive the real content of our consciousness in relation to the consciousness of the infinite. The idea of finite space and thought in relation to the infinite has given rise to the infinite extension & thought—the attributes of the infinite God. Thus the attributes are nothing but the way in which mind ~~to~~ conceives God.


Next, the writer attempts to elucidate the following ideas: God is the cause of himself in the sense that He exists by His own necessity. He is absolutely free in the sense that neither ~~caprice~~ nor constraint nor caprice are to be attributed to Him. The essence of substance implies eternity and existence. Even intellect and will are not to be ascribed to God. He is absolutely indeterminate, since

determination is limitation by negation. Not being intelligent, He does not work with <sup>an</sup> end in view. He is the efficient cause of things.

In the last part of his essay the writer in a course of tackling the problem why Spinoza brings in attributes of God who is absolutely above qualification, unconsciously glides into a train of ideas obviously contradictory to his previous utterances. Here he says that the proposition - Determinatio est negatio, does not imply that God is absolutely indeterminate - a non-being or a negative being, but that He has absolutely unlimited attributes or absolutely infinite perfection; He is a positive, concrete and not real being who unites all possible attributes in Himself and possesses ~~them~~ infinity of them without limitation. Thus he says that attributes are not subjective, but inherent in the essence of substance.

This conception of attributes as the inherent essence of substance & the conception of mode as modifications of substance gave rise to much discussion in the meeting. Dr. Shastri lucidly tackled the points and gave a brief exposition of Spinoza's conception of substance in relation to attributes and modes before the meeting ended.

President



Md. abdur Raquib.  
Sect., Philosophy Seminar.

The eighth meeting of the Phil. Seminar was held in the 6<sup>th</sup> year Phil. Room, Ashutosh Building on the 15<sup>th</sup> Feb. 1938, when a paper on 'Intellect & Intuition' was read by Nirmal Chandra Majumdar of the 6<sup>th</sup> year class of the Presg. Coll.

Please a short summary of the paper & the discussion to be incorporated here.

Ref  
-

### The Eighth Meeting.

The eighth meeting of the Philosophy Seminar was held in the 6<sup>th</sup> yr. Philosophy Room, Ashutosh Building on the 15<sup>th</sup> Feb. '38, in which Mr. ~~Home~~ Nirmal Chandra Majumdar, <sup>of the 6<sup>th</sup> yr. Class of the Presidency Coll.</sup> read a paper on Intellect and Intuition. Dr. P. D. Shastri took the chair. The 6<sup>th</sup> yr. students attended the meeting in large numbers.


In his brilliant paper, ~~Mr.~~ Mr. Nirmal Chandra Majumdar approached the problem very artistically. He defined intellect intuition as that type of cognition which enters directly into the heart of things. Intellect on the other hand moves, according to him, round the object; — ~~it is~~ knowing by means of concepts which gives us the translation of the object, and not the object itself.

According to the essayist, the conception of intuition in Western Philosophy is more or less intellectual, the Western philosophers consider intuition as intellect in disguise. Spinoza & Hegel can be taken as instances of this position. The conception of

intuition became reorientalized by the theories of  
Bradley and Bergson. But still intuition to him  
is a sort of object-cognition. These philosophers  
failed to transcend the conceptual form of thinking.

The essayist thinks that the most perfect  
form of intuition is found in Vedanta and Patanjali.  
Intuition as conceived in them is pure *anantora*, where  
the Chit (Cos) shines in its native fundamentality.  
In the next place the essayist considered the  
possibility of realizing such intuition. Here he pointed  
out that valid knowledge presupposes a particular  
stage of ~~intuition~~ cognition, where the ideal and the  
real coincide. From this it follows that the idea  
of realizing an intuitive cognition is in the  
highest degree justified.

The essay stirred the students to  
earnest and enthusiastic discussions, which lasted  
for a very long time and satisfied those who joined  
in it to a very high degree. The President  
congratulated ~~the~~ Mr. Majumdar on his  
successful treatment of the problem and spoke  
on the subject for a few minutes. The  
end of the meeting was attended by a vote of  
thanks to the chair.

  
President

M. A. Rajput  
Secretary, Philosophy  
Seminar.  
4.4.28

## The ninth Meeting

The ninth meeting of the philosophy seminar was held on the 22nd March 38. Dr. N.K. Brahma was on the chair. In the meeting a paper on Intelligence Test was read by Mr. M. A. Ragunil of the 3rd year Honours class. The paper was an attempt on a clear exposition of the growth, nature and utility of the intelligence test. The relation of intelligence with various walks and aspects of life was traced in the paper. The theoretical interest in the new movement in the domain of scientific study has produced was dealt with in detail. Mr. M. N. Ghosh made a few remarks on the paper in course of the discussion that ensued in the meeting.

Dr. Brahma pointed out the discrepancies of the paper and dwelt on the present utility and future possibility of the practical benefit of the movement. He also encouraged the essayist in course of his speech. Vote of thanks to the chair preceded the end of the meeting.

N. K. Brahma  
President

M. A. Ragunil  
Secretary, Philo. semis



## Seminar Meetings

For the session 1938-39.

### The First Meeting


The first meeting for the session '1938-39' was held on the 21st September 1938. Mr. Shafique-ul-alam Imam Mahmood of the 3rd year Honours class had the proud privilege of opening the seminar procedure for the session. In the meeting he read a paper on "Value of Introspection as a Psychological Method". Mr. J. P. D. Shastri was on the chair.

The third year and the fourth year Philosophy students attended the meeting.

Mr. Mahmood's paper contained in a short space a clear and lucid statement of the value of introspection in the study of psychical states of consciousness. He tried to develop the essay through a critical study of the objective methods of measuring psychical expressions. The paper was prepared mainly to uphold the cause of introspection, the essayist however tried to give an adequate praise to other methods which are in no way negligible in the field of modern investigation — much less in that of behaviouristic psychology. The essayist in his enthusiastic praise for introspection did not forget that introspection as corroborated with other methods should be the proper guide in psychology.

The discussion that followed the reading of the paper was mainly in the line of <sup>distinguishing between</sup> demarcating the ~~the~~ scope of subjective and objective methods in psychology. The value of each method in its own field was discussed by Mr. Abdul Raquib in the meeting. The third year students cited facts which of mental life, which could be studied not by this or that method alone but by the combination of the methods.

The President thanked Mr. Mahmood for his lucid paper and elaborated some points left by him in course of his address to the students. After a vote of thanks to the chair, the meeting ended.

  
President.  
15-11-38

M. A. Raquib.  
Secretary, Philosophy  
Seminar.  
21. 9. 38.

The second meeting for the session 1938-39 came off on the 15th Nov. 1938 under the presidency of Dr. P. D. Shastri. In the meeting Mr. Abdul Raquib of the 4th year Hon. Class read a paper on "The Sources of Religious Insight - Faith vs. Reason".

In his paper the essayist develops the claim of reason through a critical study of the nature of faith. He was mainly a rationalist. He showed in an elaborate way the essential deficiencies of faith to claim the light of the supra-sensible universe. According to him faith as faith or as without the sure background of rational apprehension is short of religious insight. It is the inherent rational element in reason faith that is of any ultimate importance for us. The proper union between the finite and the infinite is possible not through faith as opposed to reason, but through reason and rational elements in faith. Thus it is reason that can give us the synthetic insight knowledge of God. Faith or feeling as subjective and empirical is fleeting and evanescent. Even the rational element in faith is helpful to give only the fragmentary view of the ultimate reality. The synthetic and synthetic view of the absolute is attainable ~~is~~ through reason and reason only. God

reveals himself to mankind through reason which is not foreign to his own nature. The type of reason that can have access to the spiritual universe is divine in nature. The divinity in man which is latent when left uncultivated develops through his rational culture into a synthetic view of the Absolute — the view which is perfectly harmonious in its unity between man and God. Hence the knowledge of God — which is essentially rational — is not man's knowledge of God but it is the "God's knowledge of himself". In man, the process of this knowledge passes through the stages of perception and rational thinking, which ultimately attains to a conviction that surpasses the all attitude that faith can claim for itself.

Mr. H. N. Ghosh, of the Lili near Howrah and Messrs Satya P. Bhattacharyya and Imam Hani Mahmood of the 3rd year class joined in the discussion that followed. The President thanked the essayist for his paper and encouraged the students in course of his speech. He clearly pointed out how the paper, otherwise excellent, could not draw a distinction between reason and intuition. The synthetic view of the whole in a harmonious unity is, he said, the stage that can be attained to by intuition only. Thus, though we start ~~with~~ <sup>from</sup> faith and proceed a long way ~~to~~ through a rational pursuit after the ultimate reality, we have after all to fall upon a higher stage of faith issuing forth <sup>from</sup> intuition. Hence it is not

The ordinary faith of the ignorant, but the higher  
faith of the spiritualist that is really the source  
of the ~~real~~ religious insight.

With a vote of thanks to the chair in  
meeting ended.

~~C.S. Jones~~  
- President  
22. 11. 38

M. A. Raquit.  
Secretary.  
29. 11. 38.

1938-39

### The Third Meeting

The third meeting of the seminar was held on Tuesday the 6th December 1938 under the Presidentship of Dr. P. D. Shastri. In the meeting Mr. Harendra Nath Ghosh of the 4th year Hon. Class read a paper on "The Nature of Self." The attendance was satisfactory; <sup>almost all</sup> the philosophy students joined the meeting enthusiastically.

The essayist, on being asked, to read out his paper in the meeting. His paper was mainly confined <sup>to</sup> the analytical study of the several aspects of the self without any clear principle of unity and assimilation. He proceeded with the conceptions of the nominal, the empirical, and the concrete idealistic self, answering <sup>with</sup> ~~the~~ the criticisms and estimates regarding them with a view to establish the concrete idealistic self as the higher conception in philosophy. Having dealt with this metaphysical aspect of the problem, he passed on to the psychological aspect of it and took up the questions of relationship between the self and personality and the self and the activities having their origin at the subconscious depth of human nature.

The essay provoked an enthusiastic discussion through questionings between the essayist himself on the one hand and Messrs M. A. Raqib and Satya K. Bhattacharyya on the other. Mr. Raqib criticised the paper on the ground of inadequacy as to the distinction maintained by the writer between the nominal self and the concrete idealistic self. While the essayist tried to maintain the view of the concrete idealistic nature, the Mr. Raqib tried to

elucidate that the noumenal self, left rather half-ignored by the essayist, should be the proper conception of the self, which is for all practical and theoretical purposes nothing but a unity of the multiplicity of conscious states - a unity of this unanalysable in nature. However the attending parties had their own ivory vision and were ultimately left, each by his own ~~with~~ ~~their~~ at peace with their own conceptions.

The President all through this discussion directed the speaker in proper channel and stopped any digression that might bring in unnecessary complications in the debate. He asked the students to cultivate the habit of proper assimilation before presentation, which he found to be lacking in the present paper and in students' presentation generally.

With a vote of thanks to the chair the meeting ended.

A. Shashi  
President  
23.1.29

A. A. Razvi.  
Secretary.  
13.12.28

1988-89

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17



Philosophy Seminar.

Session. 1988-89.

President. Dr. P. D. Shastri.

Secretary - SA. Inam Mahmud.

1938-39.

The fourth meeting.

The fourth meeting of the philosophy seminar was held on Thursday the 6th April, 1939, under the presidency of Dr. P. D. Shastri. In the meeting a paper on 'the relation between the mind and the body' was read by Mr. S. N. Datta.

The essayist on being asked, read out his paper in the meeting. The paper was written elaborately enough, and did not leave much for discussion. The writer dealt with all the three theories of Interaction, parallelism and Automatism regarding the problem of the relation between the mind and the body. He stated each of these theories, criticised them and also contributed his own views as far as possible. He also dealt with the Idealistic and Realistic points of view concerning this problem.

He maintained that the theory of Interaction can be supported by facts and Common Sense. It is a possible fact that mind and body mutually react on each other. When we feel tired we cannot perform anything serious; Similarly when we are angry we clench our fists.

The writer holds that all the theories are untenable, ~~as they cannot be proved~~ ~~causally~~. So, if we are to accept any one of these we shall accept the most plausible one.

And most certainly the theory of interaction  
is such that ~~without being actually~~ we can  
accept it as a fact, though we cannot prove  
it. He also maintained that the theory  
can be accepted only on the strength of being  
a fact; but if we press it further, we shall  
be nowhere. He however, ultimately maintains  
that these problems are still mysteries on which  
human intellect is to throw light. It is a  
doubtful case whether humanity will ever find  
any eye-to-eye proof of its operations. So it is better  
to leave these problems to metaphysicians to tackle with.

The president thanked the writer for his  
earnestness which he has exhibited in writing  
out the paper. The president developed all the  
points which remained unfinished. He recalled  
the different stages of development that have been  
made ~~in the~~ in psychology. He really wondered  
and was amazed to find that still now there are  
more things on earth which have defied human intel-  
lectual effort. He concluded that these theories are  
more or less one-sided; they are ~~so~~ to say  
hypotheses and dismiss the problem instead of solving  
it. He finally comes to the conclusion that he should  
not bother about these problems on scientific lines &  
should leave them to the ~~the~~ metaphysicians. Up to this  
time they have been like mysteries and it would be  
wisdom on our part if we do not try to fight

with the Infirmary and submit to him  
with a vote of thanks to the Chair the meeting  
ended.

G.S.P.  
President.  
11.9.39

Sf. Iman Mahmood.  
Secretary.  
3.7.39.

## The Fifth Meeting.

The fifth meeting of the Philosophy Seminar was held on the 11<sup>th</sup> September, 1939, under the presidency of Dr. T. D. Shastri. In the meeting Mr. Arafat Ahmed read a paper on "Hume's Critique of Causality."

The essayist, in the beginning gives us a general notion of causation. Then he dwells on what Hume understands by the notions of Cause & effect. Having proved that all our ideas are derived from sensation, Hume shows that they succeed each other in a certain order. And this order, this connection presupposes certain principles of connection. Now, as to the question, whether these principles, especially causality, are a priori or mere faint sensations, Hume answers that they are copies of similar impressions only. He devotes all the efforts of his criticism to the notion of Causality and the explanation of its origin. To him, this idea like all others, arises from sensations. Experience teaches us that one billiard-ball communicates motion to another upon impulse and that the latter moves in a certain direction. We have no a priori knowledge either of the movement or of the direction of the movement. Between what we call the cause and what we call the effect there is no necessary connection that could ever be discovered a priori. The effect is totally different from the cause, and consequently can never be discovered in it. The mind can never possibly find the effect in the supposed cause, by the most accurate scrutiny and examination. The idea of Cause is no exception to the rule according to which all our ideas arise from sensation.

We get the idea of cause by custom or habit. We are accustomed to seeing certain events in constant conjunction. When one particular species of event has always, in all instances, been conjoined with another, we make no longer any scruple of foretelling one upon the appearance of the other. We observe that ~~that~~ there is a constant connection between heat & flame and we are accustomed to infer the existence of one from the existence of the other. We then call the one object, cause, the other, effect. We suppose that there is some connection between them.

Hume fully realised the force of the

belief in a necessary connection between cause & effect. But this was, according to Hume, after all only a belief. To him, such a connection could be no better than a subjective tendency, a figment of the mind. The mind could never discern a necessary connection between the two.

Afterwards, the writer brings in what Kant means by causation. According to him, the principle of causality is a priori, innate, anterior to all impressions.

The President, in his speech, made a comprehensive review of the philosophy taught by Hume, pointed out its merits and demerits and lastly estimated its position in the history of European philosophy.

O. S. Shukla  
President:

27. 11. 29

S. A. Inam Mahroof  
Secy: Philosophy Section

## The <sup>11</sup>sixth meeting.

The sixth meeting of the philosophy Seminar was held on the 27th ~~ultimo~~ <sup>November</sup>, 1939, under the presidency of Dr. P. D. Shastri. In the meeting a paper on "Science and Religion" was read by Mr. Joytee Prasanna Mullick.

The essayist begins his paper by tracing the history and the cause of the conflict that exists between science and religion. The relation between science & religion, as it exists to-day is one of conflict and antagonism. It is generally held that the findings of science are subversive of religion; that a scientific conception of the world leaves no room for religion. In the middle ages the conflict was even sharper. But among the primitive men we find no traces of such an antagonism. With the gradual development of mind there came into existence a division of labour in man's mental activities and the different aspects of reality came to be studied from different standpoints. According to the writer, 'This clash is a sign that there are wider truths and finer prospects within which a reconciliation of a deeper religion & a subtle science will be found.'

The conflict between science and religion arose out of a confusion as to their respective viewpoints and provinces. The business of science is to study the facts of nature as they actually are. Judgments of facts form its subject matter. But religion looks upon facts from a different angle of vision. It is an outcome of man's endeavour to find out the value & meaning of the facts of experience. Religion deals with judgments of value. But often they have intruded upon each other's territory & have caused confusion. Religion has intruded upon the field of science by attempting to give a factual explanation of experience whereas science has also retaliated by invading the province of religion by way of explaining away the very significance of a religious evaluation of reality. If this distinction between their viewpoints is maintained, there is no chance of a conflict between them.

Thus, on the surface they differ and they are to maintain this difference. But at bottom they owe <sup>almost</sup> a common origin and for their completion they are to depend on each other. The beginning of science was found in religion. Religious teachers were called upon to explain the phenomena of the universe and they did so by means of mythology. Mythology may be said to be the first science. Science to be satisfactory must depend upon religion. Science itself depends upon faith which is a religious attitude of the mind. There are several points-

at which science must depend on faith. Scientists must have belief in their own faculties. Further the scientist proceeds upon faith in the uniformity and rationality of nature and the ultimate unity of the world. The scientist try to connect all the phenomena of the universe with some supreme principle. This effort of science, turns out to be a religious effort.

Again, religion also takes the help of science. By intuition we may have certain amount of contact with the divine; but we must put the religious feeling into a scientific form. Scientific formulation of religious faith is also necessary to avoid the emotional type of religion.

If we can realise & appreciate their respective tasks, their close relationship & their mutual dependence, we will be able to see <sup>them</sup> as friends & not as enemies. As knowledge advances science ceases to scoff at religion and religion ceases to growl on science. Then they will dwell in peace & goodwill. They will mutually illustrate the wisdom, the power & grace of God. Then we will realise that an apparent clash of doctrine is not a disaster - it is an opportunity. The president in his speech made a review of the whole situation <sup>with points</sup> and dealt like whether they give rise to any conflict or not or whether they can ultimately shake hands with each other or not.

P. S. Shastri  
President:  
14.12.39

S. A. Inam Mahomed.  
Secy: Philosophy Seminar



III

Enter here the minutes  
of the Seminar meeting held  
on the 14<sup>th</sup> Dec. 1909

\_\_\_\_\_

WJF

7<sup>th</sup> meeting

\_\_\_\_\_

14<sup>th</sup> Dec. 1909

8<sup>th</sup> March

5<sup>th</sup> March 1940

*[Faint handwritten mark]*

*[Faint handwritten notes]*

2. March 1840  
2. March 1840

Session 1940 - 41

President - Dr. N. K. Brahma

Secretary - Gouri Sankar Bhattacharya

16th Aug  
1940.

## The first meeting

The first meeting was held on the 16th August 1940, with Dr. Borkma on the chair. Mr. Gouri Sankar Bhattacharyya of the IVth yr. class read a paper on 'The place of feeling in religion'. Honours Students of the 3rd year and the 4th yr classes joined the meeting.

The paper began with a brief survey of the history and severeness of the Conflict between Feeling and Reason contending for the place of exclusive religious faculty. Indeed, the one-sidedness of the Conflict has to some extent obscured, for the posterity, the proper Antithesis of both the faculties in religious Consciousness. ~~It~~ <sup>It</sup> then expounded and criticised in quite an elaborate manner the main arguments put forward by ~~both~~ the opposite parties. In conclusion the ~~essayist~~ <sup>essayist</sup> conceded certain amount of truth to the position of ~~the latter~~ the parties. The root of the Conflict, according to him, lay in failing to notice the psychological interdependence of feeling and reason as the ~~main~~ <sup>main</sup> motive force of an objective enterprise. ~~Feeling~~ <sup>Feeling</sup> has a position of central and indispensable in religion but it lacks objectivity and universality. Reason, on the other hand, though an universal element in human Consciousness, lacks that personality and intimacy which is the very ~~essence~~ <sup>essence</sup> of religious Communion. So their relation is not ~~one~~ of mutual Conflict but of mutual Cooperation instead of antagonism, they should supplement each other, ~~in the~~ in the constitution of religious Consciousness.

After appreciating the high standard ~~and~~ of the paper and the sincere labours of the essayist, the president pointed out that the only defect of the paper is that after reading ~~the~~ <sup>it</sup> on the value of the paper we cannot be sure whether the essayist sides with the intellectualists or with the exponents of feeling. In places, however, he has given his preference for feeling but the arguments for the cause of reason also are ~~so~~ <sup>much</sup> strong ~~as the~~ <sup>enough</sup> ~~others~~. He has, however, suggested a harmonious blending and mutual Cooperation, but the value of the paper would

have been very much heightened, had he been able  
to ~~through~~ throw some light as to how that cooperation  
is to be effected. The standpoint of Indian philosophy  
on this issue is clear enough. The task of reason is  
to purify our beliefs and practices - our feeling in  
a word, but it is ~~not~~ <sup>sincere</sup> feeling, or devotion that paves  
for knowledge. Intellect can rationalise our experiences  
but for the materials and the inner urge we must  
go to feeling and will. As a by-issue of the discussion  
Mr. Jambhikar of the IVth yr. class questioned the validity  
of the rational method as the method of philosophical  
enquiry. But the president clearly pointed out  
that if reason does not guide us in our quest for  
knowledge we can only take resort to the position  
of the agnostics which is nothing short of suicidal.  
The meeting then concluded with the declaration of  
the topic for <sup>the</sup> next discussion.

Gouri Sankar Bhattacharyya  
Secy. Phil. Seminar.

M. K. M. S.  
President.

7th Sept.  
1940.

The second meeting

The second meeting of the Philosophy Seminar came off on the 7th September, 1940. Dr. G. R. Chakraverty kindly took the chair. Mr. H. A. Jammal of the fourth year class read a paper on "The Conception of Substance and Modes in Spinoza".

The essayist began with a brief exposition of the particular status and standpoint of Spinoza in the whole history of philosophy. The essay was a thorough one touching all the relevant points - How Spinoza defines his substance and how does he come down to attributes and modes. He points out how this rigid definition of the attributes has given rise to various controversies in different ages and different spheres. He, however, preferred the idealistic interpretation.

Coming down to modes he showed that the relation of substance and modes involves an inherent flaw in Spinoza's system. While treating of substance Spinoza makes it all inclusive but while accounting for the existence of the finite world he, in quite a different vein, seems to admit independent reality of the modes themselves. These two conflicting tendencies in his philosophy create immense difficulties in the way of calling Spinoza a Pantheist. The introduction of the 'infinite modes' to bridge the gulf between substance and the modes is also a futile attempt. In conclusion he asserted that many of these controversies are due to the geometrical method, Spinoza adopted for his exposition of the system. On this point Gaurisankar Bhattacharya of the 4th year class raised a question whether our 'method' was responsible for the chasm between the substance and modes in Spinoza's system.

The president began by praising the essay for its comprehensive character. He then pointed out that no man can completely shake off the prevailing convictions of his own time. Spinoza was largely influenced by his age in the matter of adopting the analytical method and the method by itself cannot be ~~deprived~~ blamed. But while criticising the system of any philosopher we must take care to look into

him in his own place. It is not fair to criticize  
Spinoza from the ultra-modern standpoint. About the  
difficulty of reconciling the modes and substance, in  
Spinoza we must also take into account the serious  
nature of the problem. If Spinoza had not been able  
to make a happy reconciliation, it is largely a question,  
whether anyone else has achieved the result.

The meeting then concluded with a vote of thanks  
to the Chair.

Gouribankar Bhattacharya  
Secy. Phil. Seminar

V. K. ...  
President



14th Dec  
1940

## The Third meeting

The third general meeting of the philosophy seminar came off on the 14th December with Dr. R. K. Bohman on chair. Mr. Sandesh Kumar Samant of the Third Year class read a paper on 'Science and Philosophy'.

The essay dealt with some of the main points in the controversy in a short compass. Philosophy and science had a common origin and their final aim also is not very different but their differ in their method of procedure. But unless we have a clear and exact conception of the nature of both philosophy and science, one may be apt to believe that there is a sort of antagonism between them, that philosophy is no more necessary in addition to science. The essayist ~~stated~~ <sup>referred</sup> to the definition of Herbert Spencer and also to Paulsen's clear statement of the respective viewpoints of both the fields of enquiry. Science is partial and analytic; it makes ~~an~~ arbitrary sections and confines the whole of its endeavor to these special compartments only. But reality is not a conglomeration of isolated sections. So philosophy aims with a synthetic and comprehensive outlook to evaluate the results of the sciences in their proper context of reality. Philosophy rises out of science for the latter leaves some unexplained assumptions which philosophy takes up for explanation. But philosophy, in its own, cannot be independent of

Science; for science supplies the materials which only can philosophy evaluate and interpret.

The essay was rather too short and its shortness had resulted in some inherent defects in the development of points. As the President pointed out, the essayist had referred to the strife between science and philosophy without adequately describing the proper nature of the strife. The essay contained some harsh remarks too, one of which ~~is~~ was in connection with the definition of Herbert Spencer which was rather unjustly and hastily criticised. In spite of the evidences of immature reflection here and there, the essay on the whole was a good one.

*M. K. ...*

Gouri Sankar Bhattacharya  
Secy. Philo Seminar

The Fourth meeting.

Session - 1941 - 42  
President - Dr. K. K. Brahma  
Secretary - Mr. Santosh Kumar Samanta

The Proceedings of

The <sup>First</sup> ~~Fourth~~ meeting

Date - 19<sup>th</sup> Feb. '41.

Subject - 'Introspection - a method of Psychology'

Essayist - Mr. Sitanshu Bhuson Das.

President - ~~Dr. J. K. Chakravarty~~  
Dr. J. K. Chakravarty.

<sup>first inaugural</sup>  
The ~~4<sup>th</sup>~~ meeting of the Seminar came off on 19<sup>th</sup> Feb. '41 with Dr. J. K. Chakravarty in the chair. Mr. Sitanshu Bhuson Das read a paper entitled 'Introspection - a method of Psychology'.

- What the paper says:

The essayist at the outset dealt elaborately with the distinction of Psychology from other sciences of study. Then he referred to Introspection as the central time-honoured method in psychology. It is the problem on which almost the whole realm of psychological speculation rests. Then with the development of science, human mind began to turn towards the mechanical explanation of the world and discovered the behaviouristic method as the method which can only be practical in the psychological study. Then the <sup>essayist</sup> develops

the behavioristic method and tries to find out where Watson is in error. The essayist says that Behaviorism refers to the symbols of internal processes. But in many ~~we~~ instances we are liable to fall in error if we interpret the internal process through the external behaviour. As for example shedding of tears is generally the indication of sorrow, but the man in question may not be afflicted with grief but overpowered with joy that excites his tears. So herein lies a defect of behaviourism that cannot make an accurate study of subjective / mental processes.

Secondly, can behaviourism do without introspection? Behaviourism is the external manifestation of internal processes of mind. So it is through mind that we can have a correct study of other's mind. Thus after a brief exposition of the merit of introspective study the essayist turns to show the defects inhering. He refers to Comte. "In order to observe its own action it is necessary that mind should pause from activity; yet it is the train of activity that is to be observed." (Maudsley)

This argument rests on the assumption that human mind is incapable of simultaneous attention to two things (mental process and the object). But the solution may be had in the line that all retrospection is introspection.

Then the essayist stresses on the point that physical or experimental processes must have introspection for its basis; for without it ~~is~~ no perception of the mental processes is possible and as there is a close resemblance between the two processes above, one kind cannot do without the other. Then again introspection overshoots the experimental method in the qualitative aspect. Stout says what is required to remedy the difficulty of introspection is alertness and perpetual readiness. The essayist pointed out that Emmanuel Kant was mistaken when the philosopher said that his empirical psychology was on the observation of <sup>not</sup> self but of others. The essayist says that mind itself has the prerogative of observing its processes; only it requires a gradual tactful practice.

In conclusion, he pointed out the future glory and immense possibilities of discoveries ~~to~~ in Psychology lie in the combination and co-ordination of all methods.

When the essayist led his article to a finish, the paper was thrown open in the house for a critical examination. Mr. J. Saha said that the essayist did overlook certain points while referring to the demerits of introspection. He pointed out that it is introspection that has brought many objections to psychology as a science. The introspective study cannot

establish a general science of mind.  
Secondly, consciousness is not always reliable  
eg. madman's delusion. Mr. S. K. Samanta  
thanked the essayist for his elaborate discussion  
of the subject but he said that the essayist  
while dealing with the subject has been more  
a Reader of experimental psychology. He  
ought to have given more stress on the  
subject itself. Secondly, he has wasted three-  
fourths of the paper to picture the background  
that the subject itself. Mr. Madan Lal Jain  
pointed out that the essayist has an eye only  
for the facts but not for ~~the~~ the order and symmetry  
in systematisation. It was a bright vehement  
debate on the subject and a burning discussion.

The President, last of all, gave a gist  
of the paper and the criticism it embraced. He  
remarked that the paper was indeed a good  
one; but the essayist was very quick and indistinct  
in his articulation; otherwise, ~~it~~ it would have  
attracted a better appreciation.

It was a fairly large gathering.  
Most of the philosophy students both of the Presidency  
and the Sanskrit College were present.

Then, Mr. S. K. Samanta, the Secretary of the  
Seminar, begged to be allowed to express his heartiest  
thanks to the chair and to the essayist and  
the meeting of the ~~fourth~~ <sup>five</sup> day came to a decent  
finish.

29<sup>th</sup> Feb. '41  
Presidency College  
Calcutta

S. K. Samanta  
Secretary.

N. B. Chatterjee  
President.

29.2.41



26<sup>th</sup> July '41

Farewell of Prof. Bhattacharya.

Under the auspices of the Philosophy Seminar a farewell meeting of Prof. U.C. Bhattacharya was held on Saturday, the 26<sup>th</sup> July, 1941. Principal B.M. Sen took the chair. It was a fairly large gathering <sup>in which</sup> most of the philosophy and logic students of the college participated. The garlanding over, the ~~Principal~~ Secretary read out the farewell address presented to Prof. Bhattacharya. Then the Principal spoke eloquently about the behaviour and sincerity of Prof. Umesh Chandra both as a college colleague and a teacher. Dr. N. X. Brahma, Dr. D. K. Chakravarty and Prof. Biju all spoke on the activities of Prof. Bhattacharya and highly admired him for his popularity among students. Among the students Mr. Kalyan Dutt and Mr. Amlan Dutt of the second year class spoke. Then Prof. Bhattacharya gave a brief sketch of his professorial life and emotionally described what a strong love students bore for him. Then the Secretary of the Seminar after a short speech on the activities and achievements of Prof. Bhattacharya thanked the chair, the professors and the students present.

A group photo was taken and there was a hearty refreshment amongst the seminar students, the professors including.

# The Proceedings of the Second Meeting

Date - 15<sup>th</sup> August '41  
Subject - "The Idea of Truth"  
Essayist - Mr. Santosh Kumar Samanta  
President - Dr. J. K. Chatterjee, N.K. Brikma  
M.A., P.R.S. P.I.

The second meeting of the philosophy seminar was held on Friday, the 15<sup>th</sup> August 1941, at the residence of Dr. N. K. Brikma, presiding. The essayist at the outset tried to show the idea of truth as advocated by different cults of rationalism, empiricism, intuitionism, mysticism, realism and idealism. Then he proceeded to establish how knowledge is possible, how truth, knowledge and reality imply each other. Then the author expounded different ~~conce~~ theories of truth. The Correspondence theory going to show the correspondence between ideas and things fails down. According to Berkeley, mental things must resemble mental and thus the coherence theory appears. The truth of judgment depends upon the its consistency with other judgments. This theory is mostly applicable in our everyday life. To supplement this theory we require the help of self-evident theory. As the theory of coherence can not give us any definite standards we must take certain self-evident postulates as fundamental truths. The essayist further analysed the other things e.g. the

pragmatic theory, and showed how  
pragmatism, bitterly criticised the absolute  
or self-evidence theory as nothing better  
than the holiday give, the banister of cosmic  
fear.

In critically examining the paper Mr. Sitabdar  
Shyam Das said that the author failed to  
make any reference to the theory of creative  
evolution of Bergson and ~~also~~ also could not  
establish any satisfactory conclusion with  
regard to the theories.

The president, had said in a brief  
and nice speech opinion that the author  
ought to have established his own view  
with regard to the theories. The agreement  
between ideas, he said, is as much  
necessary as a standard to provide a  
firm footing. So in his opinion the theory  
of Bergson supported by the self-evidence theory  
ought to be the best one. Apart from  
these ~~points~~, the paper was well written.  
Thus ended the president.

It was a fairly large gathering in  
which both third year and fourth year  
Honours men were present. The president  
proposed that the paper must be written at least  
seven days before the seminar meeting  
so that students may find time to read the  
paper and properly criticise it. The proposal  
was accepted and thanking the president  
and students present by the seminar secretary, the  
meeting ~~is~~ ended.

S. S. Das  
Secy.

M. K. Das  
President

# The Proceedings of The Third Meeting

Date - 25<sup>th</sup> November '41.

Subject - Knowledge of the External world  
in the light of modern philosophy

President - Prof. N. K. Brahma. P.R.S., P.S.

Essayist - Mr. Santosh Kumar Samanta

The third meeting of the Philosophy Seminar was held on Tuesday, 25<sup>th</sup> Nov '41. Dr. N. K. Brahma was in the chair. Mr. S. K. Samanta of the Fourth year class read the paper entitled 'Knowledge of the External world in the light of modern philosophy'.

The essayist at the outset tried to give some hint of the line of ancient thought mainly of Plato, and Aristotle to show how they viewed the problem at issue. To Plato real knowledge is knowledge of the Absolute Idea. The external world as we see before our eyes everyday is only the phenomenal aspect of what the Reality is. And this phenomenal representation is nothing but an illusion. We human beings are 'as it were imprisoned' within the walls of illusions. These illusions ~~is~~ being removed, we will find that what was inert matter to us is nothing but an objective kingdom of ideas of which the Supreme is the Absolute One. Aristotle on the other hand modifies Plato's doctrine on the ground that Plato

has overlooked. The importance of the phenomenal aspect and has been one-sided. A full view of Reality gives as much importance on the phenomena as on the noumena. While the phenomenal or the The Common-sense world before our eyes supplies us the matter, the non-mental aspect of Reality gives us the form. Matter is as much necessary for form as form for matter. Neither of them can be abstracted.

Then the essayist dwelt briefly on the point how the transitional philosophy came and philosophy veered through another channel. Descartes was the real founder of modern philosophy. According to his opinion, Knowledge of the external world is purely commonsense knowledge. Which knowledge of God and the comes to us as a ready-made clear distinct innate idea in the self. Knowledge of the external world is of a different character. It is forced from an external agency into the self. This has empirical reality and is ~~knowledge~~ known as the factitious idea. This idea has a lesser degree of reality than the innate idea. While the innate idea is our ~~knowledge~~ own the factitious idea is external and awaits the correspondance-relation.

Locke while explaining the philosophy of Descartes ~~found~~ <sup>found</sup> some difficulty.

According to Locke, knowledge implies agreement or disagreement of ideas in the mind and so knowledge depends on the ideas not on the external objects. On the other hand he maintains that knowledge is only possible through sense experience. According to common sense ideas are the media through which we have knowledge of reality but according to Locke, we know the ideas themselves. Locke could not overcome this difficulty because of the duality of mind and matter.

This has been, however, explained by Berkeley who holds that the materialistic hypothesis is superficial and unnecessary. There is nothing as matter. This is only a conventional invention from language. The thing exists in its being perceived. Johnson however challenged this argument. He kicked the stone and said, 'it is here'. Hume carried this conclusion to its extreme logical consequence. He opined that all that we have through experience has mere probability. Though mathematical knowledge has apodictic certainty, it cannot give us synthetic knowledge.

Hume's conclusion aroused Kant from his dogmatic slumber of the omnipotence of reason. He made a critical analysis of reason through reason in order to find out its nature and limits to which knowledge can be extended. Kant's method is critical idealism or transcendental idealism or formal idealism as against empirical or material idealism and transcendental realism. Kant's merit lay in proving the a priori elements of cognition in space and time and conceive them as formal intuitions. Knowledge of external objects is possible through the interaction of the subject and the object.

Here perhaps cannot furnish knowledge. The  
transcendental scheme must co-ordinate and  
arrange in order the sense-intuitions. Kant  
is an empiricist, and a critical philosopher  
in discovering the limits of reason to provide us  
with the knowledge of the external world or the  
phenomenal reality; and again he is an  
idealist in discovering the super-subject, or  
the transcendent in the transcendental unity  
of apperception and a rationalist in fixing  
the importance of the ideas of reason in his  
Transcendental Dialectic. Here the essayist  
found scope to wind up his essay.

The paper was criticised by Mr. S. Das  
and certain points for elaboration were  
suggested. The president of the Seminar, as  
usual made a very learned remark that  
the Seminar paper must be more original.  
It must be written in an easy, facile  
fashion to be understood by non-philosophy students.  
He further criticised the paper on the ground  
that the paper ought to have embraced the  
doctrines of the post-Kantian philosophers, and specially  
the philosophers of the 20th Century world.  
The gathering though not a very  
fascinating one was one to be remembered.  
The meeting ended after the speech  
of the President.

1.41  
President of the Seminar

S. S. Sanyal  
Secretary

1877  
See also the ...  
... ..



Secretary of State  
Washington, D.C.

Session 1943-44

President - Professor Nalinikanta Brahma, M.A., B.S.,  
Ph.D.,

Secretary - ~~Mr. J. K. Das~~

Secretary - Mr. Jatil Kumar Mookherjee  
Jadhav N. H. H.

Session - 1943-'44 .  
President - Dr. N.K. Dasgupta, M.A., Ph.D.)

Secretary - Mr. Jatal Gopal Mukherjee  
4<sup>th</sup> yr. B.A. Class,  
1944.

Date - March 24, 1944

Subject - Rationality in Religion

Essayist - Mr Anil Kumar Mookerjee

President - Dr. N. K. Brahma, M.A., P.R.S., Ph.D.

The first meeting was held on the 24th Mar  
1944

As this was the first meeting of the session the president invited the essayist for reading his paper "Rationality in Religion".

Following is a brief summary of the proceedings:-

Reason and religion are not at loggerheads with each other as the religious jurists demand. The objections of the religious dogmatists are based on the misapprehension of the function of reason in religion. Or in other words, of the end aimed at by a philosophy of religion. Philosophy or reason merely justifies a faith by finding out its criterion, but does not itself reveal the truth. Intuition is what first leads to the beliefs which subsequent reason confirms or confirms. Reason is a harmonious controlling force rather than a creative one. But the religious dogmatists do not or rather cannot see through the logic of the ~~Statesman~~ statements, and they are therefore dead against, admitting any activity of reason in religion. The ~~constructs~~ of religion which reason does not understand nor is capable of understanding is 'blind'. But those, who are of opinion that <sup>reason</sup> cannot have any place or function in <sup>religion</sup> advanced some such objections as are presented

(1) Human knowledge is relative and finite,

(2) Religious knowledge is intuitive;

and (3) Religious knowledge is revealed.

But an examination of each of the objections, the essayist pointed out that none of them stands close examination. Human knowledge is not fully confined within the limits of finitude and relativity; there is a potential infinitude involved in the nature of mind. The idea of intuition and revelation is not exclusive of reason; but on the contrary they are inseparable without any reference to reason. Religion is based on man's intelligent nature and hence man as a rational self-conscious being, ~~has~~ <sup>does</sup> feel the necessity of religion.

Mr Amarendra ~~was~~ Sengupta of the Economics Honours class participated in the discussion and thanked the writer of the essay.

Mr Ashok Chandra Banerjee of the History Honours class also participated in the discussion and after thanking the essayist, said, "that religion is a vague term. It has been used by so many nations of the world in so many senses. He ~~was~~ was not sure whether all religion is based on reason."

Mr Jatil Kumar Mookerjee of the Philosophy Honours class joined the discussion and ~~stated~~ said that Philosophy and Religion the relation between Philosophy and Religion is a very close one. He ~~stated~~ Mr Mookerjee pointed out that there are two avenues which lead us to that ultimate goal: (1) one is the way of Philosophy or reason and (2) the other is the way of religion. Although the way and aims and objects of both Philosophy and religion are same, yet their approach

in each these of Caste. Philosophy approaches the Absolute slowly step by step and realises the Absolute with its gradual thought-process, while Religion <sup>reaches</sup> takes a tremendous flight and realises the <sup>Absolute</sup> in some super-human experience - by being identified with it. Mr. Mookjee said nothing against the essayist, save on the seems point (that religion's knowledge is not intuitive). He emphasised this point and said that Absolute can best be realised in intuition and intuition alone. By reason we

can know <sup>it</sup> the appearance of a thing and at best with which it is alike. But the thing-in-itself the intrinsic value of a thing can best ~~only~~ be known only when we <sup>to</sup> the subjects, completely identify ourselves with the object. He referred to the French philosopher Bergson in order to support his position.

Mr. Sushir Banerjee of Economic Honours class stressed that religion is more concerned with the uplift of mind than with that of body.

Mr. S. H. Huda Khan of History Honours class said that reason has a place - a very prominent place in religion.

Then the President in <sup>the</sup> fine and eloquent language showed the relationship that exists between these two <sup>the meeting</sup> ~~concepts~~. The meeting <sup>and the meeting</sup> came to a close with a vote of thanks to the chair.

J. Comookjee  
Secy.

President -

Second meeting

Date - July 22, 1944, (Saturday)

Time - 1-45 Pm.

Subject - The relation of Philosophy to Science.

Essayist - Mr. Jatal Kumar Mookerjee

President - Prof. N. K. Brahma, M. A., P.R.S., Ph. D.

The second meeting of the Philosophy Seminar was held on Saturday, July 22, 1944 at 1-45 Pm under the presidency of Prof. N. K. Brahma. The essayist was Mr. Jatal Kumar Mookerjee of the 4th yr. Arts class.

The essayist read out his paper before the audience his lucid exposition and elaborate discussion of the relation between philosophy and Science. The contents of the essay may be summed up thus:

To define Philosophy is a difficult task. The nature of philosophy lies in its procedure. Philosophy studies the nature of the ultimate reality. Science, he defined, as a systematic study of a particular department of reality. Science is partial, Philosophy is complete. Sciences are partially unified knowledge, Philosophy is completely unified knowledge. Science studies different branches of phenomena reality, but philosophy studies the reality as a whole and as such it cannot spin out the results and conclusions reached by the different sciences by keeping itself in a dark room away from the world of experience. Philosophy thus is the sum total of all scientific results. The objection

he anticipated in his essay, that such philosophy is not possible for it is a difficult task to construct such a system of philosophy. The objection was met for historical perspective

as well as from the traditional points of view.

Mr. Anil Kumar Mookerjee of the fourth year philosophy Honors class participated in the discussion, and he was on first point he offered sincere thanks to the essayist for his ~~scholarly~~ <sup>scholarly</sup> treatment of the subject. On a particular point he said a word or two by way of elaboration and expansion. The definition of philosophy, according to him, is more misleading than illuminating. If philosophy were nothing more than the adding together of all the results of the various sciences, this would make philosophy coincide with reasoning from parts to whole, to the exclusion of the reasoning from the whole to parts, by which alone the work can be fully understood.

Then, he dwelt on the point of interdependence between philosophy and science and acknowledging the amount of debt ~~the~~ <sup>philosophy</sup> philosophy owes to science, tries to remove the ~~debt~~ <sup>debt</sup> ~~error~~ <sup>error</sup> dreadful ignorance that is not infrequently found in the common run of people with the help of some concrete examples.

An inquisitive student of the third yr. class put forward a question "with a view to knowing if inductive logic was in anyway related to philosophy?"

In fine, ~~then~~ the president made an enlightened discussion on the subject in such a way as to enable the non-philosophy students to ~~find~~ <sup>find</sup> much interest in the subject. He dwelt ~~on~~ <sup>mainly</sup> on the practical aspect of philosophy in order to remove the wrong notion of the non-philosophers. His discussion was highly appreciated by all students, philosophic and non-philosophic.

After offering thanks to all, the meeting came to a ~~close~~ <sup>an</sup> end.

Anil Kumar Mookerjee  
Secretary

N. K. Mookerjee  
President



## Third meeting

Date - 19th August 1944

Time - 1-30 Pm.

Subject - Epistemology as a necessary introduction  
to Metaphysics

Essayist - Mr Jatil Kumar Mookerjee

President - Dr Jitendra Kumar Chakravarty,  
M.A., Ph.D.

The third meeting of the Seminar was held on Saturday, the 19th August, 1944 at - 1.30 Pm. under the presidency of Dr J.K. Chakravarty. The essayist was Mr Jatil Kumar Mookerjee of the 4th year Hons. Class.

The choice subject "Epistemology as a necessary introduction to Metaphysics" was <sup>meritoriously</sup> dealt with by the essayist. The following points constitute the substance of the essay: -

Emancipation in philosophy  
One peculiar feature of philosophy that strikes everyone is the absence of unanimity of view. ~~to the sphere of science~~ ~~there is~~ ~~no such~~ ~~anarchy~~ And it is this anarchy in philosophy that has justly evoked the Godsends condemnation of it by the sciences, where there is no such anarchy, no such antagonism. The question is, why is this <sup>disorderly</sup> anarchy in philosophy in spite of its being the oldest possible study? Earlier philosophers are all silent over this urgent problem. It is Doubt, who for the first time marks it and that is why he begins his system with his prima facie scepticism. But it is Locke in England and Immanuel Kant in Germany who give us a clear idea and thorough exposition of the subject.

The only instrument ~~and~~ ~~of~~ ~~philosophy~~ ~~is~~ ~~knowledge~~  
~~and~~ ~~the~~ ~~only~~ ~~instrument~~ ~~that~~ ~~belongs~~ ~~to~~ ~~philosophy~~  
Knowledge is the primary object of our philosophical

inquiries. To determine the limits, extent & validity of knowledge is the main problem in philosophy. And the consideration of this problem is the business of Epistemology, the actual problems of philosophy are the subject-matter of metaphysics, and these two taken together make up what are called philosophy.

Both Locke and Kant discussed that unanimity in Science is possible because it deals with sense-perceptible phenomena. If there is any such difference of opinion the unanimity is very soon reached by an appeal to sense-experience. Observation and Experiment constitute the basis of the Sciences. But philosophy deals with noumena. It deals with God, Soul, immortality-etc- or when it deals with more tangible things, like space, time, causality etc., it always looks to these in their noumenal aspects. So that in the case of any difference of opinion concrete phenomenal facts cannot assert as crucial correctives.

Both Locke and Kant held that knowledge is possible only if it refers directly or indirectly - the reference is direct in the case of perception and memory, and this reference is said to be indirect in inference, where we start not merely from sense-perceptible things as data but come to such things, as are believed to be sense-perceivable. (Cf. the example of fire and smoke on the hill). Sense-perception therefore is an indispensable condition of knowledge. This necessarily means that metaphysics which is concerned with noumena is impossible, for the noumena cannot be sense-perceived. It is not Locke, but Kant and other Empiricists who avoided the problem without any amount of reservation.

The special feature of Kantian epistemology lies in this: Although sense-perceivability is a necessary condition of knowledge theoretical knowledge, and metaphysics of the super-sensuous which cannot be a body of theoretical knowledge, yet it cannot on that ground be urged that metaphysics is an impossibility. Kant proposes to show that theoretically

it is a body of necessary beliefs, which can neither be proved nor can be disproved, that its validity is guaranteed by our practical faith. Such metaphysics is valid only in the context of morality.

Kant makes this position clearer by distinguishing two features in our ordinary phenomenal experience: one feature is the sense given elements and the other feature is the necessary relation among the sense given. These necessary relations are a priori, which are absolutely certain.

*[Faint, illegible handwriting, likely bleed-through from the reverse side of the page.]*

# The Proceedings of the Fourth ~~Seminar~~ Meeting

The fourth meeting under auspices of the Philosophy Seminar was held on Thursday, 10 September, 1944, at in the Physics Theatre at 4-30 P.M. Mahamahopadhyaya Pandit Jogendranath Vedantacharya of the Calcutta University was the principal speaker and Mr A.K. Choudhary, Principal of the College, was in the chair. The ~~whole~~ of the ~~town~~ Staff and Students of the College were present on the occasion.

The ~~subject~~ following in the substance of the topic of discussion ~~is~~  
"The Ancient Indian Culture":-

The speaker dwelt on the subject from various stand-points, so as to bring into bold relief the various ~~features~~ features of Indian glory and pride. He touched ~~upon~~ upon the subject in all its aspects - political, economic, religious and philosophical. As to political aspect he said that India was not in any way inferior to any of the politically advanced countries of ancient times. ~~It is still~~ ~~unparalleled~~. As regards economic conditions of the country he ~~tried~~ tried to show the richness and grandeur of ~~ancient~~ the ancient Indian Kings and Emperors with illustrative quotations from the Mahabharata. So far as the religious ~~life~~ life of the people was concerned, he said that they were much ~~more~~ advanced and there <sup>was</sup> a unique combination and harmony of the two opposite qualities i.e., Renunciation and Enjoyment; in ~~ancient~~ the religious life of the people. Enjoyment was not an end in itself, but through enjoyment they tried <sup>to</sup> attain the bliss of Renunciation and emancipation. Finally the speaker came to deal with the philosophic culture and development of ancient India. India was not only an abode of politics, economics, ~~and~~ religion, but also the seat of <sup>spiritual</sup> learning and erudition. Philosophy was the breath and being of India. The Vedantic philosophy is ~~not~~ only the pride not only of India but it ~~has~~ ~~been~~ ~~receiving~~ ~~Commendations~~ ~~much~~ ~~respect~~ ~~and~~ ~~admiration~~ ~~from~~ ~~all~~ ~~quarters~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~globe~~. <sup>other</sup>

Prof. N.K. Brahmachari M.A., P.R.S., Ph.D., President of the Philosophy Seminar, ~~has~~ dwelt upon ~~the~~ more elaborately the religious

side <sup>of the people of</sup> ancient India and ~~was~~ regretted to say that the unique  
virtue <sup>of</sup>  $\frac{1}{3}$ , a perfect and harmonious combination of the two opposite  
conflicting qualities ~~of~~ renunciation and enjoyment, which  
~~was~~ ~~present~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~life~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~ancients~~, was wonderfully  
present in the life of the ancients, is ~~but~~ almost lacking in the life  
of the modern people.

Then Prof. Brahma on behalf of the Philosophy Seminar  
forwarded his heartfelt thanks to the speaker, ~~and~~ to Principal  
A.K. Chanda, and to the Staff and Students of the College, who  
were kind enough to present themselves on the occasion.

Jatil Kumar Mookijee  
Secretary.

President

# Proceedings of the fifth Meeting.

Date - November 17, 1944.

Time - 3-30 Pm.

Subject - The Problem of Truth

Essayist - Mr Anil Kumar Mookerjee

President - Prof. N. K. Brahma, M.A., P.D.C., Ph.D.

The fifth meeting of the Seminar was held on Friday, ~~September~~ November, 1944 at 3.30 Pm. under the Presidentship of Prof. N. K. Brahma, M.A., Ph.D., the essayist was Mr Anil Kumar Mookerjee of the Fourth year Honours Class.

The subject was ably dealt with by ~~the~~ the essayist. The ~~fall~~ salient features of the essay are noted below:—  
Truth is said to be the be-all and end-all of all science and philosophy. But there is no unanimity as to the definition of truth. What is truth? is a perplexing question of all times and climes. Various theories such as Correspondence, Coherence, Pragmatism etc. have been propounded with a view to determining the nature and criterion of truth. After attempting a brief discussion of all these theories the essayist comes to maintain that ~~all~~ these theories are on the same level of validity and utility so far as the relative and hum-drum truths are concerned. In practical life we apply ~~cannot strictly~~ ~~confine~~ ourselves to the application of only one theory in complete indifference to, and <sup>total</sup> rejection of, the other theories. But the philosophers ~~that~~ are not satisfied with the solution of the problems and difficulties that a theory or theories can offer. But they ~~are~~ are bent upon knowing the intrinsic nature and essence of truth. In the east as well as in the west there has been much speculation on the problem. In the west we find Descartes advocating the self-evidence theory of truth. Truth is that which is intuitively known and is most clear

and distinct. There must not be any element of vagueness and indistinctness in what is really true. Therefore reason is the reliable instrument that can provide us with truth. We commit error when and in so far as we are overpowered and stultified by ~~desires~~ will. Will when instead of reason which is the most reliable apparatus of truth gets the upper hand, we cannot have an insight into truth clearly and distinctly. ~~So for us~~ So in order to obtain truth we are to fall back upon reason and its faithful guidance. This theory has been much misinterpreted and misunderstood by many thinkers, but the essayist is of opinion that this is the most theory that ~~can~~ enables us to ~~so~~ obtain that truth. Further when truth obtained can be verified and tested by Correspondence Coherence etc. Again in the east we find Samkhya

Again ~~in~~ enunciating the principle of non-contradiction & abēdha to be the test of truth, we can apply this principle to our phenomenal experiences in order to see whether we have attained truth.

Then Mr. Jatil Kumar Mookerjee took part in the discussion. After thinking the essayist he said that the essay was a good one. He said nothing in way of criticizing it but by appreciating his essay Mr. Mookerjee said a few points to make clear the current theories Correspondence, Coherence, Pragmatism etc., to the audience. He criticized the theory of Correspondence from the point of view of Joachim, which also he said, a criticism purely from Kantian stand-point. Again he criticized the essayist for saying that the problem of truth was no problem at all. It is the problem and the problem of all problems. He advocated the



Cherence theory.

Then other students of the Pan class took part in the discussion.

Then the president in a ~~few~~ neat, little speech gave out his views. He touched all the aspects of the problem and made it intelligible to all who were present. For want of time he was not able to discuss the Sayam Gokash theory of birth, which was postponed for a future date.

The meeting came to a close after offering thanks to the Chair and the students who were present on the occasion.

J. C. Mookerjee  
Secretary

President.

Proceedings of the Sixth meeting

~~Form~~  
Date - November 25, 1944

Time - 1-40 P.M.

Subject - Conception of Substance, attributes and Modes  
in Spinoza

Essayist - Mr Jotel Coomab Mookerjee

President - Prof. A. H. Abdul Bagi M.A.

The sixth meeting of the Philosophy Seminar was held on ~~the~~ Saturday, the 25th November, 1944, at 1-40 P.M. under the presidency of Prof. A. H. Abdul Bagi M.A. The essayist was Mr Jotel Coomab Mookerjee of the 4th Philosophy honours class.

The Subject was dealt with from various Stand. points. The following constitutes the salient features of the paper.

He began with the Conception of Substance. Substance in Spinoza is the be-all and end-all of everything. Substance is existence - ~~no~~ existence not as a property of the existent thing, but existence as such is existence not as an adjective but as a substantive. By Substance he means God. The essayist discussed the charge brought against Spinoza, that he was a atheist, a theist and all that. He ~~the~~ pointed out that Spinoza was a pantheist but he was not a pantheist of the low and degraded sense, because he did not wholly identify God with the Substance. He clearly distinguished between ~~Natura Naturata~~ ~~Natura Naturans~~ and ~~Natura Naturans~~. ~~Natura Naturans~~ in his God. He then discussed the Conception

of attributes in Spinoza. He started with the definition of Spinoza and raised the relevant question, that might crop up from such definition. The essayist rejected the interpretation of attributes made by Kinnoscher as false. He stated that such interpretation was wholly misleading and erroneous for, in Spinoza ~~temporal~~ force has no place. He rejected all question of temporality. Then the essayist came to deal with the modes of in Spinoza. He said that Negatively speaking it may be proved that Spinoza's are real as following what Spinoza has said it may be not very difficult to maintain their reality. But what sort of reality do these modes possess was a question that essayist discussed. Do they possess the same reality as the Substance? When this question is raised we cannot determine maintain that modes in Spinoza are real. For Modes are transient, ~~temporary~~, evanescent, they appear and disappear.

Then Mr Anil Kumar Mookajy took part in the discussion. He reviewed the <sup>whole</sup> subject entirely and criticized the essay, which ~~is~~ however were met with by the essayist.

Then the president began the discussion entirely ~~from a new point~~ and said that in Spinoza there flow only two currents of thought — one Jewish and the other mathematical. Then he said, that Spinoza had not specifically said as to the proper interpretation of Substance and attributes and modes and that is

why there are so many conflict, and absence of  
opinion and unanimity among the various  
interested.

The Secretary then forwarded <sup>his</sup> thanks to the  
president, to the students of ~~both~~ <sup>both</sup> years and the  
pass and honours classes of both the third year and  
fourth year classes and the meeting came to  
an end.

J. C. Mookerjee  
w  
Secret Secretary

A. P. P. P.  
President 16.12.1911

## Proceedings of the Seventh Meeting

A debate was held in the Seminar on December, 1944 ~~undertaken~~ with Prof. A. H. Abdul Bari M.A., in the Chair. The Subject for discussion was

"Pleasure as the ultimate goal of life." The Subject was an interesting one and the president invited Mr Jatil Kumar Mookerjee to speak in favour of the motion. Mr Mookerjee ~~read~~ ~~read~~ ~~his~~ ~~points~~ after giving a brief historical survey of the Subject, beginning from Aristippus of the Cyrenais down to the Timodens Mill, Bentham and Dr Sidgwick. Mr Then Mr Mookerjee Criticised the Criticisms ~~made~~ made by the Standard authors. The Conclusion was reached ~~by~~ that 'pleasure is the only for which we live - it may be animal sensual-pleasure, it may intellectual pleasure ~~etc~~ whatever may be, pleasure we want by all means. Mr Anil Kumar Mookerjee ~~supported~~ ~~at~~ ~~last~~ checked the rolling ball and Criticised Hedonism to his heart's Content.

Then the president made a fine discussion on the Subject and attempted a reconciliation of the two views propounded by the two speakers.

Jatil Kumar Mookerjee  
Secretary

President.

# Proceedings of the eighth meeting

Date — December 15, 1944

Time — 4-30 P.M.

Subject — The Philosophy of the Upanishads  
— Ancient and modern Views

Speaker — Mr. Basanta Kumar Chatterjee, M.A.  
Chief Auditor, E. I. Ry.

President — Prof. N. K. Brahma, M.A., Ph.D.,

The eighth and last meeting of the Session 1944-45 was held on ~~to~~ the 15<sup>th</sup> December, 1944 at 4-30 P.M. Mr. Basanta Kumar Chatterjee, M.A., of E. I. Ry. spoke on the 'Philosophy of the Upanishads'.

Mr. Chatterjee said that the Upanishads form the nuclei